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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on contemporary participatory performance in which 
participation is facilitated awkwardly, and in which awkward modes of 
participation are welcomed and encouraged. My use of the term ‘awkward’ 
here is not so much in reference to embarrassment, uneasiness, or social 
faux-par, though I do observe and critically respond to such phenomena 
throughout. Instead, the term ‘awkward’ is predominantly employed as an 
adjective in line with the dictionary definition ‘causing difficulty; hard to do or 
deal with’ or ‘not smooth or graceful; ungainly’. Such awkwardness is framed 
as productive because of its disruptive relation with the smooth running of 
inter-relational encounters. These disruptions, I argue, in turn encourage 
critical reflection on our co-presence with others without removing us from that 
co-presence. Thus it allows for necessary affective and critical work to occur 
within the participatory performance itself as opposed to being delegated to 
those not involved and encountering the performances through secondary 
sources.  
 
This focus on awkwardness in contemporary participatory performance occurs 
in response to what art critic Claire Bishop and others have defined as the 
‘Social Turn’ in art and performance. This ‘turn’ refers to the increased critical, 
curatorial and cultural attention given to socially engaged, participatory and 
relational art practices since the late 1990s. The key aim of this project is to 
refocus this attention onto practitioners that, in my reading, have a 
productively awkward relation with its rhetoric, ideologies and socio-politics. 
My approach to these practices is often supported by the writings of Slavoj 
Žižek, especially his employment and supplement of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. His theories of the ‘big Other’ and its ‘super-egoic 
injunctions’, of over-identification, of the ‘real’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ 
registers that structure our reality are worked-through as I develop my own 
theories of agency, reality and fantasy, desire, and socio-political efficacy 
through critical engagement with awkward participatory performance. 
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Preface  
The Role of Dyspraxia in this Thesis 
 
I am diagnosed as having dyspraxia and, according to my diagnostic report, 
have particular difficulties with executive functioning and imposing order on 
activities.1 Dyspraxia was formally known as ‘clumsy child syndrome’ and 
according to psychologist David Grant, clumsiness is its ‘most obvious 
aspect’.2 My own difficulties with planning and order lead to a visible 
clumsiness in terms of writing. I was diagnosed during my Masters as a 
consequence of tutors noticing issues around clarity and structure in essays, 
and the frequent occurrence of typographical errors. However, writing is not 
the only activity affected by my condition. Grant describes dyspraxia as a 
layering of a ‘small visible part’ and a ‘very considerable hidden portion’:3 
 
The visible part in the case of dyspraxia is the element of clumsiness 
and associated difficulties with motor coordination. The hidden aspect 
is the underlying difficulties with attention, memory and some tasks 
requiring perceptual skills.4 
 
In my experience, these ‘underlying aspects’ have the potential to cause 
awkwardness in social situations. The difficulties are accentuated due to the 
hidden nature of the disability. Problems arising from these aspects can be 
                                                
1 Mazahir Mohamedal, Working with Dyslexia: Dyslexia Assessment 
Consultancy, Confidential Diagnostic Assessment Report, 29th September 
2009. 
2 David Grant, ‘What is dyspraxia?’ in That’s the Way I think: Dyslexia, 
Dyspraxia and ADHD Explained (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 
pp. 50-64 (p. 50). 
3 Grant, p. 50. 
4 Grant, p. 50.  
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mistakenly perceived as a result of laziness, imperviousness or intentional 
antagonism. In her writing on dyspraxia in Neurodiversity in Higher Education: 
Positive Responses to Specific Learning Differences Sharon Drew addresses 
such challenges in relation to ‘certain learning situations’ that ‘can be difficult 
or uncomfortable’.5 Drew gives the example of difficulties in ‘participating in 
discussions’ which lead ‘to an apparent unwillingness to join in, or making 
contributions that do not seem relevent’.6 Drew’s reference to challenges in 
‘joining in’ demonstrates that there is a potentially awkward relationship 
between dyspraxia and participation. The word ‘awkward’ is apt here in 
relation to dyspraxia when defined, following the Oxford English Dictionary, in 
terms of a person who lacks ‘dexterity or skill in performing their part; clumsy 
in action, bungling’.7  
 
The aim of this preface is, firstly, to foreground the role of this awkwardness in 
terms of motivating and guiding my research and its methodologies. A key 
part of my research involves my own participation or collaboration in the 
projects and performances that I write about. Thus I briefly discuss the risk 
that, due to my dyspraxia, I bring the heightened potential for awkwardness 
with me. Secondly, this preface discusses the role of clumsy approaches to 
writing when documenting and reflecting upon experiences of awkward 
participatory performance. The preface is not, however, meant as an 
                                                
5 Sharon Drew, ‘Dyspraxia’, in Neurodiversity in Higher Education: Positive 
Responses to Specific Learning Differences (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2006), pp. 91-123 (p. 109). 
6 Drew, p. 109. 
7 ‘Awkward’, Oxford English Dictionary 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13971?redirectedFrom=awkward#eid, 
[accessed 10 December 2011]. 
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extended version of the ‘Specific Learning Difficulties Cover Note’ that 
accompanied the submission of this thesis, in which examiners are asked to 
‘mark exam scripts sympathetically, ignoring dyslexic/dyspraxic errors and 
focusing on content and understanding of the subject’.8 Rather than prompting 
‘sympathetic’ approaches to my condition, my aim is to highlight the important 
role that dyspraxia played in my research and in my written accounts of that 
research. It suggests that instead of overlooking ‘dyspraxic errors’, the reader 
should be open to the idea that such clumsiness plays an appropriate, integral 
and productive role in a PhD on the efficacy of awkwardness in participatory 
performance.  
 
In taking this position, I align myself with the recent (15 years) concept of 
neurodiversity, which emerges from writings by sociologist Judy Singer.9 
Singer writes: 
 
The rise of neurodiversity takes postmodern fragmentation one step 
further. Just as the postmodern era sees every once too solid belief 
melt into air, even our most taken-for-granted – that we all more or less 
see, feel, touch, hear, smell, and sort information, in more or less the 
same way (unless visibly disabled) – are being dissolved.10 
 
 
A neurodiverse approach to dyspraxia means reframing elements that are 
usually defined as dysfunctional as being merely differences. It also means 
suggesting ways of being open to those differences, and of encouraging 
                                                
8 ‘Specific Learning Difficulties Cover Note’, submitted with thesis.  
9 Judy Singer, ‘”Why can’t you be normal for once in your life?” From a 
“problem with no name” to the emergence of a new category of difference’ in 
Disability Discourse, ed. by Mairian Corker and Sally French (Buckingham/ 
Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999), pp. 59-67. 
10 Singer, p. 64. 
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positive approaches to those differences. The first part of this preface 
addresses the former of these approaches. It suggests that participatory 
performances that are open to awkwardness are also open to people with 
awkward modes of being (such as dyspraxia). It also suggests that writing and 
research on participation that implicitly frames awkwardness as dismissible or 
problematic is complicit in creating barriers to people with an awkward mode 
of being who want to produce and perform participatory projects. The second 
part of this preface engages in a reframing of attributes of my neurodiversity 
that are presumptively categorised as problematic by proposing that dyspraxic 
writing be approached as productively performative.  
 
Dyspraxic Methodologies  
 
In Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York Avant-Garde 
Amelia Jones describes her ‘affinity with the time, place, and activities of the 
New York Dada group’ that she researches that is ‘personal as well as 
intellectual’.11 She explains: 
 
As a sufferer of panic disorder, my descriptions of their neurasthenic 
responses are thus openly admitted to be projections, empathetic 
attempts to inhabit, and also to identify with, they’re anxious, 
sometimes downright disorderly and antisocial behaviour and creative 
expressions. Anxiety is my mode of being.12 
 
                                                
11 Amelia Jones, Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York 
Avant-Garde (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2004), p. 28 
12 Jones, p. 28 
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Jones’ approach acts, to a certain extent, as a precedent for my own. I also 
admit to a personal identification with the awkward strategies and outcomes of 
the participatory projects I discuss due to my own experiences with dyspraxia. 
The ‘underlying difficulties with attention’, ‘memory’ and perception described 
by Grant can lead to misunderstanding, inappropriateness or, as Drew notes, 
withdrawal or irrelevancy in social situations. Each of these attributes has a 
clear connection to being, or causing awkwardness. In other words, dyspraxia 
means that there are times and situations in which awkwardness is my mode 
of being. Hence my project involves an inhabitation and identification that 
connects my engagement with awkwardness to Jones’ engagement with 
anxiety. Whilst Jones identifies with the experiences and behaviours of the 
individuals that she writes about, I recognise and am drawn to awkward 
situations because of my awkward mode of being. It is important to disclaim 
this because of the dominant research method of this PhD project, which 
relies heavily on my own participation in the participatory projects I discuss. 
Whilst, unlike Jones, I would not describe my descriptions of awkwardness as 
projections, it could be argued that my dyspraxia might make me directly 
complicit in that awkwardness or even an instigator of it.  
 
There is, therefore, a potential problematic role of dyspraxia in my 
methodology.  This problematic approach would involve me contributing to or 
triggering awkward situations in participatory art and performance projects 
and accounting for the efficacy of that awkwardness. However, the majority of 
the thesis focuses on awkwardness as a strategy or tactic for producing 
particular efficacies. In general, the potential for awkwardness is built into the 
 13 
projects I discuss and does not rely on an individual with an occasional 
awkward mode of being to trigger or perpetuate that awkwardness. The 
exception to this is Chapter 3, in which I do discuss awkwardness as a mode 
of being and as a contingent outcome of particular individuals being involved 
in particular situations. In this case, those individuals were members of the art 
group a.a.s, my long-term collaborator Luke Ferris (who also has dyspraxia), 
and myself. Thus this chapter allows me to test the limits of my methodology 
and addresses the potentially problematic approach mentioned above. I reach 
the important conclusion that participatory practices that embrace contingent 
awkwardness are also important to my research and my key arguments.   
 
As I have stated, dyspraxia can be aptly described as an awkward mode of 
being. This awkward mode of being leads to a wealth of experience of 
awkward situations and, in turn, of different responses to awkwardness. This 
experience suggests that in most situations attempts are made to reduce, 
overcome or ignore awkwardness. However, my personal identification with 
awkwardness means that I have an invested interest in situations in which it is 
invited, welcomed, and maintained. The role of dyspraxia in relation to my 
methodology is connected to a heightened sensitivity to these different 
responses to awkwardness. It means that, as stated, I am not only interested 
in contemporary participatory performance practices in which awkwardness is 
pursued, but also in the way awkwardness is handled once it arises. This 
relates to the key contribution that this thesis makes, which is to identify 
exclusions and blind spots in the discourses that surround the social turn in 
art and performance.  
 14 
I argue that one of the exclusions of the discourse around the social turn in art 
and performance is participatory practice that trigger, pursue or embrace 
awkwardness. The exclusion of such practices risks producing or reinforcing 
barriers to those for whom awkwardness is a mode of being, hindering them 
from producing or participating in socially engaged, relational and participatory 
practices. My dyspraxia means I am personally invested in highlighting such 
barriers.  
 
Dyspraxic Writing  
 
This section of my preface is not meant as a defence of any typos or issues 
with clarity that might remain in this thesis as a consequence of my dyspraxia. 
Instead it offers a rationale for their aptness. I suggest that such mishaps 
maintain a stylistic and performative fidelity to the clumsiness and 
awkwardness of my experiences. They go some way to meeting the 
‘challenge’ that Peggy Phelan suggests performance brings to writing by 
discovering a ‘way for repeated words to become performative utterances’.13  
I understand this as a prompt to engage with the way in which writing on 
performance can re-perform elements of a performance as well as describing 
them.  Such writing reproduces the tones, styles, and experiences of the 
performances it describes. Thus writing on awkward performance could itself 
be awkward.  
 
                                                
13 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), p. 149. 
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For this reason I had contemplated intentionally leaving many of the writerly 
mishaps that occur as a result of dyspraxia in the thesis. This would have 
been with the intention of re-performing interruptions to the smooth flow of 
interactivity and communication that the practices I discuss pursue, facilitate 
and embrace. The difficulty would have been in signposting this intentionality 
in order to avoid the risk of submitting a thesis that appeared to have not gone 
through required proofreading processes. This is further complicated by the 
ambiguous relationship that awkwardness has with intentionality and 
capability. In many of the situations I describe in this thesis awkwardness is 
triggered or heightened due to the way interactions and experiences 
challenge our readings of the authority, capability and intentions of a 
performer or artist. Awkwardness in these projects is rarely neatly framed and 
signposted. Thus a written account of these projects that aimed to re-perform 
their awkwardness would also need to disrupt the reader’s experience of the 
authority, capability and intentions of the writer. The writerly clumsiness that 
results from dyspraxia could enable such re-performance. However, clear 
signposting would undermine this experience of ambiguity.  
 
The majority of this thesis is not performative in this way. However, by 
introducing the performative potential of dyspraxic writing, I hope to guide the 
way the reader accounts for any dyspraxic moments that do encounter.  I 
have gone through the rigorous process of identifying and correcting 
typographic, structural, formatting and tonal deviances.  This was done with 
the understanding, developed through past experience, that even after such 
processes are completed, some elements of dyspraxia will remain. Rather 
 16 
than overlooking such elements, the reader is prompted to allow them to exist 
as momentary indulgences in performing and triggering awkwardness. This 
should provide further clarification and insight into the particular type of 
awkwardness addressed in this thesis and its efficaciously disruptive 
relationship with authorial status and communication.   
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Introduction 
 
There are two serendipitously productive moments that triggered and then 
reframed the key thread of the research and argumentation of this thesis. I will 
outline these moments here as a means of briefly introducing my definition of 
the terms ‘participation’ and ‘awkwardness’. The first occurred on 25 February 
2010 during the ‘Participation and Activism’ panel discussion as part of the 
Birkbeck Centre for Contemporary Theatre’s Theatre Conversations in 
London, UK. Ali Tomkinson spoke about the participatory programmes that 
she was involved with at the Battersea Arts Centre (BAC), a venue for theatre 
and performance in Battersea in Wandsworth, South London that declares 
itself to be a ‘place where everyone plays a role in inventing the future of 
theatre’.1 Discussing the venues outreach work with schools, Tomkinson 
describes what happens when an artist “hasn’t got great facilitation skills”, 
giving the example of “one of our artists (…) who we describe as looking, in 
school, (…) like an old fashioned geography teacher.” 2 In these situations the 
BAC “back fill them with people who actually are really great at facilitation”.3 
 
I reference this moment of Tomkinson’s presentation here, at the very 
beginning of my thesis, because it played a key role in inspiring a series of 
questions that fuelled my research. These questions were triggered through 
Tomkinson’s allusion to the idea of a ‘great’ facilitator of participation on the 
                                                
1 Battersea Arts Centre, ‘About’ 
<https://www.bac.org.uk/content/15969/about_us/about_us/about_us> 
[accessed 10 October 2014]. 
2 Ali Tomkinson, ‘Participate’, Theatre Conversations: Participation and 
Activism < http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/our-research/bcct/projects/theatre-
conversations> [accessed 12 December 2012]. 
3 Tomkinson. 
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one hand, and an excluded, ‘awkward’ facilitator of participation on the other. 
My experience as an artist and researcher with dyspraxia means I identify, to 
some extent, with the predicament of the ‘old-fashioned geography teacher’ 
style artist who ‘hasn’t got great facilitation skills’. The core question that 
emerged in response to this is: How might ‘awkward’ facilitation of 
participation be reframed as ‘great’? Each of my chapters goes some way to 
answering this question, but it does so in response to a different framing of 
the term ‘participation’ in relation to theatre, art, and performance.  
 
Although Tomkinson described the relationship between theatre and 
participation as being ‘very interconnected’ at the BAC, the participatory work 
that she is engaged in is not framed as a performance practice itself.  For 
Tomkinson ‘participation’ refers to building, developing, and sustaining 
relationships and ‘strategic partnerships’ between the theatre and 
performance that occurs at the BAC and children and young people in the 
borough of Wandsworth. I, on the other hand, am not researching 
programmes of participation put in place to get people involved in theatre, 
performance, and the arts. The ‘participation’ that I describe is an integral part 
of the performances and artworks that I engage with. Specifically, in this 
thesis ‘participation’ refers to live, co-present interactions between artists, 
performers and participants and the facilitation of co-present interactions 
between different participants. The words and actions of participants are 
deemed to be part of the performances and artworks that they participate in, 
and are not merely responses to an artwork or performance. My use of other 
terms such as ‘interactive’ or ‘collaborative’ throughout the thesis all have this 
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definition at their root. Words other than ‘participation’ are generally selected 
based on their use by the artists I discuss or the writings I respond to.  
 
Examples of participation that I have experienced as part of my research for 
this thesis include avant-garde drag performer David Hoyle having 
spontaneous verbal altercations with his audience members in various 
performances at the Royal Vauxhall Tavern, London; art groups a.a.s and 
Reactor collaborating with participants to pursue fantastical goals or build and 
maintain fantastical worlds in Xe54 (Walsall 2011) and Total Ghaos 
(Nottingham 2005); performance artist and photographer Bjørn Venø silently 
and authoritatively selecting audience members and then attempting to strip 
them naked in Outside In (Flying Dutchman, London 2014); Matthew De 
Kersaint Giraudeau constructing one-to-one performance installations that 
flicker abruptly between inviting and denying interaction (I’m here. You’re 
Here. Let’s Discourse!, Open School East, London 2014); Adrian Howells 
bathing, hugging, and feeding (optionally) nude participants in The Pleasure 
of Being: Washing, Feeding, Holding (BAC, 2011); Markus Coates using 
shamanic methods to communicate with badgers in order to assist people 
with their personal problems in Spirit Caravan: mobile personal consulting 
(South Bank Centre Square, London, 2008), and myself persuading audience 
members to perform as the corpses of their dead friends in Weird Séance 
(Ipswich, 2014). Whilst I do not address all these experiences in this thesis, 
they each contributed to the development of my overall argument for the 
efficacy of awkwardness. I participated, in some way, in each of these 
 20 
examples and have done so in almost all the performances and artworks that 
I discuss throughout the thesis. 
 
The second moment that is useful for introducing and defining the core 
question of this thesis occurred during a conversation at an evening of 
performances that I curated called Live Art Dogging (Nottingham, 26 January 
2013). Live Art Dogging was the third of a series of ‘Reactor Halls’ events that 
were facilitated by Nottingham-based art collective Reactor in their large 
studio space at Primary. Primary is an ex-primary school that has been 
repurposed as an ‘artist led-space that exists to support creative research and 
to develop new ways of engaging audiences’.4 It opened in 2012. In each 
Reactor Halls event a different artist or art group was invited to curate an 
evening. I was approached by Reactor and proposed the idea of an evening 
of performances that were primarily for one participant at a time, but in which 
other people in the space could observe that interaction, or at least some 
element of it. My aim was to bring together a collection of performances that 
experimented with intimacy and voyeurism. This was influenced by 
performance artist and scholar Dominic Johnson’s observation that often the 
encounters we experience in one to one performances are ‘partly boring, 
partly threatening, possibly embarrassing or uncomfortable, and then the 
difficulties resolve themselves into an experience of beauty or wonder, 
however slight.’ 5 Johnson suggests that this is ‘a neat description of intimacy 
                                                
4 Primary, ‘About’, http://www.weareprimary.org/about/ [accessed 10 
September 2014]. 
5 Dominic Johnson, in an interview with Rachel Zerihan, The Live Art 
Development Agency Sudy Room Guide to one-on-one performance, 
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itself, as a situation that aims (to varying extents) at pleasure, but necessarily 
involves less pleasurable eventualities’.6 My intention, influenced by my 
academic interest in awkwardness, was to curate an event that foregrounded 
those discomforts and ‘less pleasurable eventualities’ by undermining the 
element of privacy that much one to one performance embraces. Hence the 
titular reference to ‘dogging’ - a discreetly organised gathering in a public 
space (often in car-parks) in which people can watch or participate in sexual 
activities. 
 
In Live Art Dogging attendees were invited to participate in intimate 
encounters that were, to varying degrees, on display. There were fourteen 
artists presenting at Live Art Dogging. Performances included Live Artist Traci 
Kelly’s Touch Vs. Touch, in which participants were invited up onto a large 
table to hold a pose with Kelly that included some form of physical interaction 
and lasted for a minute. Kelly had a shot of rum between each interaction, 
which had an obvious effect on her approach to physical interactivity and on 
her ability to hold the pose. By the end of her performance Kelly had to be 
carried off of the table. Ellie Watmough performed Cath’s Community 
Cupcake Competition. ‘Cath’ (Watmough’s patronisingly strict matriarchal 
persona) approached attendees who were then invited to join Cath at a small 
table where they would carefully and elaborately decorate a pre-cooked 
cupcake. As they selected and placed edible decorations on the sponge, Cath 
mixed small talk with tenuous interpretations and thinly disguised critiques of 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.thisisliveart.co.uk/resources/Study_Room/guides/Rachel_Zerihan.
html [accessed 11 May 2012], pp. 38-40 (p. 39). 
6 Johnson, p. 39. 
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their creative decisions. After the participant had finished and left Cath 
crushed or ate the cake and, later in the event, found the participant and 
handed the remains back to them in a clear plastic bag. Performance artist 
Simon Raven set a table and chairs up for a romantic meal with one 
participant. The table was covered in a white table-cloth on top of which was a 
meal hidden beneath a metal plate cover. Once the participant had joined him 
the meal was revealed to be a large pile of snow (it was snowing at the time in 
Nottingham). The snow was promptly made into snowballs that Raven and his 
participant threw violently at those watching. In Bruce Abestos’s Bruce 
Asbestos as Justine Boobier it was me that was coerced into participating, 
forced, as the curator, to negotiate with him as he threatened to jump from a 
dangerously high mezzanine in the room. Chloe Cooper, Luke Ferris, Michael 
Pinchbeck, Earth Rod, Kimbal Bumsted, Matthew Hawthorn, Amelia Beavis-
Harrison, Owen Parry, Andy Barrett and myself also presented performances 
and installations.  
 
An example of a contribution that neatly met my intentions for the event was 
Owen Parry’s Touching Feeling, a performance that has been performed in 
various venues and festivals internationally since May 2011.7 Parry wandered 
around the space asking people if they wanted to participate in his 
performance. If they agreed it was explained to them that Parry would close 
his eyes and touch them wherever he wanted to. If they wanted the 
                                                
7 Cruising for Art by Brian Lobel, Psi Utrecht, The Netherlands (May 2011); 
Cruising for Art, Vogue Fabrics, London (9 Dec 2011); Cruising for Art, 
Basement, Brighton (10 Dec 2011); Live Art Dogging, Reactor Halls, 
Nottingham (Jan 2013); In Between Time, Cruising for Art, Bristol (Feb 2013); 
ANTI Festival, Kuopio, Finland, (Sept 2013); Nuit Blanche, Brussels, Belgium 
(Oct 2013). 
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performance to stop, they were to slap him as hard as they could. Parry could 
also stop whenever he wanted to. This was a physically intimate performance 
that immersed participants in a spattering of desire, resistance, provocation, 
and surrender. I was told that Parry did not hesitate to touch participant’s 
genitals early on in the encounter. They were invited to experience an overlap 
of heightened physical sensitivity and cerebral questioning of their 
responsibilities and agency. For me, it invited an insistent speculation on 
Parry’s motivations and a questioning of what he wanted from participants. 
Was he hoping for them to be compliant or resistant? Were they meant to be 
providers or recipients of pleasure? Touching Feeling was enticingly 
ambiguous in its purpose: overlapping elements of social and psychological 
experimentation with a pursuit of the unsettled pleasures of publically 
performed physical intimacy. As with all the performances, others in the space 
might have caught a glimpse of the interaction as they drank at the bar, 
chatted with other attendees, or engaged in the other participatory 
performances and installations on offer. They might have come close and 
gawped at the interaction, making participants aware of the potential for their 
actions and responses to be enjoyed and judged. They might have made it 
visibly clear that the interaction held no interest for them as spectators. This 
sense of awkwardness, in which we are in close proximity to the ambiguous 
desires of others, and in which we might question our own position in relation 
to fulfilling those desires, is a cornerstone of my engagement with awkward 
participatory art and performance throughout this thesis.  
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On his website Parry describes his performance in terms that match my own 
contextualisation of Live Art Dogging: 
 
Despite its reputation for creating intimate and confessional 
encounters, what is now widely refered [sic] to as 'one on one 
performance' either seems to be championed for its potential to create 
'real' encounters between performer/spectator, or in other instances it 
is limited to comparisons with models of exchange in the service 
industry. But what about the more sleazy and illegitimate operations at 
stake in the performer-participant transaction?8 
 
 
A pursuit of the sleazy and the illegitimate lay at the root of the curatorial 
decisions I made in terms of spatial arrangement, scheduling, and lighting. 
This was partly based on maintaining a fidelity to the experiences offered by 
dogging. Whilst it was up to individual artists to respond to the idea of intimate 
encounters and voyeurism, it was mine to address the wider experiences of 
attending a ‘dogging’ event. I was interested in the potential for 
disorganisation in ‘dogging’ events; in the difficulty of knowing exactly when 
and where sexual activities would begin, of waiting, of getting bored, of just 
missing something, or of having to choose between two different experiences 
or spectacles. Anecdotal evidence collected in the run-up to the event 
suggested that occasionally a dogging event consists of two or three men 
drinking cans of lager, engaging in small talk, and waiting for a sign that there 
something worth watching is about to occur. Some of the decisions that I 
made as organiser and curator of Live Art Dogging were partially motivated by 
a desire to facilitate similar experiences.  All the performances occurred in the 
same room, which also contained the bar. There was a schedule, but at 
                                                
8 Owen Parry, ‘Touching Feeling’, http://owengparry.com/#/touching-
feeling/4557695875, [accessed 10 December 2013].  
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various points there was more than one performance sharing the space. 
There were no physical barriers around individual performances and they 
were not individually lit – fluorescent strip-lights providing a stark lighting 
across the entire space.  Artists, participants, voyeurs, and non-participating 
attendees were equally exposed. I loosely structured the event so that for the 
first hour not much happened. This lead to smatterings of anticipatory small 
talk and an atmosphere of restrained impatience. When the performances did 
begin to occur they were sparsely scattered, both temporally and spatially, 
often situated towards the edges and corners of the room. I hosted with a mix 
of raucous joviality and abrupt boorishness, frequently using a microphone to 
badger attendees to donate money for artist’s fees and repeatedly and 
unjustifiably reminding everyone that I had recently become a father. I view 
my mode of curatorship and hosting as matching Parry’s pursuit of illegitimacy 
because of its antithetical relationship towards the experiences usually 
expected from social, performance, and art events.  
 
During the evening one of the artists, who knew about my research 
commented that he felt that there was something awkward about the event, 
but that it was not the sort of awkwardness he was expecting. This prompted 
me to think through the different modes of awkwardness that the event 
facilitated in order to develop a clearer understanding of what I was referring 
to when I described a participatory performance as ‘awkward’. I assumed that 
the artist was referring to the stilted atmosphere created through the structure, 
setting, and host personality when he described the event as ‘awkward’. This 
prompted me to rethink awkwardness not only in terms of shameful mishaps 
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and cringe-inspiring social faux-pas, but as a methodology. I am particularly 
interested in the potential of participants to question the capabilities and 
authority of those in charge when participatory art and performance is 
created, facilitated, hosted, and maintained awkwardly. This framing of 
awkwardness as a methodology links to its etymology, in which ‘awk’ 
translates as 'backwards, perverse, clumsy'.9  This etymological definition of 
awkwardness aptly frames my decision to include Andy Barrett’s performance 
Guilty Pleasures (2013) and schedule it as the finale of Live Art Dogging. 
Guilty Pleasures was a five-minute performance nestled in the corner of the 
room. Barrett sat naked eating cake as the majority of the attendees stood 
with their backs to him looking at Asbestos, who lay sprawled on a pile of 
cardboard boxes on the floor  (having asked the audience to close their eyes 
whilst he climbed down the stairs from the mezzanine and laid himself down 
beneath the spot where he was previously stood, hence clumsily feigning the 
jump). As Asbestos’ performance finished and the audience turned around, 
Barrett began masturbating (whilst continuing to gorge himself on cake) and 
continued until he ejaculated. Barrett and Parry were the only artists of the 
fourteen who presented work at Live Art Dogging that explicitly and physically 
addressed the potential ‘sleaziness’ of dogging. Despite the fact that I gave 
frequent warnings throughout the event that Barrett would be masturbating in 
the corner at the end, many attendees displayed disbelief when it actually 
occurred, and quickly left the room when he started. I was enthusiastic about 
Barrett’s inclusion in the event. It ensured an unapologetic, abrupt, and 
                                                
9 ‘Awkward’, Oxford Dictionaries < 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/awkward> [accessed 20 
May 2011]. 
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awkward slippage from a series of witty, conceptual engagements with 
dogging that disavowed its organisation around carnal pleasure, to the 
unadulterated experience of seeing a man clearly enjoying being watched as 
he masturbated. Thus the awkwardness of the inclusion of Barrett’s 
performance in Live Art Dogging did not emerge through its inappropriateness 
(putting aside the fact that the venue used to be a primary school). It was 
awkward because Guilty Pleasures engaged directly with the event’s explicit 
references (sex acts in front of a crowd) and ignored its implied suggestions 
(to reframe ‘dogging’ as an analogy for structuring relations between 
performers, participants and spectators).  
 
To summarise and recap, the basic question triggered and supplemented 
through the moments discussed above is ‘What might be ‘great’ about 
awkward methods of creating and facilitating participatory art and 
performance?’ This forms the basis of the research of this thesis, where 
‘great’ refers to the efficacy of awkwardness in terms of ethical and social 
politics. The thesis also engages with the efficacy of being an awkward 
participant and of writing about participatory art and performance awkwardly. I 
will refer to these engagements in my section on my research methodologies 
below, which includes a return to the definition of ‘awk’ as 'backwards, 
perverse, clumsy'. 
 
These opening paragraphs have introduced five interlinked modes of 
awkwardness, each of which is returned to in detail in this thesis. I will list 
these here, and refer to moments in my thesis in which I address them. The 
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first is illustrated through the figure of the unwelcome, ‘geography teacher’ 
style of school-based outreach work. Awkwardness here is related to an 
apparent dysfunction in someone’s mode of being with others. In my writing 
on a.a.s’ project Xe54 I refer to the dysfunctional relations that occurred 
between collaborators due to a clash of different approaches and awkward 
modes of being. Core member Stuart Tait writes that this resulted from the 
fact that the core members of a.a.s are ‘four, intense people (two men, two 
women) who make very demanding work’.10 The second, exemplified in Owen 
Parry’s contribution to Live Art Dogging, relates to our experience of other’s 
desires, and a questioning of our own role in relation to those desires. I return 
to this in my writing on Reactor, in which I discuss the potential for participants 
to experience paranoia in response to motivations behind the activities they 
participate in. The third is related to the abrupt shift in tone encaptured in the 
curation of Live Art Dogging and the scheduling of Guilty Pleasures. At 
various points in my thesis I focus on abrupt shifts and changes and the 
awkwardness related to their decontextualizing effects. Hoyle’s unexpected 
switches between conviviality and antagonism is particular important because 
of its relation to key arguments in existing theoretical responses to the ethics 
and politics of participatory art and performance. The fourth example of 
awkwardness in the above writing relates to my curation of Live Art Dogging. 
Here awkwardness arises through a questioning of the motivations and 
capabilities of those who are in charge of the participatory activities people 
are involved in. This idea is returned to at various points throughout the 
                                                
10 Stuart Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’, in A thousand lines of flight – 
Anarchist Network Conference, Loughborough University, 3-5 September 
2012 <http://stuarttait.com/writing/molecularpaper/> [accessed 5/12/2014]. 
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thesis, and relates to the potential for participatory performance to trouble the 
presumed relationship between authority and expertise. Finally, Guilty 
Pleasures provides an example of an awkwardness that is attached to 
ignoring the unspoken rules of a social system. In the following section I will 
further clarify the way I define the term ‘awkwardness’ using Kotsko’s 
frameworks of ‘everday’, ‘radical’, and ‘cultural’ awkwardness. I then engage 
further with Kotsko’s text in order to introduce the efficacies of awkwardness 
that underpin engagement with it throughout my thesis.  
Adam Kotsko’s Three Types of Awkwardness 
 
Adam Kotsko’s essay Awkwardness discusses the humorous exploration of 
social discomfort in various recent television shows and films, with most 
attention given to the U.S version of The Office and Curb Your Enthusiasm, 
and the films of Judd Apatow, including The 40-Year-Old Virgin and Knocked 
Up.11 Whilst these case-studies, limited to acted, pre-planned scenarios made 
for television, DVD and the cinema, bare little resemblance to my own 
engagement with live participatory art and performance, Kotsko’s discussion 
of the potential efficacy of awkwardness is useful. This is, firstly because 
Kotsko breaks down awkwardness into three separate categories. He uses 
the terms ‘everyday awkwardness’, ‘radical awkwardness’ and ‘cultural 
awkwardness’ to define the three modes of awkwardness he identifies and 
their relationship to the social situations in which they emerge. ‘Everyday 
awkwardness’ occurs when an individual breaks a socially agreed rule. This 
mode of awkwardness relies on the presumption that each person in a certain 
                                                
11 Adam Kotsko, Awkwardness (Ropley: 0-Books, 2010). 
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scenario knows the rules of the social and cultural context in which they find 
themselves. It is important to note that these are not necessarily the explicitly 
stated rules or laws of the situation, but more often the ‘unspoken norms of a 
community’.12 Whilst we might instinctively, in this scenario, blame the 
awkward individual for being ignorant of such norms, we can also use the 
awkward moment of ‘break down’ to move towards an understanding of what 
those norms are, how they came into being, how they are perpetuated, and, 
perhaps most importantly, who and what they exclude. In Chapter 4, I discuss 
performance artist David Hoyle’s outbursts of antagonism in public scenarios 
originally framed as friendly, or sudden shifts from uncomfortably mischievous 
interventions to acts of attentive love and care. These moments are framed, 
firstly, as awkward due to their inappriopriate emergence in public spaces, 
and secondly, in their abrasive relation to the rules of engagement (friendly or 
mischievous) that he himself seemed to have set up. This in turn positions 
Hoyle’s social practice as awkward in relation to the idea, implied in writings 
on the ‘social turn’ in art and performance, that social engagement should be 
either antagonistic or convivial. His refusal or inability to follow this suggests 
that such approaches to social engagement, whether they focus on 
antagonism or conviviality, exclude practitioners who embrace volatile 
improvisation, such as Hoyle.  
 
According to Kotsko, ‘radical awkwardness arises when there doesn’t seem to 
be any norm governing a given situation at all’.13 This absence of governing 
norms often occurs when two differing sets of implied rules, etiquettes and 
                                                
12 Kotsko, p. 6. 
13 Kotsko, p. 7.  
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‘unwritten shadows’ clash in the same space. Thus there is an anxiety about 
which set of rules to follow; whether to insist upon your own, clumsy attempt 
to adopt those of the other, or tentatively negotiate for an unspoken 
compromise. Kotsko suggests that it is ‘radical awkwardness’ that inspires 
‘reactions far more dangerous than an uncomfortable grimace’, with ‘forced 
assimilation, segregation, and expulsion’ as potential strategies for ensuring 
that a ‘norm’ is established, and that that norm is your own and not the 
others.14 In Chapter 3 I allude to some clashes between art group a.a.s and 
my performance duo AuntyNazi, which emerged through what, in my 
experience, was the absence of ‘norms’ governing the Xe54 project (2011) in 
which we collaborated. In a.a.s’ collaborative practice these norms are, 
ideally, developed and continually revised through collaboration, as opposed 
to existing prior to groups coming together and guiding the ways in which we 
collaborated. As hinted at in the above reference to a.a.s’ relationship with 
staff at Walsall Gallery, such strive towards openness is not always inviting, 
and can be experienced as ‘intense’ and ‘demanding’. AuntyNazi resisted 
assimilation into this ideology of perpetual malleability itself, repeatedly 
demanding structure and rules from a.a.s’. This is because our own 
collaborative approach relies on us positioning ourselves ignorantly or 
disobediently in relation to such structures and rules. This led to what Tait 
described as ‘glitches in communication that caused extreme tension between 
individuals, leading to new, anxious, work that was outside anything either 
                                                
14 Kotsko, p. 8. 
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group usually produced’.15 This was the closest I have come to experience 
what Claire Bishop describes as ‘relational antagonism’.16  
 
Bishop’s critical approach to social engagement, participatory, and 
collaborative is a key referent throughout this thesis. I return to her position 
towards the end of this introduction, and outline her approach more fully in 
Chapter 1. When Bishop uses the term ‘relational antagonism’ she is referring 
here to artworks such as Santiago Sierra’s Wall Enclosing a Space (Venice 
Biennale, 2003) in which a wall was constructed that ‘rendered the galleries 
inaccessible’.17  Only visitors with a Spanish passport could enter, via the 
back of the gallery. Bishop favours such projects over more convivial and 
benevolent modes of interactivity due to their apparent adherence to Chantal 
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s theory of a ‘fully functioning democracy’ in which 
‘friction and antagonisms between people’ are maintained in order to 
continually ‘draw up’ and bring into debate ‘the frontiers between different 
positions’.18   However, Kotsko’s definition of radical awkwardness, and my 
own experience of the fluxing frontiers and frameworks of Xe54, suggest that 
the actual experience of this ‘fully functioning democracy’ is not being irritated 
or angered through inaccessibility (as in Wall Enclosing a Space) but feeling 
awkward. Neither party was ‘antagonised’ in the collaborative exploits of 
Xe54. There were, as Tait points out, anxieties and tension but, for me, 
                                                
15 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
16 Claire Bishop, Installation Art: A Critical History (London: Tate Publishing, 
2005), pp. 120-127. 
17 Bishop, Installation Art, p. 120. 
18 Bishop, Installation Art, p. 119.  
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Xe54’s fidelity to a politics of antagonism did not equate to the kinds of felt 
antagonistic experiences offered in the artworks Bishop favours.  
 
Finally Kotsko outlines the concept’ of ‘cultural awkwardness’, an ‘awkward 
kind of awkwardness’ that arises ‘when there seems to be a set of norms in 
force, but it feels somehow impossible to follow them or even fully know 
them’.19 I would argue that there are elements of ‘cultural awkwardness’ 
across my experiences with Hoyle, Reactor, a.a.s and the other performances 
I have participated and collaborated in.  It is, however, within Reactor’s 
haphazardly facilitated worlds of conspiratorial fantasies and totalitarian role-
play that such impenetrable ‘norms’ are most prominently constructed and 
maintained. I discuss the experience of being immersed in their ramshackle 
systems of ‘cultural awkwardness’ in Chapter 5.  
 
The Efficacy of Awkwardness  
 
In this section I describe and extend Adam Kotsko’s Heiddegarian-influenced 
analogical use of a broken hammer.20  This is because it is illustrative of my 
framing of the efficacy of awkwardness. Kotsko indulges this analogy in order 
to outline the way in which awkwardness emerges as a socio-politically 
productive affect and as a method for producing affects. 
 
                                                
19 Kotsko, pp. 16-17. 
20 Kotsko, pp. 11-12. 
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Kotsko describes how Martin Heidegger’s ‘analysis of the structure of human 
existence’ begins with ‘what he calls “ordinary everydayness,” which is 
characterised by essentially going with the flow’.21 In this state of ‘ordinary 
everydayness’ we ‘interact with others in fairly stereotyped ways’ and ‘don’t 
give much thought to any of it, because there’s really no need to’.22 However, 
‘when things start to break down’, we ‘really need to step back and reflect on 
what has happened’.23 Referring to Heidegger’s nostalgia and penchant for 
the ‘supposedly “authentic” peasant lifestyle’ and consequent use of 
‘examples from that milieu’, Kotsko states:24 
 
When I am working on something in the workshop, I don’t really think of 
a hammer, for example, as anything more than a readily available tool. 
It is only when it breaks that it presents itself to me as something more 
than just its use to me.25 
 
 
In short, it is only when a hammer breaks and cannot be used that we might 
begin to think about what a hammer is. This is an example of what Kotsko 
describes as the kind of ‘objective contemplation that philosophy and science 
have tended to put forward as the most authentic type of knowledge’.26 
However, the key Heideggerian concept that informs Kotsko’s analysis is the 
argument that this is not the only type of knowledge. For Heidegger ‘there is 
also the kind of intuitive knowledge or “know how” that gets us through our 
                                                
21 Kotsko, p. 11. 
22 Kotsko, p. 11. 
23 Kotsko, p. 11. 
24 Kotsko, p. 11. 
25 Kotsko, p. 12. 
26 Kotsko, p. 12. 
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day-to-day life’.27 These different types of gaining and employing knowledge 
arise through different ways of ‘standing in relation to the world’ or being 
‘“attuned” to the world’.28 As Kotsko points out, these different stances are 
collected together by Heidegger in a term translated as ‘moods’.29 Kotsko 
frames awkwardness as a type of Heideggerien ‘mood’ and makes an 
important distinction in relation to the differentiation between ‘going with the 
flow’ and ‘breakdown-fuelled objective contemplation’: 
 
Awkwardness clearly fits with the general pattern of insight through 
breakdown, but unlike anxiety or boredom, it doesn’t isolate the person 
who feels awkward – as I have already discussed, it does just the 
opposite: it spreads.30 
 
He goes on to summarise that ‘awkwardness is a breakdown in our normal 
experience of social interaction while itself remaining irreducibly social’.31 
Thus, when I talk about the awkward facilitation of participation and 
interactivity in the practices I engage with, Kotsko’s framing of awkwardness 
as simultaneous social breakdown and social immersion is a key referent. 
When the social interactions of a participatory performance or relational 
artwork are facilitated awkwardly, participants, performers, artists, and 
theorists have an opportunity to diagnose the unspoken rules and frameworks 
of that social situation whilst continuing to participate in it. In summary, 
throughout my thesis I discuss performances in which participation, 
collaboration, and interactivity do not, I argue, run smoothly. They run 
                                                
27 Kotsko, p. 12. 
28 Kotsko, p. 12. 
29 Kotsko, p. 12. 
30 Kotsko, p. 15. 
31 Kotsko, p. 15. 
 36 
awkwardly. This is an awkwardness that emerges from openness to 
mismanagement and an inclusive approach towards non-normative modes of 
tangibility, precision, and conviviality.  
Methodology 
 
Following Kotsko’s suggestion that awkwardness ‘spreads’, it is important to 
clarify the multiple, overlapping ways in which awkwardness spreads through 
the thesis: I address the ways that participation can be facilitated awkwardly 
and I address the way that participation can trigger awkward affects. Finally, 
as discussed in the preface to this thesis I approach awkwardness with my 
own awkward modes of researching, theorising, and analysing, and with 
potentially awkward tones, phrasing, and argumentation in my writing. This 
entails an overlap of my own writerly performance as a dyspraxic with a lightly 
engaged re-performance of the tones and affects I experienced through 
participating and collaborating in the projects I address. In terms of my 
research, throughout the thesis I rely on and foreground a methodological 
approach I describe as Collaborator/Performer-Participation-as-Research 
(C/PPaR), taking my cue from the term ‘Spectator-Participation–as-Research’ 
(SPaR) that Deidre Heddon, Helen Iball and Rachel Zerihan use to describe 
their work on One on One performance.  Heddon, Iball, and Zerihan write that:  
 
Practice-as-Research (PaR) usually refers to making performance but, 
given that One to One is usually participatory, here the practice is 
located in the experiential processes of reception: PaR becomes SPaR 
(Spectator-Participation-as-Research). This acronym intentionally 
signals the relational dynamic embedded in the One to One form, a 
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dynamic – or enfolding – that we unfold here.32 
 
 
The development of my arguments on awkwardness and participatory 
performance is also rooted in ‘experiential processes’. This experience is not 
just as a participant, but also as a collaborator in the construction of projects 
and playing key roles in their facilitation and maintenance. Whilst, in some of 
the projects I discuss, the roles between punters and performers are 
intentionally blurred, I have often had privileged access to the back-stories, 
bickerings, processes, and discussions through which projects emerged. Thus, 
whilst the methodology of my research is not strictly ‘PaR’, in that none of the 
projects I write about were instigated and built up by myself, I often had an 
insider position that meant I was privy to, if not part of, the performance 
making process. I should note that whenever I was involved in a project in a 
way that went beyond that offered to the public, the practitioners I worked with 
knew about my research project. Any time I have written about elements of 
projects not publically available, I have sent that writing through to the artist 
for their approval.  
 
I have collaborated, performed, and actively participated in many of the 
practices that I discuss, and I have often done so awkwardly. This is key to 
my engagement with practices that Bishop describes as framing 
‘intersubjective relations over detached opticality’.33 I favour participatory art 
and performance that facilitates affective diagnosis that occurs during our 
                                                
32 Deirdre Heddon, Helen Iball, and Rachel Zerihan, ‘Come Closer: 
Confessions of Intimate Spectators in One to One Performance’, 
Contemporary Theatre Review, 22:1, (120-133), 122. 
33 Claire Bishop, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’, October, 110 
(Autumn 2004), 51-79 (61). 
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participation in it, not in response to the videos, images, and other secondary 
materials it produces. Further to my interest in the way that awkward 
interactivity forces diagnoses of that interactivity, I am interest in the looping, 
cumulative, feedback effect in which that diagnoses becomes itself an 
awkward intervention. Throughout this complex spreading and entangling of 
awkwardness and diagnoses the social interaction keeps going, but does not 
run smoothly. It is crucial for my theorisation to emerge from the midst of that 
entanglement. I then shuttle between reflections on the intricacies and 
efficacies of my experiences and theoretical engagement with theories of how 
participation should be facilitated (primarily the writings on the social turn in 
art and performance). These two points of engagement are triangulated with a 
theoretical allegiance to the psychoanalytic, cultural criticism of Slavoj Žižek. 
Žižek’s theory is essential to a critical engagement with the awkwardness of 
participatory performance because of his repeated focus on the awkward, 
interacting matrices of desiring, fantasizing, and barely tolerating subjects of 
the 21st century. At times the theorisations I use as a framework for my 
reflections on these projects might seem like an awkward choice, as if I am 
hammering square pegs in to round holes. My rationale for pursuing this 
methodology is not to reduce and reshape the pegs, but to widen the hole. In 
other words, my aim is to allow these performances to stretch the critical and 
theoretical approaches that I apply to them.  
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Claire Bishop’s ‘Lacanian Angle’ 
 
Of the various ways that art critic and historian Claire Bishop takes issue with 
what she defines the ‘Social Turn’ in art and performance (the increase in the 
production, curation, and facilitation of art and performance that frames and 
foregrounds social interaction),34 the argument that I return to most often in 
this thesis emerges from an idea she had for an article that has remained 
unwritten. Reference to this unwritten piece occurred in an interview that 
followed the publication of her provocative ArtForum essay ‘The Social Turn: 
Collaboration and its Discontents’.35 Bishop claims that for some time she has 
been tempted to write an article that would push the ‘ethical question’ that 
arises in response to collaborative and participatory practices ‘a bit further, 
from a Lacanian angle’.36 She goes on to opine that ‘the best socially 
collaborative art does not derive from a super-egoic injunction to "love thy 
neighbour," but from the position of "do not give up on your desire"’.37 She 
then rejects the potential of addressing this angle any further in writing. This is 
primarily because she is ‘unconvinced of its ability to tell us much about 
contemporary art’.38 However, the polemic position that lies beneath her 
proposition runs throughout Bishop’s approaches to collaborative, 
participatory and socially engaged art. She returns briefly to her ‘Lacanian 
angle’ in Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, in 
                                                
34 Claire Bishop, ‘The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents’, 
ArtForum, (February 2006) http://www.artforum.com/inprint/id=10274 
[accessed 1 February 2009]. 
35 Bishop, ‘The Social Turn’. 
36 Bishop in Roche. 
37 Bishop in Roche. 
38 Bishop in Roche. 
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which she clarifies the importance of the distinction between pursuits of 
neighbourly love and pursuits of desire: 
 
Instead of obeying a super-egoic injunction to make ameliorative art, 
the most striking, moving and memorable forms of participation are 
produced when artists act upon a gnawing social curiosity without the 
incapacitating restrictions of guilt. This fidelity to a singularised desire 
rather than to social consensus – enables this work to join a tradition of 
highly authored situations that fuse reality with carefully calculated 
artifice (…).39 
 
The development of my own arguments closely follows this assertion. 
However, mine remains more explicitly related to theories of French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (most often read through Slovenian 
philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Žižek) throughout, whereas his theories 
are not explicitly referenced throughout the rest of Artificial Hells.  
 
The essential difference between the position I take and that which Bishop 
takes is located in her reference to the importance of pursuing guilt-free 
‘singularised’ desire and ‘highly authored’ situations. Bishop references 
Lacan’s approach to Antigone in order to expand on her position, describing 
her as ‘an instance of a subject who does not relinquish her desire: she 
persists in what she has to do, however uncomfortable or difficult this task 
may be’.40 In Sophocles’ play Antigone, Antigone obstinately disobeys 
Creon’s ruling that the body of her brother, Polynices, must be left to rot 
                                                
39 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship (London and New York: Verso, 2012), p. 39. 
40 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 39.  
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outside the city walls, by burying her brother herself.41 Importantly, Creon’s 
ruling and punishment of Antigone is not presented as arbitrary cruelty, but as 
enacted for the ‘good’ of the city, Thebes, and its inhabitants. This means 
Antigone is entirely isolated in her defiance. Even her sister, Ismeme, 
encourages her acquiescence. The punishment for her actions is to be buried 
alive in a cave, and consequently she hangs herself. In response to this act of 
radical defiance Lacan asks, rhetorically: ‘Is there anyone who doesn’t evoke 
Antigone whenever there is a question of a law that causes conflict in us even 
though it is acknowledged by the community to be a just law?’42 However, 
whilst Lacan’s framing of Antigone’s total defiance of the community goes 
someway to supporting Bishop’s call for ‘singularised desire’ to be prioritised 
over ‘social consensus’, Bishop overlooks the fact that Antigone’s actions 
occur in line with the relentless pursuance of a cause. Antigone insists that 
Creon’s ruling is against the gods, and her sacrifice is for a greater cause than 
the ‘good’ that Creon seeks for Thebians.43  
 
For Žižek, however, the real weight and impact of Antigone’s defiance lies not 
in the adherence to a divine ruling, but in the impenetrability of her 
motivations. It is not so much divine law that Antigone sacrifices herself for, as 
much as an ambiguous, and ‘unconditional’ cause.44 In doing so she emerges 
                                                
41 Sophocles, ‘Antigone’ in The Three Theban Plays, trans. Robert Fagles, 
(London: Penguin Classics, 1984), pp. 55-128. 
42 Lacan, Jacques, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII, The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 243.  
43 Lacan, p. 258.  
44 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through 
Popular Culture (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p. 15.  
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as a key example of Žižek’s understanding of the experience of subjectivity as 
a ‘primordial passivity’: 
 
… a sentiency, of responding, of being infinitely indebted and 
responsible to the call of an Otherness which never acquires positive 
features, but always remains withdrawn, the trace of its own absence.45 
 
For Bishop for an artist following Antigone’s example, it is more ethical to ‘act 
in accordance with his or her (unconscious) desire than to modify his or her 
behaviour for the eyes of the Big Other (society, family, Law, expected 
norms)’.46 My own approach, on the other hand, follows Žižek’s focus on 
desire as emerging through our relationship with murky, impenetrable causes 
and elusive authorial figures. In summary, for Bishop participatory and 
collaborative art and performance should be grounded in the ruthless pitting of 
individual desire (the artist’s) against the implicit and explicit consensus of 
those collaborating. For me, collaborative and participatory art should 
foreground the emergence of desires through our relationship to Otherness.  
 
Each of my chapters has a thread of argument that responds to Bishop’s 
position on desire and neighbourly love. Sometimes this thread dominates the 
chapter, and sometimes it supports it or is implied through its propositions. My 
first chapter introduces the key arguments of the social turn. I address the 
writings of Nicolas Bourriaud, Shannon Jackson, and Jen Harvie, through 
each of their approaches to the relational installations of Rirkrit Tiravanija. 
This chapter does not explicitly respond to Bishop’s desire/neighbourly love 
                                                
45 Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the 
(Mis)Use of a Notion (London and New York: Verso, 2002), p. 153. 
46 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 39.  
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stance, but refers to and expands the ways in which her diagnosis of artworks’ 
and performances’ ethical positions and affective frameworks often overlooks 
the potential complexities of the experiences on offer.   
 
Chapter 2 opens with a brief recollection of my experience of Adrian Howell’s 
one on one performance The Pleasure of Being: Washing, Feeding, Holding 
(April 2011). This is offered as an example of a performance in which the line 
between caring for others and pursuing individual desires is blurred. After this 
brief engagement with a case study, I offer an elongated introduction to the 
psychoanalytic theories through which Bishop’s ideas of desire and 
neighbourly love emerged. This includes reference to both problematic and 
productive methods of using psychoanalytic theory as a tool to critically 
respond to performance and art. The chapter traces psychoanalytic theory 
from its position as a tool for identifying and analysing an individual’s desires 
to approaching desire as an inherently inter-relational phenomenon that can 
only be analysed from within the social system through which it emerges. 
Here I suggest that Bishop’s position inherently relies on the former of these 
approaches.  
 
Chapter 3 reflects on a short collaboration between my own performance art 
duo, AuntyNazi, and art group a.a.s. a.a.s’ practice is important in this thesis 
because of their commitment to the contingencies of participatory 
performance. All the incidents, actions and affects that arise through the 
social interactions that a.a.s facilitate can become integral parts of the 
projects and significantly impact upon how they develop. The awkwardness I 
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discuss emerged as a contingent result of the responses of the particular 
individuals involved in the project, which included myself. There was a clash 
of two awkward modes of being: AuntyNazi’s dyspraxia and what I identify as 
a.a.s’ Bartleby-like ethics. Bartleby is the titular character of a short story by 
Hermann Melville who relentlessly and disturbingly responds to all requests 
for productive action with the phrase ‘I prefer not to’.47 I align a.a.s’ practice 
with Bartleby because of their own resistance to fixity, framing and goal-
orientated activity. The contingent nature of the awkward outcomes of the 
project means that this chapter stands out as a test of my dyspraxic- C/PPaR 
methodology. This is because in this case my position as a collaborator had a 
role in the emergence of that awkwardness. My research was not based upon 
first-hand experience of an awkwardness that was already integral to the 
project. However, due to a.a.s’ openness, awkwardness became integral to 
the project. Hence the chapter is important in terms of accounting for a 
practice that embraces awkwardness even if it does not pursue it.  
 
In Chapter 4 I discuss the performance artist David Hoyle, framing 
participation as a form of complex affirmation and engaging with Hoyle’s car-
crash flips between ecstatically convivial and acerbically antagonistic tones. 
The awkwardness discussed in this chapter relates to the ethical 
responsibilities Hoyle confronts his audience with as he engages in potentially 
damaging acts. Those present are challenged to choose whether or not to 
affirm these acts. Further to this, my reading of Hoyle’s own ethical position is 
supported by an engagement with Antigonian ethics. For example, I identify 
                                                
47 Hermann Melville, ‘Bartleby the Scrivenor’ in Billy Budd and Other Stories 
(Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) pp. 1-38. 
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moments in which Hoyle pursues activities despite audiences’ disapproval, 
displaying a kind of Antigonian pursuit of desire that resists the lure of 
communal approval. Following the reading of Antigone offered above, Hoyle’s 
ruthless defiance is not read as reducible to a pursuit of personal desire, but 
instead emerges as a response to a complex and contradictory set of causes.  
 
In Chapter 5 I write about my experiences of collaborating with Reactor on 
several of their multi-layered, large-scale, fantastical worlds of role-play and 
interactive games. Reactor’s practice is framed as an immersion in, and 
foregrounding of the complexities of neighbourly love, as opposed to a pursuit 
of individual desire or a facilitation of cosy socialising that disavowals 
awkwardness. 
 
My conclusion reflects on the way that each of the participatory performance I 
have engaged with facilitate the simultaneous act of being involved, and 
critiquing that which we are involved in. This entails a return to the points 
made in this introduction about the efficacy of awkwardness in relation to 
analysis and critique. It also includes clarifications of the contributions this 
thesis makes to the discourses around the social turn in art and performance, 
revisiting the blind spots that the thesis identifies. I finish with the proposal 
that accounts and critiques of awkward participatory performance should also 
embrace awkwardness. This entails a return to the comments made in the 
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preface to this thesis about the potential efficacy of dyspraxic text in relation to 
Peggy Phelan’s description of performative writing.48 
                                                
48 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), p. 149. 
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Chapter 1 
The Social Turn 
 
This chapter outlines and responds to one of the two major theoretical 
contexts for my thesis, namely, writing that addresses the ‘social turn’ in art 
and performance. The other is Slavoj Žižek’s psychoanalytic politics, which I 
put to work throughout the rest of the thesis. Here I outline key texts that 
define and debate the social turn in art and performance and describe the 
ways in which my research and writing supplements and responds to them. 
Thus, my focus is on the writers that address, contribute to, and, I propose, 
construct this social turn. The three key theorists of the social turn are Nicolas 
Bourriaud, Claire Bishop, and Shannon Jackson. Bishop uses the term ‘social 
turn’ in 2006 as part of a critique of the socio-political and aesthetic qualities 
of recent arts practices that frame and foreground social interactivity and of 
the writings that gather together and celebrate these practices.1 This critique 
arose primarily as a response to Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics (first 
published in French in 1998 and translated into English in 2002) in which he 
collects together ‘a set of artistic practices, which take as their theoretical and 
practical point of departure the whole of human relations and their social 
context, rather than an independent and private space’.2 Bishop usefully, and 
disparagingly, summarises the characteristics of relational aesthetics as ‘low 
                                                
1 Claire Bishop, The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents, ArtForum, 
(February 2006) <http://www.artforum.com/inprint/id=10274> [accessed 1 
February 2009]. 
2 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. by Simon Pleasance and 
Fronza Woods (Dijon: Les presses du reel, 2002), p. 113. 
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impact in appearance’ and ‘basically installation art in format’, but with an 
essential insistence on ‘use rather than contemplation’.3 The key texts of the 
‘social turn’ in visual studies and performance studies include: Grant Kester’s 
book Conversation Pieces: Community + Communication in Modern Art 
(2004); articles by Bishop (2004, 2006), as well as her books Installation Art: 
A Critical History (2005) and Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics 
of Spectatorship (2012); several articles by Jackson as well as her book 
Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics (2006, 2008, 2011); and 
most recently, Jen Harvie’s book Fair Play: Art, Performance and 
Neoliberalism (2013).4 This list is by no means exhaustive, and there are 
several other texts that discuss social engagement, participation, and 
collaboration in contemporary art and performance, including Lars Bang 
Larsen’s essay ‘Social Aesthetics: 11 examples to begin with, in the light of 
parallel history’ (1999); Hal Foster’s article ‘Arty Party’ (2003); Miwon Kwon’s 
book One Place After Another: Site-Specific and Locational Identity (2004); 
artist Liam Gillick’s written response to Bishop’s critique of his and other’s 
                                                
3 Claire Bishop, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’, October, 110 
(Autumn 2004), 51-79 (55). 
4 Grant Kester, Conversation Pieces: Community + Communication in Modern 
Art (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004); Claire Bishop, ‘Antagonism 
and Relational Aesthetics’; Claire Bishop, ‘The Social Turn: Collaboration and 
its Discontents’, ArtForum, (February 2006) 
<http://www.artforum.com/inprint/id=10274> [accessed 1 February 2009]; 
Claire Bishop, Installation Art: A Critical History (London: Tate Publishing, 
2005); Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship (London and New York: Verso, 2012); Shannon Jackson, 
‘Social Practice’, in ‘P-S’, Performance Research, 11:3, (2006) 87-126; 
Shannon Jackson, ‘What is the “Social” in Social Practice?: comparing 
experiments in performance’ in The Cambridge Companion to Performance 
Studies, ed. by Tracy C. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008) pp. 136-150; Shannon Jackson, Social Works: Performing art, 
supporting publics (New York and London: Routledge, 2011); Jen Harvie, Fair 
Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013). 
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work (2006) and Gareth Whites’ Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics 
of the Invitation (2013).5  
 
The first part of this chapter aims to address the exclusions of the social turn 
in art and performance.  This means collecting together moments in which the 
writings that theorise this turn identify the exclusions and disavowals of certain 
participatory artworks. This sets the groundwork for my approach to 
exclusions, which focuses on the methodologies of producing and facilitating 
participatory art and performance that are seemingly left out in the existing 
critical writing on the social turn in art and performance. This focus on the 
exclusions of the social turn in art and performance begins in the second part 
of this chapter, which focuses on challenging the way that these theorisations 
frame participatory performance as either ‘open’ to the inherent contingencies 
of participation, or ‘closed’ - maintaining the authority of the artist(s). In the 
conclusion to this chapter I link my focus on these exclusions to my 
experiences as a dyspraxic person who is invested in producing, performing, 
and participating in contemporary participatory performance.  
 
The main artists, performances and artworks discussed in this chapter are 
Rirkrit Tiravanija, Wochenklausur, Santiago Sierra, and Bjørn Venø. Of these 
                                                
5 Lars Bang Larsen, ‘Social Aesthetics: 11 examples to begin with, in the light 
of parallel history’ in Afterall, no. 1 (London: Central Saint Martins School of 
Art and Design, 1990) 77-87; Hal Foster, ‘Arty Party’ in London Review of 
Books, Vol. 23, (4 Dec. 2003); Miwon Kwon, One Place After Another: Site-
Specific and Locational Identity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) Liam Gillick, 
‘Contingent Factors: A Response to Claire Bishop’s Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics’, October, 115 (Winter 2006), 95–107; Gareth White, 
Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics of the Invitation (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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four I have only experienced Bjørn Venø’s work first hand. I was a participant 
in his performance Inside Out when it was presented at Martin O’ Brien’s and 
Franko B’s Discharge vs. Untouchable event at the Flying Dutchman, London 
(22 June 2014). I have not had first hand experience of the participatory and 
relational artworks by Tiravanija, WochenKlausur, or Sierra. These are 
approached through the lens of those who have already described and 
analysed them. This means there is a heavy leaning towards secondary 
resources in this chapter. This may seem contradictory in a thesis that 
emphasises the importance of participation-as-research when critically 
engaging with participatory art and performance. However, there are two 
essential rationales for my approach in this chapter. The first is that the focus 
of this chapter is on the ways in which participatory art and performance is 
accounted within the framework of the social turn in art and performance. This 
is in order to clarify, supplement, and dispute these analyses, the positions on 
social engagement and efficacy that they support, and the approaches to 
participatory art and performance that they exclude. Having accounted for 
these approaches, I can then refocus and challenge them through my own 
critical accounts of participatory performances that I have participated in. The 
second rationale for approaching the work of Tiravanija, WochenKlausur, and 
Sierra through secondary sources is because the writers of these sources 
rarely evidence their own participation in the performances and artworks they 
write about. Focussing on, and re-performing their own impersonal approach 
and reliance on other’s accounts of participation allows me to clearly 
distinguish that approach from the collaborator/performer-participation-as-
research methodology that I engage with for the rest of the thesis.  
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Working chronologically, the writing below first addresses Relational 
Aesthetics. Using Bourriaud’s book as a point of departure, I then provide 
outlines of Kester’s, Bishop’s, Jackson’s and Harvie’s approaches and 
arguments. As well as providing general introductions to Kester’s, Jackson’s 
and Harvie’s arguments, I focus on their (and Bishop’s) responses to some of 
the claims Bourriaud makes for relational art, particular as it is manifested in 
the relational installations of Tiravanija. Tiravanija is an artist who currently 
lives and works across New York, Berlin and Bangkok, and creates ‘wall 
drawings, sculptures, installations, and text-based works that often relate to 
his social initiative’.6 His installations are, arguably, the most concrete, and 
frequently referenced example of relational art.  He is well known on the 
international art scene for relational installations such as Untitled (Free) 
(1992) at 303 Gallery in New York, which involved him cooking and serving 
Thai rice and curry to gallery visitors.7 The serving of food and gathering of 
people together to eat it is a repeated gesture throughout Tiravanija’s 
practice.  As Bishop suggests, this practice (alongside Liam Gillick’s) is the 
‘clearest expression of Bourriaud’s argument that relational art privileges 
intersubjective relations over detached opticality’.8 Otherwise put, it is an art 
practice, like most of the projects collected together by Bourriaud, in which 
active, inter-relational involvement is repeatedly and insistently prioritised over 
visual spectacle and individualised critical distance. The neatness of the 
                                                
6 ‘FOCUS: Rirkrit Tiravanija’, The Modern < 
http://www.themodern.org/exhibition/upcoming/focus-rirkrit-tiravanija/2177>, 
[accessed 8 August 2014]. 
7 Jackson ‘Social Practice’, 114. 
8 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 61. 
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relationship of Tirivanija’s practice to the social turn is evident in the 
recurrence of (often derivative) references to his work across the writings that 
theorise it. I refer to these responses throughout the following literature 
review, as they encapsulate and introduce some of the key responses to and 
debates around the ethical problems and social and political efficacies of 
relational aesthetics in relation to the social turn in art and performance. 
 
Relational Aesthetics 
 
Relational Aesthetics brings together artworks that invite aesthetic judgment 
‘on the basis of the inter-human relations which they represent, produce or 
prompt’.9  Relationships between artworks and visitors, artists and visitors, 
and visitors and visitors are framed, by Nicolas Bourriaud, as the primary 
focus and material of many art practices in the 1990s. Artworks defined as 
‘relational’ by Bourriaud include Jens Hanning’s publically sited installation 
Turkish Jokes (1994), in which funny stories were broadcast in Turkish in a 
Copenhagen square,10 Alix Lambert’s Wedding Piece (1992) in which she 
married and divorced four different people within the space of six months,11 
and Félix González-Torres’ Untitled (Blue Mirror) (1990), consisting of a stack 
of sky-blue squares of paper that visitors were allowed to remove from the 
gallery.12  
 
                                                
9 Bourriaud, p. 112. 
10 Bourriaud, p. 17. 
11 Bourriaud, p. 34. 
12 Bourriaud, p. 49. 
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Bourriaud’s Approach to the Relational Artworks of Rirkrit Tiravanija 
 
For Bourriaud, relational installations such as Tiravanija’s have the potential to 
form ‘hands on utopias’: intersubjective experiences that counter the 
contemporary commodification of socialisation in which the subject is ‘reduced 
to the condition of a consumer of time and space’.13 This implies that when we 
get together with others to eat Tiravanija’s curry we are able to step outside of 
our position as consumers who must invest, for example, in coffee or beer, or 
be on the receiving end of relentless advertising in order to socially interact 
with one another. The reference to ‘utopias’ suggests that these are ideal, or 
idealised, modes of local sociality. In Bourriaud’s words, in these installations 
we have the opportunity to become more than just a member of a ‘society of 
extras, where everyone finds the illusion of an interactive democracy in more 
or less truncated channels of communication’.14 Tiravanija’s apparent 
‘countering’ of the commoditised, ‘illusory’ interactions offered in 
contemporary society exemplifies Bourriaud’s claim that art ‘today’ (1998 for 
Bourriaud) is (or should be) occupied with ‘modelling possible universes’.15 
This, for Bourriaud, is a progression from the previous aim of art, which was to 
‘prepare and announce a future world’.16 In his words, the ‘role of artworks is 
no longer to form imaginary and utopian realities, but to actually be ways of 
living and models of action within the existing real’.17 Thus, for Bourriaud, 
Tiravanija’s relational installations offer a kind of escape from the 
                                                
13 Bourriaud, p. 9. 
14 Bourriaud, p. 26.  
15 Bourriaud, p. 13. 
16 Bourriaud, p. 13. 
17 Bourriaud, p. 13. 
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consumption-orientated ‘society of extras’, not so that we can change it, but 
so that we might work on better ways of living together within it. 
Conversation Pieces 
 
Grant Kester collects together projects that ‘share a concern with the creative 
facilitation of dialogue and exchange’.18 As in many of Bourriaud’s relational 
artworks these exchanges do not occur in response to a finished art object, 
but are, instead ‘an integral part’ of the artwork itself.19 Also like Bourriaud, 
Kester implies that these practices have the potential to act as spatial and 
temporal retreats from a contemporary social system of relentless 
consumerism and banal and empty transactions. Referring to these 
compromised social systems, and complaining about the collapsed 
differentiation between the aesthetics and style of much contemporary art and 
that of advertising, Kester describes how we are ‘reduced to an atomized 
pseudocommunity of consumers, our sensibilities dulled by spectacle and 
repetition’.20 Kester seeks out practices that resist this atomization and strive 
for the formulation of genuine communality. His definition of dialogical 
practices has a tighter focus than Bourriaud’s relational practices. They do not 
just entail the pursuit of unsullied interactions between individuals, but also 
specifically focus on ‘dialogical’ interaction, hence the titular reference to 
‘conversation pieces’.21 These practices have the potential to reframe 
conversation ‘as an active, generative process that can help us speak and 
                                                
18 Kester, p. 8. 
19 Kester, p. 8. 
20 Kester p. 29. 
21 Kester p.10. 
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imagine beyond the limits of fixed identities, official discourse, and the 
perceived inevitability of partisan political conflict’.22 They focus explicitly on 
the facilitation of the co-presence and exchange of a diversity of socio-political 
positions. In developing this definition Kester follows Mikhail Bakhtin, who 
‘argued that the work of art can be viewed as a kind of conversation – a locus 
of differing meanings, interpretations, and points of view’.23 Again, these are 
not conversations that emerge in response to a work of art ‘as a locus of 
differing meanings’. Instead, the bringing together of differing interpretations 
of, and ameliorative responses to, concrete, and often localised, socio-political 
problems is the substance of the artwork itself.  Hence, the key socio-political 
efficacy of Kester’s Conversation Pieces does not only lie in the creation of 
spaces and contexts in which we can try out idealised modes of socialising 
(as in Bourriaud’s ‘relational’ artworks). More than this, it is important that the 
facilitated dialogue has the potential to lead to concrete change in the 
problematically individualist, consumerist, and socially imbalanced systems 
that they attempt to bracket out.  
 
For Kester, the Austrian group WochenKlausur provide an exemplary case of 
this productive, concrete socio-political intervention and amelioration through 
the facilitation of dialogue. For example, Kester describes WochenKlausur’s  
socially engaged project Intervention to Aid Drug Addicted Women (1994), 
which occurred in Zurich. This project aimed to intervene in the ‘uniquely 
precarious situation’ of drug-addicted women who were supporting 
                                                
22 Kester p. 8. 
23 Kester p. 10. 
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themselves through prostitution.24 In order to address this situation, 
Wochenklausur cannily bought together ‘secretaries of the major Swiss 
political parties, the police commissioner, four of the eight city councillors, 
several corporate managers, and the chief editors of the city’s major 
newspapers as well as sex workers and activists’.25 The outcome of this 
gathering was monetary support for a ‘pension housing fifteen women’.26 As 
well as this direct approach to social change, WochenKlausur’s works, and 
the other practices Kester describes, also differ from Bourriaud’s in that they 
almost always take place outside of the gallery system and often away from 
any context that might clearly position the works as ‘art’. In turn they directly 
challenge the presumptions, restrictions, and exclusions of the contexts and 
locations that they do inhabit. 
 
Kester’s Approach to the Relational Artworks of Rirkrit Tiravanija 
 
Kester describes Bourriaud’s response to Tiravanija’s relational art as a 
celebration of the potential of relational art works to  ‘transcend institutional 
and cultural boundaries’ and create ‘a utopian space of free and open 
exchange’.27 His sceptical response is to note that Tiravanija is ‘a highly 
successful and sought after artist who works and teaches in New York, the 
very epicenter of Western cultural privilege’.28 The problematic relationship of 
                                                
24 WochenKlausur, ‘Intervention to Aid Drug-Addicted Women’ 
http://wochenklausur.at/projekte/02p_lang_en.htm [accessed 29th May 2014]. 
25 Kester p. 100. 
26 Kester p. 100. 
27 Kester, p. 105. 
28 Kester, p. 104. 
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this ‘privilege’ and ‘success’ to Bourriaud’s ideals is, for Kester, evidenced in 
the controversy that surrounded Tiravanija’s installation Untitled 1996 
(Tomorrow is another Day) at Cologne’s Kölnischer Kunstverein (1996). The 
installation consisted of a reconstruction of Tirivanija’s New York apartment, 
offered, according to Kester as an ‘”open space” for cooking, eating, and 
“communal celebration”’.29 At the same time as Tirivanija was reconstructing 
his apartment, the Cologne police were removing a nearby homeless 
settlement. This was because of ‘a local business group called City Marketing 
that was concerned about the threat the homeless would pose to tourism and 
gentrification in the area’.30  Kester goes on to refer to the ‘number of local 
artists and activists’ who ‘found the juxtaposition of Tiravanija’s magnanimous 
spatial gesture (albeit one in which admission was carefully monitored by a 
stern Hausmeister) and the brutality of (business motivated) police attacks on 
the homeless deeply problematic’.31 In response to this ‘deeply problematic’ 
juxtaposition, Kester opines that whilst Tirivanija ‘cannot be blamed for the 
attacks on the homeless community near the gallery’ his projects do ‘suggest 
the challenges facing artists who claim a dedication to dialogue but ignore the 
(political, social, and cultural) context in which that dialogue is situated’.32 
Thus Kester alludes to an unsavoury irony in Tiravanija’s practice in which a 
localised embrace of sharing is supported by, and potentially supports, 
ideologies of privileged accessibility and brutal exclusion. 
 
                                                
29 Kester, p. 105. 
30 Kester, p. 105. 
31 Kester, p. 105. 
32 Kester, p. 105.  
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Claire Bishop 
 
Bishop’s contribution to the theorisation of the social turn in art and 
performance can be broken down into three strands. Firstly, there is the 
problematic delegation of social work away from the government and onto the 
artist. Bishop states that, in the UK: 
 
New Labour have for the last nine years instrumentalised art to fulfill 
policies of social inclusion – a cost-effective way of justifying public 
spending on the arts while diverting attention away from the structural 
causes of decreased social participation, which are political and 
economic (welfare, transport, education, healthcare, etc).33  
 
This leads her to suggest that, given the choice, she would prefer for art to be 
instrumentalised by the art market as opposed to the state. Secondly, Bishop 
accuses writers such as Kester of privileging social work over aesthetics, 
suggesting that in these approaches ‘there can be no failed, unsuccessful, 
unresolved, or boring works of collaborative art because all are equally 
essential to the task of strengthening the social bond’.34 Thirdly, Bishop is 
skeptical about the politics of work that has a ‘feel-good’, ‘love-thy-neighbour’ 
attitude towards community building, social relations and relationality.35 
Bishop’s politics here are openly indebted to the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe and their move towards’ ‘radical democracy’, in which any 
stabilization or resolution is problematically entwined with the quilting effect of 
                                                
33 Claire Bishop in Jennifer Roche, ‘Socially Engaged Art, Critics and 
Discontents: An Interview with Claire Bishop’, Community Arts Network, July 
2006, 
http://www.communityarts.net/readingroom/archivefiles/2006/07/socially_enga
ge.php (accessed 02/02/2009). 
34 Bishop ‘The Social Turn’, 1. 
35 Bishop, in Roche 
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one decision being made ‘at the detriment of another one’.36 Thus for Bishop, 
‘a democratic society is one in which relations of conflict are sustained, not 
erased’.37 It is perhaps due to the final of these three positions that Bishop 
favours socially engaged projects that she describes as ‘relational 
antagonism’.38 However, an antagonistic approach to social engagement 
might also signal an active resistance to the instrumentalisation of art for 
social good. Bishop attributes the term ‘relational antagonism’ to artists such 
as Santiago Sierra, who, like WochenKlausur, has a concretely descriptive 
approach to titling, as demonstrated in the piece 10 Inch Line Shaved on the 
heads of two Junkies who received a shot of Heroin which occurred in San 
Juan de Puerto Rico in the year 2000.39 
 
Claire Bishop’s Approach to the Relational Artworks of Rirkrit Tiravanija 
 
Bishop also discusses Untitled 1996 (Tomorrow is another Day), providing an 
analysis that aligns with Kester’s: 
 
The Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger [a Cologne newspaper] concurred that 
the work offered “a kind of ‘asylum’ for everyone.” But who is the 
“everyone” here? This may be a microtopia, but—like utopia—it is still 
predicated on the exclusion of those who hinder or prevent its 
realization. (It is tempting to consider what might have happened if 
Tiravanija’s space had been invaded by those seeking genuine 
                                                
36 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of 
Democracy’, in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, ed. by Chantal Mouffe 
(London: Routledge 1996), 1-12 (9). 
37 Bishop ‘Antagonism’, 55-56 
38 Claire Bishop, Installation Art, 120-127. 
39 See Santiago Sierra,  http://www.santiago-sierra.com/200011_1024.php 
[accessed 05/05/2011]. 
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“asylum.”)40 
 
 
Bishop’s has an on-going interest in relational artworks that facilitate and 
manipulate the kinds of ‘invasions’ that she implies Tiravanija’s installation 
denied. However, in the practices she admires, it is more likely the artists and 
their audiences that are invading. For example, Bishop returns to Thomas 
Hirschhorn’s Bataille Monument (2002) throughout her responses to relational 
aesthetics and the social turn.41  Bataille Monument was an installation 
situated in Kassel, Germany as part of the Documenta 11 exhibition. Bishop 
describes the work as being comprised of ‘three installations in large 
makeshift shacks, a bar run by a local family, and a sculpture of a tree, all 
erected on a lawn surrounded by two housing projects’.42 It was realised 
through collaboration with paid members of the mainly Turkish community that 
inhabited its site. Visitors had to travel some distance from the main sites of 
‘Documenta 11’, via a local Turkish taxi company, in order to reach 
Hirschorn’s installations. They were then ‘stranded at the Monument until a 
return cab became available’.43 The relevance of this piece in relation to 
relational artwork’s (negation of) invasions, or ‘intrusions’ is summarised in 
Bishop’s analysis: 
 
 
In locating the Monument in the middle of a community whose ethnic 
and economic status did not mark it as a target audience for 
Documenta, Hirschhorn contrived a curious rapprochement between 
the influx of art tourists and the area’s residents. Rather than make the 
local populace subject to what he calls the “zoo effect,” Hirschhorn’s 
                                                
40 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 68. 
41 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 75-77; Installation Art, pp. 123-127; ‘The Social 
Turn’, 181; Artificial Hells, pp. 21-23. 
42 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 75. 
43 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 75. 
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project made visitors feel like hapless intruders.44  
 
A major reason for Bishop’s interest in the potential for relational practices to 
facilitate invasions and intrusions is her investment in the socio-political 
efficacy of the antagonisms that might arise from them, again indebted to 
Mouffe and Laclau’s approach to democracy, as mentioned above. This leads 
to the assertion that relational installations such as Tiravanija’s, and the utopic 
political systems that they respond to, attempt a problematic sidestepping of 
antagonism by barring intrusions from those prejudicially framed as potential 
antagonists and focusing on the facilitation and maintenance of conviviality. 
The risk here is that without antagonism ‘there is only the imposed consensus 
of authoritarian order—a total suppression of debate and discussion, which is 
inimical to democracy’.45 Thus, for Bishop, the socio-political problems of 
Tiravanija’s work are not only present through its limited accessibility, but also 
in the implicit suppression and authority experienced by those who are able to 
access them.   
 
In Artificial Hells, Bishop returns to the recurring problem of Tiravanija’s 
exclusivities in a brief discussion of another cooking-utensil based relational 
installation called untitled 1993 (flädlesuppe). The installation, which was 
exhibited as part of the ‘Backstage’ exhibition at the Hamburger Kunstverein 
(1993), was only operational before the exhibition opened and therefore not 
usable by the public. Responding to this installation, Bishop summarises both 
her and Kester’s critique of the claims made for Tiravanija’s practice: 
                                                
44 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 75-76. 
45 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 66.  
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One of the paradoxes of Tiravanija’s practice is that in intensifying 
convivial relations for a small group of people (in this case, the 
exhibiting artists), it produces greater exclusivity vis-à-vis the general 
public.46 
 
 
In responding to these observations, I am interested in what Tiravanija would 
have to do in order to frame these ‘exclusivities’ and misguided ‘intensifying’ 
of conviviality as an integral part of the work’s politics. Jackson alludes to the 
trigger-happy way in which Bishop fires off diagnoses of a work’s convivial or 
antagonistic approach to interactivity and participation, noting that ‘certain 
artists – such as Rirkrit Tirivanija and Liam Gillick – end up on the “bad” feel-
good side of [Bishop’s] critical equation while others – such as Santiago 
Sierra and Thomas Hirschhorn – end up on her “good” antagonistic side’.47 
She then goes on to point out that ‘sometimes Bishop doesn’t like art that is 
feeling good, and sometimes she doesn’t like art that is doing good’.48 It is 
clear that despite its lack of explicit ‘bad-feelings’, Bishop does identify a 
murky undergrowth of antagonism beneath what she dismisses as 
Tiravanija’s ‘cozy situations’.49 This underlying antagonism lies in the project’s 
exclusions and the potential resentment that this exclusivity breeds. Could this 
playing out of the reliance of cozy community building on uncomfortable 
antagonisms be framed as the key political message of the work? In other 
words, is it not possible to frame the uneasy complicity between ‘good-feeling’ 
and ‘bad-doing’ as the experience Tiravanija is offering up for our interaction 
and critical reflection? This would position the work alongside, as opposed to 
                                                
46 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 209. 
47 Jackson, ‘Social Practice’, 115. 
48 Jackson, ‘Social Practice’, 115. 
49 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 79. 
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in opposition to, Bishop’s antagonistic artists (such as Santiago Sierra). I 
return to Bishop’s reductive and simplifying approach to conviviality and 
antagonism in my writing on performance artist David Hoyle (Chapter 4).  
 
Before moving on to a discussion of Jackson’s work on the social turn and her 
responses to Tiravanija’s practice, it is important to note that Bourriaud’s 
discussion of conviviality is more nuanced and complex than Bishop’s 
dismissals suggest. Apparently pre-empting critiques such as Bishop’s, he 
addresses those who might frame a Tiravanija installation as ‘nothing more 
than a phonily utopian pantomime’.50 For Bourriaud, this is not because, as 
my position states (influenced by Jackon’s), a relational work’s conviviality or 
antagonism is often contingent on who the participants, secondary viewers or 
critics are, and how they participate, look and criticise. It is, instead, because 
such responses are ‘mistaking the object of the practice’.51  This is because, 
in Bourriaud’s words, ‘the purpose is not conviviality, but the product of this 
conviviality, otherwise put, a complex form that combines a formal structure, 
objects made available to visitors, and the fleeting image issuing from 
collective behaviour.52 Bourriaud states that what ‘these critics overlook is that 
the content of artistic proposals has to be judged in a formal way: in relation to 
art history, and bearing in mind the political value of forms’.53 He is suggesting 
that we frame conviviality as a ‘formal’ aspect of relational artworks, and that 
form itself is inherently political. For Bourriaud, the word ‘form’ in this context 
relates to a ‘bringing together’ of ‘heterogeneous units’ on a level, in order to 
                                                
50 Bourriaud, p. 82. 
51 Bourriaud, p. 83. 
52 Bourriaud, p. 83. 
53 Bourriaud, p. 82. 
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create a relationship to the world’.54 In line with this definition, he suggests 
that for artists who engage with conviviality as a formal quality, it ‘is not a 
matter of representing angelic worlds, but of producing the conditions 
thereof’.55 It is clear that for Bishop, the conditions needed to create ‘angelic 
worlds’ would be unlikely to include overt conviviality. However, she does not 
seem to hear Bourriaud’s call to frame conviviality as a complex formal 
component of these projects as well as to focus on the menagerie of other 
formal attributes that produce, and are produced by conviviality. Whilst there 
is an implied reference to these ideas in her suggestion that for ‘Bourriaud, 
the structure is the subject matter—and in this he is far more formalist than he 
acknowledges’,56 her focus on the misguided political ideology of relentless 
pursuits of conviviality suggests that she does not take on board the 
complexity of the role of conviviality in the aesthetics and politics of Relational 
Aesthetics. This seems particularly neglectful considering her pursuit of 
artworks and critical responses that ‘attempt to think the aesthetic and the 
social/political together’.57 
 
Shannon Jackson  
 
In her essay ‘What is the “social” in social practice?’ Jackson compares ‘one 
artist [Santiago Sierra] who calls himself a “Minimalist with a guilt complex” 
with another [Shannon Flattery, founder of ‘Touchable Stories’] who seeks to 
                                                
54 Bourriaud, p. 111. 
55 Bourrriaud, p. 83. 
56 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 64. 
57 Bishop, ‘The Social Turn’. 
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give marginal sectors of society the opportunity to “define their own voice”.58 
Sierra’s controversial installations, celebrated by Bishop for their explicit social 
antagonisms,59 include Eight People Paid to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes 
(Guatemala, 1999) and 250cm Line Tattooed on Six Paid People (Havana, 
1999). They enact problematic modes of labour, delegation, exploitation, and 
economic precarity, through minimalist performance installations.  Flattery’s 
‘Touchable Stories’ are described by Jackson as ‘a Boston-based community 
arts group that creates multiyear, interactive, site-specific oral history 
installations in neighbourhood community spaces’.60 Jackson exposes and 
examines the surprising overlaps in the way both these seemingly opposing 
practices work with and against duration, instrumentalisation, didacticism, and 
intelligibility. Through this, she demonstrates the contingencies, prejudices, 
and ideologies that underlie and support the attribution of the term ‘social’ to 
an art practice. This troubling of the terminologies, lexicons, and disciplines 
used to organise, celebrate, deride, or reduce art practices runs throughout 
Jackson’s work. It is a key influence in my own building of awkward bridges 
between terminologies and practices (i.e. the social turn and Hoyle’s raucous, 
‘avant garde’ cabaret) and between one practice and another (i.e. Hoyle’s 
solo club performances and Reactor’s publically sited, collaboratively 
developed events and experiences).   
 
                                                
58 Jackson, ‘What is the “Social” in Social Practice?’, p. 144. 
59 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 78-79; Installation Art, pp. 120-122. 
60 Jackson, ‘What is the “Social” in Social Practice?’, p. 144. 
 66 
In her book Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics, Jackson neatly 
summarise her theory of the ‘contingency of perception’, which runs 
throughout her work and influences my own:61   
 
Our evaluations of work depend not only upon critical histories but also 
upon disciplinary perceptual habits that can make for drastically 
different understandings of what we are in fact encountering. 
Perceptions of stasis and durationality, passivity and activity, stillness 
and action, might well be in the eye (and body) of the beholder.62 
 
 
In Social Works the focus of this contingent approach to perception is 
‘support’. In her first chapter, which is the one most relevant to this thesis, she 
works to undo the polarization of artistic autonomy and systems of care and 
dependence. She insists that whether ‘cast in aesthetic or social terms, 
freedom and expression are not opposed to obligation and care, but in fact 
depend upon each other’.63 The modes of support that Jackson addresses 
include those ‘that sustain not only the life of art, but also the lives of artists’.64 
This leads to the ‘contention that some socially engaged art can be 
distinguished from others by the degree to which they provoke reflection on 
the contingent systems that support the management of life’.65 She insists 
that: 
 
By emphasising – rather than being embarrassed by – the 
infrastructural operations of performance, we might find a different way 
to join aesthetic engagement to the social sphere, mapping a shared 
                                                
61 Jackson, Social Works, p. 4. 
62 Jackson, Social Works, p. 4. 
63 Jackson, Social Works, p. 14. 
64 Jackson, Social Works, p. 16. 
65 Jackson, Social Works, p. 29. 
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interest in the confounding of insides and outsides, selves and 
structures.66 
 
 
Following Jackson’s position, my own interest is in the way the participatory 
performances I discuss occasionally attempt to set up their own, autonomous 
forms of co-dependence, support networks, and social spheres within the 
performance itself. The ‘confounding of insides and outsides’ thus emerges 
through the affirmative, negating, comfortable or awkward relationships that 
these internal networks of care and responsibility have with those that support 
the performances, or exist outside of them.  
 
The text that stands out as a key point of origin for the theoretical research for 
this thesis, and seemingly Jackson’s own contributions to the ‘social turn’, is 
her contribution to the ‘Lexicon’ issue of Performance Research. This issue 
consists of an A-Z of key terms and concepts that each contributor ‘deemed to 
be making an impact on performance in its broadest sense, and would reflect 
aspects of the current state of ideas and practices in the field of contemporary 
performance research’.67 Jackson contributes the term ‘social practice’, 
asking: ‘What is social practice? How do we know when we are in the 
presence of it? What frameworks and methods are most appropriate for 
understanding what it is and what it does?’68 A key thread in Jackson’s 
writings on the social turn addresses the ways that others, particularly Bishop, 
generate and perpetuate limited and limiting answers to these questions. For 
Jackson many of the current, routine frameworks and methods used for 
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understanding what social practice is, and what it is for, reductively cast 
socially-engaged work as ‘overly pre-occupied with content over form and with 
accessibility over critical antagonism’.69  This position is underlined by an on-
going concern over ‘how often a critic’s reaction to social content has 
obscured his or her ability to credit a work with any kind of formal 
innovation’.70 Jackson works to challenge this obscuration and reduction, 
exposing the affinity of its ‘critical barometers’ with anti-theatrical prejudice 
and, more problematically, with ‘previous critical movements that notoriously 
rationalized the subordination of feminist, anti-racist and anti-homophobic 
art’.71 The key elements of this ‘critical barometer’ are summarised in 
Jackson’s observation that the ‘aesthetic turn to the social is regularly cast 
and critiqued with the lexicons used to critique performance –feel-good, 
content-heavy, literal, accessible, consumable, unclear authorship, etc’.72 
Jackson asks a series of essential questions in order to highlight the 
contingencies of these lexicons, and the trigger-happy ways in which they are 
fired out as a means to negatively diagnose an artwork’s capitulations to 
social amelioration as opposed to aesthetic and formal vanguardism. For 
example, she approaches Bishop’s critique of ‘unclear authorship’ by asking:  
 
What if a radical openness to collaborative authorship is not so much a 
moral reification of ‘the Christian good soul’, but a formal experiment in 
whether ‘the Author’ is in fact ‘dead’? 
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Here Jackson is suggesting that the un-rooted, dissipated authorship of a 
collaborative project productively refuses a reductive interpretive approach 
based on ascertaining the intentions and desires of an individual author. 
Roland Barthes’ The Death of the Author is a particular effective text to use in 
a disagreement with a ‘critic’ such as Bishop, because of its claims of the 
inter-relationship between such expert criticism and authorship: 
 
Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself 
the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostasis: society, 
history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author has been 
found the text is ‘explained’ – victory to the critic.73 
 
 
Jackson’s use of Barthes’ theory of authorship and criticism here implies that 
Bishop’s preference for clear, individual authorship might emerge more from a 
concern for her own profession and cultural capital than the capitulation of 
artistic autonomy. My own approach to the question of authorship, which 
emerges from Jackson’s argument here, focuses on the relationships and 
overlaps between participants and authors. I observe awkward instabilities 
around authorship and authority in each of the performances and projects I 
examine. 
 
The next essential question in Jackson’s troubling of Bishop’s ‘critical 
barometer’ addresses her derision towards ‘feel-good’ art.   For Jackson, 
Bishop equates Mouffe’s ‘(post)-socialist theory of antagonism with the felt 
antagonism of a spectator’s encounter with appropriately edgy art material’.74 
                                                
73 Barthes, Roland, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image Music Text, trans. by 
Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 142-148 (p. 147). 
74 Jackson, ‘Social Practice’, 115. 
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Jackson refers to the WochenKlausur project mentioned in my discussion of 
Kester above. She asks: 
 
When prostitutes and civic leaders talk on a boat about drugs, is such a 
social practice a capitulation to “consensus politics” if they try to 
understand each other? Is it insufficiently “antagonistic” if they find 
each other legible? Or is the oddity of that boat and its members itself a 
gesture that “antagonizes” the instrumental processes and habituated 
divisions of a social welfare operation?75 
 
 
This demonstrates what Jackson will later define as the ‘contingency of 
perception’ in defining or locating an artwork’s antagonism or conviviality.76 
My own approach to consensus, conviviality, and antagonism is strongly 
influenced by this suggestion that an artwork’s position as either ‘feel-good’ or 
‘feel-bad’ depends on who is applying these definitions, and what agendas lie 
beneath this act of defining. However, in relation to these allusions towards 
the potential ‘contingencies of perception’ and reductiveness of categorizing 
relational and participatory art and performance based on conviviality or 
antagonism, it is important to outline another of Bishop’s key critiques of the 
claims made for Tiravanija’s practice.  This is because her position here, 
which is based on skepticism towards artworks that overly embrace 
‘openness’ in terms of their authorial status, functionality, and meaning, 
implies an equal skepticism towards critical responses, such as Jackson’s, 
that focus on the contingencies of categorizing, evaluating, and analyzing 
artworks.  
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Bishop notes that the social efficacy of relational artworks is often attributed to 
their position as a ‘potential trigger for participation’ and a ‘desire to activate 
the viewer’.77 In connection to this, for Bishop, there are three key writers 
whose theories on the role of authorship underlie what Bourriaud describes as 
a ‘forever unfinished discursiveness’.78 These are Walter Benjamin’s ‘Author 
as Producer’ (1934), Roland Barthes’ ‘The Death of the Author’ (1968), and 
Umberto Eco’s The Open Work (1962).79 This implies, firstly, that the 
apparent openness of relational aesthetics emerges through what Bishop 
observes as an overly literal Barthesian undoing of authorial authority in 
collaborative and interactive installations.80 This is due to their frequent 
incorporation and remixing of art works by others, and their inherent 
collaborative methodology. This means it is often difficult to ‘identify who has 
made a particular piece of “relational” art’, leading to a ‘blurring’ of the ‘imprint 
of individual authorial status’.81  For Barthes, this ‘blurring’ of authorial status 
has the potential to break down some of the ‘limits’ that he suggests an author 
imposes, because to ‘give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to 
furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.82 In turn, the overtly 
interactive nature of relational works such as Tiravanija’s might be said to 
follow Benjamin’s call for art and literature to lead ‘consumers to production’ 
                                                
77 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 61-62. 
78 Bourriaud, p. 26.  
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and be capable of ‘making co-workers out of readers or spectators’.83 
However, for Bishop, this approach to openness misunderstands these 
theoretical concepts of what Eco describes as an ‘Open Work’. As Bishop 
points out, for Eco, ‘every work of art is potentially “open” since it may 
produce an unlimited range of possible readings’.84  Therefore the fact that 
Bourriaud only applies these post-authorial concepts of openness to relational 
practices, such as Tiravanija’s, overly literalizes this concept ‘and thereby 
redirects the argument back to artistic intentionality rather than issues of 
reception’.85 In other words, despite a declared fidelity to the concept of the 
‘death of the author’, the focus is still on the intention of the artist to be ‘open’. 
This is evident in the artwork’s social structures, the modes and sensibilities of 
the interactivity, and the ways in which participation is triggered or invited. In 
her footnotes Bishop goes further, suggesting that this ‘approach actually 
forecloses “open-ended” readings, since the meaning of the work becomes so 
synonymous with the fact that its meaning is open’.86 Following Bishop, I am 
interested in the potentials of works that have a complex relationship with this 
open/closed polarity. I return to this in my writing on Bjørn Venø’s Outside In 
at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 Benjamin, 6. 
84 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 62. 
85 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 62.  
86 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 62, n. 30. 
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Jackson’s Approach to the Relational Artworks of Rirkrit Tiravanija 
 
In discussing Jackson’s approach to Tiravanija’s practice and relational 
aesthetics, I would like to reiterate Bourriaud’s insistence on this relation of 
conviviality to a relational installation’s formal qualities, on its position as a 
formal attribute itself, and on the formal outcomes that conviviality produces. 
This is an important distinction because it frames ‘good-feeling’ as a material 
of the work, not merely as an aim or serendipitous outcome. Jackson 
acknowledges this when she observes that relational artworks such as 
Tiravanija’s regularly play with the convention of changing ‘visual art 
understandings of what constitutes the “material” of the art object’.87 She 
exemplifies this by noting that Tiravanija’s ‘didactics’ include ‘reference to 
materials, but instead of writing “oil on canvas” or “wire on steel” he writes that 
his materials are “lots of people”’.88 It follows that if an artwork’s visitors can 
be framed as a primary material of that artwork, then presumably the affective 
qualities of their interactions can as well. This is the important point that 
Bourriaud suggests that critics such as Bishop ignore. It is an essential point 
for me, because part of the methodology of this thesis includes framing the 
awkwardness of social interactions as a material (i.e. a key component of 
what Bourriaud describes as an artwork’s ‘structural unity’) of the 
performances and artworks in which it occurs,89 as opposed to an incidental, 
unwelcome consequence. The exception to this is a.a.s’ Xe54 project, in 
which, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, awkwardness was incidental. However, 
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I argue that it was not unwelcome once it was produced and therefore that it 
became a material of the project.  
 
Jackson’s reference to Tiravanija’s framing of ‘lots of people’ as his artwork’s 
‘material’ leads into a focus on the word ‘substrate’ in Bourriaud’s description 
of relational aesthetics as an ‘art form where the substrate is formed by 
intersubjectivity’.90 Jackson notes that this use of the word ‘substrate’ places 
relational art in ‘an ongoing conversation on the nature of “support”’.91 She 
links Bourriaud’s use of the word to an undoing of ‘the conventions of the 
nineteenth-century idealist aesthetic’, which ‘argued that art achieved its 
greatness to the degree that its representations transcended its material 
substrate, rising above its raw material and its social apparatus of 
production’.92 If early-mid 20th Century art foregrounded its reliance on, for 
example, paint, canvases, and gallery walls, mid-late 20th Century art 
foregrounded its reliance on people. This developing relationship to ‘raw 
materials’ is important to Jackson, because of her interest, throughout Social 
Works, in ‘the tendency, or not’ for artists and critics ‘to engage in the “avowal 
of support”’.93 Tiravanija’s foregrounding of ‘lots of people’ as a primary 
material of his installations suggests that he is invested in the ‘avowal’ of the 
fact that art practices are supported by networks of interacting humans. 
However, Jackson questions ‘whether such relational activity can be 
interpreted as a revelation of interdependent support, even if the support has 
moved from the static undermounted place of the base to the lateralized 
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dynamic of the living infrastructure’.94 This questioning links to Jackson’s 
snide, but evocative description of Tiravanija as an ‘international art darling’, 
thus hinting at a reinforcement of the concerns around Tiravanija’s elite 
cultural status put forward by Kester and Bishop. As a counterpoint in this 
discussion of the relation between an interactive artwork and its supports and 
substrates, Jackson refers to the socially-engaged interventions of Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles.95 She does this in order to ‘demonstrate earlier feminist 
and class-conscious innovations that preceded the conceptual gestures of 
“relational aesthetics”’.96 Ukeles’ projects include Touch Sanitation (1977-
1980), ‘in which she shook the hands of thousands of sanitation workers’ and 
The Social Mirror  (1983), a ‘reflective garbage truck’.97 For Jackson, this 
focus on ‘the unrecognized labour of domesticity and sanitation’ demonstrates 
‘how the so-called inter-subjective substrates of relational art simultaneously 
interact with systemic substrates of material support’.98 Following this, 
Jackson’s argument in response to Tiravanija’s practice and the claims 
Bourriaud makes for it can be summarised as another observation of its 
paradoxical exclusions. Whilst his installations facilitate and foreground a 
horizontal network of interacting individuals, it does not address the vertical 
structures of power that these interactions rely on. In other words, it excludes 
the ‘substrate’ of gallery cleaners, invigilators, ticket sellers, and so on, from 
the lateral interactions that he triggers and facilitates. 
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Jen Harvie 
 
Jen Harvie’s book Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism focuses on 
what she describes as ‘”aesthetically turned” socially turned’ art and 
performance, specifically in London, UK.99 It has less of a direct relationship 
to my research than Bourriaud’s, Jackson’s, and Bishop’s writings, and so I 
only offer a brief outline here. This is because its focus is less on the internal 
ethics and politics of participatory performances and more on the external 
material conditions and social structures that surround and support them. The 
main argument of Harvie’s book outlines the potential for these relational and 
participatory art and performance practices to be directly (rather than only 
ideologically) complicit in the perpetuation of neoliberal capitalist ideology and 
activity. For example, she examines ways in which artists are encouraged to 
position themselves as entrepreneurial, emerging as ‘artrepreneurs’ who 
‘work privately for her own advantage’.100 Harvie critiques artworks and 
performances that are socially engaged due to their temporary locational 
positioning in disused spaces (known as ‘pop-ups’) in often culturally and 
economically deprived areas. They are critiqued for their placement in 
leveraging the ‘gentrification that displaces underprivileged Londoners’.101 
When Harvie does address the modes of participation internal to art and 
performance projects she does so in reference to contemporary models of 
labour and consumerism. On the one hand, she focuses on projects in which 
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participants find themselves enacting tasks that naturalise the problematic 
predominance of unpaid and precarious labour, writing that:  
 
Thus, like [Richard] Sennett’s worker in the institutions of the new 
capitalism, the audience member in emerging participatory and art 
‘abandon[s] past experience’ and relinquishes the opportunity to ‘take 
pride in being good at something specific’ (Sennett, 2006, p.5). The 
audience member as worker in this flexible art and performance 
economy is rendered, in many ways, insecure, deskilled and 
alienated.102  
 
On the other hand this frames some modes of interactive theatre (such as that 
by the London based theatre company Punch Drunk) as reflective of the 
hollow consumerist agendas of the experience economy.103 Playing fairly 
herself throughout, Harvie also points out the potentials for increased agency, 
empowerment and democracy to be promoted and exercised in participatory 
and immersive contemporary art and performance. 
 
Harvie’s Approach to the Relational Artworks of Rirkrit Tiravanija  
 
Harvie’s response to Tiravanija’s practice is brief but, again, has an essential 
relationship to my research methodology. Harvie questions the implied 
uniqueness of relational aesthetics in relation to the claims of socio-political 
efficacy that Bourriaud makes for it, suggesting that ‘even artworks which do 
not engage audiences in a familiar social setting such as a mealtime, also 
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often engage them socially’.104 Harvie refers to the various  ‘large-scale 
installations’ that have been produced in Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall.105  For 
example, the ‘otherworldly environment of Olafur Eliasson’s The Weather 
Project (2003)’ could, she suggests, be ‘considered relational’ because the 
‘immersion of audiences in a shared environment requires those audiences to 
experience the artwork in relation not only to “itself” but also to each other’.106  
 
The widening of the criteria for what might be considered ‘relational’ and 
‘socially engaged’ is a key aim of this thesis. Picking up on Harvie’s response 
to Tiravanija’s work, I would argue that social interaction not only occurs 
without an artwork existing explicitly as a social setting, but, following Bishop, 
that artworks with an overt attention on being together with others risk diluting 
and intervening in our relationship with those others.107 This is primarily 
because it shifts our focus away from those with whom we are interacting, 
why we are interacting with them, and what the outcomes of that interaction 
might be, and onto the mere fact that we are interacting with them. In my 
arguments, awkwardness emerges as a disruptive element in this dilution. 
Without it, social interaction becomes synonymous with the food in Bishop’s 
observation that ‘what Tiravanija cooks, how and for whom, are less important 
to Bourriaud than the fact that he gives away the results of his cooking for 
free’.108 As Bishop points out, to his credit, Bourriaud has acknowledged this 
as a potential problem: 
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Bourriaud recognizes this problem—but he does not raise it in relation 
to the artists he promotes: ‘Connecting people, creating interactive 
communicative experience,’ he says, ‘What for? If you forget the ‘what 
for?’ I’m afraid you’re left with simple Nokia art—producing 
interpersonal relations for their own sake and never addressing their 
political aspects.’109 
 
 
However, for Bishop, Bourriaud’s recognition of this problem is let down by his 
focus on Tiravanija, whose projects fall ‘short of addressing the political 
aspect of communication’. 110 One reason Bishop gives for these short-fallings 
is the failure to examine who these works are for, as discussed above in 
reference to Untitled 1996 (Tomorrow is another Day) and the plight of the 
homeless individuals being evicted nearby. Following this critique, it could 
also be argued that relational artworks risk performing, and potentially 
perpetuating, what Jodi Dean describes as ‘Communicative Capitalism’.111 
This concept refers to the problematic shift from communication as a 
message, to communication as mere ‘contribution’:  
 
The message is simply part of a circulating data stream. Its particular 
content is irrelevant. Who sent it is irrelevant. Who receives it is 
irrelevant. That it need be responded to is irrelevant. The only thing 
that is relevant is circulation, the addition to the pool. Any particular 
contribution remains secondary to the fact of circulation.112 
 
 
Dean is specifically referring to the internet (especially social networking), 
print and broadcast media here. However, just as these formats repeatedly re-
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iterate an injunction to “keep communicating!” whilst diluting and negating the 
relevance of what we are communicating, so, ‘relational aesthetics’ risks an 
over-excited call to ‘keep interacting!’ whilst implicitly urging us to disregard 
the question of why, with whom, and what for.  
Relational Art’s Exclusions  
 
Throughout these responses to Tiravanija’s practice and the claims Bourriaud 
makes for it, we are confronted with an array of exclusions: cultural barriers 
and watchful ‘Hausmeisters’ literally exclude people from these installations; 
the concrete problems of space sharing (i.e. between those who need to sell 
and those who need to eat and sleep) are excluded from relational artwork’s 
idyllic ideologies of intersubjectivity; those at the bottom ‘substrate’ level of the 
vertical social and material systems that support relational artworks are 
excluded from their performances of horizontality; the antagonism inherent to 
and necessary for democracy is excluded in favor of a totalitarianism of 
conviviality; over-enthusiastic embraces of authorial openness risk excluding 
responses that do anything other than re-iterate the fact that the work is open; 
and finally, a foregrounding of relationality as the key formal aspect of 
relational artworks might end up excluding our abilities to actually relate to 
each other within them. In responding to this list of exclusions, I will now focus 
on the ways in which the management and openness of relational art and 
participatory is theorized. This leads to the proposition that these theorizations 
of the social turn in art and performance exclude work in which the line 
between the authority of the artist and the agency of the participant is unclear. 
My argument reinforces the importance of participation-as-research because 
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it suggests that one can only really find out about the boundaries and 
malleability of a participatory performance or relational artwork by getting 
involved and testing them.  
 
Management and Unexpectedness 
 
In the following section I return to the alleged exclusions that arise when 
artists and critics focus on and prioritise ‘openness’. I work from Bishop’s 
suggestion that in Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics, ‘the meaning of the work 
becomes so synonymous with the fact that its meaning is ‘open’ that it ends 
up foreclosing its open-endedness. 113 Following relational aesthetic’s 
apparent bias for ‘use’ over ‘contemplation’, I shift the focus of this suggestion 
away from meaning-making and onto action and interaction. This leads to the 
argument that the more ‘open’ a relational artwork claims to be about how we 
act and interact within it the less impact our actions and interactions might 
actually have. In this section I frame the potential use-value of a relational 
artwork as residing not, as Bourriaud (and Kester) would have it, in its efficacy 
as a space for rehearsing ideal ways of being with each other (enacting ‘ways 
of living and models of action within the existing real’),114 but as a space for 
trying out methods of political resistance and social disobedience. My specific 
interest is in the potential for artworks and performances that, at first, seem to 
have a limiting and manipulative impact on what participants can or should do, 
to be revealed as malleable, extendable and undoable in response to 
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participants’ actions and interactions.  I develop this argument through a 
comparison between an account that Jackson gives of an incident in Santiago 
Sierra’s installation 9 Forms of 100 x 100 x 600 cm Each, Constructed to Be 
Supported Perpendicular to a Wall (June 2002, Deitch Projects, New York, 
USA) and a description of and reflection on one of my own experience of 
participation.115 9 Forms was an installation that required eighteen people, 
hired through an ‘employment agency’, to hold the titular beams against a 
wall.116 The participatory performance I experienced was called Outside In 
(2014) (mentioned on page 3 of my introduction to this thesis) by 
photographer and performance artist Bjørn Venø. Venø is a London-based 
artist who has presented photography, performances, and workshops 
internationally since 2004.  
 
Bourriaud distinguishes between interactive artworks that embrace the 
unpredictability of bringing people together or inviting them to interact, and 
those that attempt a stricter or more deceptive organisation, control or 
manipulation of individuals and their interactions with the artwork and/or each 
other.  He writes that a ‘work may operate like a relational device containing a 
certain degree of randomness, or a machine provoking and managing 
individual and group encounters’.117 This suggests that user-friendliness is 
connected to clarity around how much freedom we have when participating. 
For Bourriaud, defining and knowing how, and to what extent we can ‘use’ the 
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various elements and objects of a relational installation is important.  At first 
Tiravanija’s practice seems to fit the latter of Bouriaud’s distinctions, being 
reasonably unrestrictive in the way participants might respond to the offer of 
curry or accommodation. However, Kester’s observation of ‘stern 
Hausmeisters’ suggests more management is occurring than it might seem at 
first. Another of Bourriaud’s examples of a relational installation working with a 
looser ‘relational device’ would be Lincoln Tobier, who, on several occasions 
‘set up a radio station in art galleries, and invited the public to a discussion 
then broadcasted over the airwaves’.118 An example of a more manipulative 
and provocative approach to interactivity described by Bourriaud would be 
Angus Fairhurst’s interventionist installation which used ‘airwave-pirating 
equipment’ to link two galleries together via their telephones.119 The system 
was rigged so that each person ‘thought it was the other person who had 
called, so their exchanges would end up in an improbable 
misunderstanding’.120 Bourriaud provides a useful example of a relational 
artwork that leans towards provocation and management: untitled (Blue 
Mirror) by Félix González-Torres (introduced above). The installation 
consisted of a pile of blue posters that visitors were allowed to take away. The 
options of interactivity seem to be quite limited here: you can either take a 
poster, or not. Therefore it would be inappropriate to identify this piece with 
the ‘randomness’ of interactivity, despite the fact that visitor’s interactions 
significant impact upon the work (diminishing it or even getting rid of it 
altogether). I refer to Untitled (Blue Mirror) here because Bourriaud asks two 
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important rhetorical questions in response to it. These questions have 
particular relevance to my own approach to ‘openness’. The first is ‘what 
happens if lots of visitors walk off in turn with these sheets of paper offered to 
an abstract public?’ The second asks what ‘process would cause the piece to 
change and then vanish?’121 These questions are important to me because of 
my interest in relational art and participatory performance that survive and 
thrive upon what might at first seem to be destructive actions by participants. 
In such practices, the response to these questions would focus on the ability 
of the piece to become something else, something unexpected that is partially 
authored by the participant. This is why I focus on interactive art and 
performances in which the distinction between unexpectedness and 
‘management’ is revealed to be less clear. I am interested in participatory art 
and performance in which a sense of awkwardness might arise in response to 
an ambiguity around how much agency and control artists or participants have 
over the outcomes and effects of ‘relational devices’: not because they don’t 
have agency, but because they are unsure of the parameters of their 
participation.  
 
It is important to briefly clarify here that this observation of a limited interaction 
in González-Torres’ installation is no way a value judgement. The work is 
exemplary of a practice in which, as Bourriaud explains, ‘the most personal 
and complex memories’ are turned into ‘clear, spare forms’.122 The 
heightened and foregrounded inter-relation between the presence of others 
and an inevitable loss in Untitled (Blue Mirror) emerges from an on-going 
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engagement with the theme, as described by Bourriaud, of the artists 
experiences of homosexual love and cohabitation, which he offers as a 
universal model for living.123 Whilst Bourriaud warns of the ‘currently 
widespread trend’ of reducing Gonzales-Torres’ practice to a ‘neo-formalist 
set of problems or an agenda for gay activism’, it would be more problematic 
to reduce it to its structure as a relational device and a limited invitation to 
interact. This is the reduction that Bishop accuses Bourriaud of making:  
 
Through this work, Gonzales-Torres made subtle allusions to politically 
charged issues such as the AIDS crisis (a pile of sweets matched the 
weight of his partner Ross, who died in 1991), urban violence (handgun 
laws in Untitled [NRA] [1991]), and homosexuality (Perfect Lovers 
[1991]). Bourriaud, however, demotes this aspect of Gonzales-Torres’s 
practice in favor of its “structure”—its literal generosity toward the 
viewer.124   
 
This an important point to make, because in my own engagement with the 
modes and structures of inter-relational interactions in performance practices 
that do not foreground themselves as relational (such as Hoyle’s), I am not 
aiming to bracket out or neglect other key themes and formal and material 
attributes. I focus on moments of interactivity, participation, and social 
engagement in such practices whilst acknowledging that these structural and 
methodological aspects are there to support a range of other themes, 
materials and aesthetics.  
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Relational Aesthetics as Delegated Labour, Theatre as Relational 
Aesthetics 
 
As a means of exemplifying this focus, and in arguing for the efficacy of this 
approach, I will reflect on two moments in participatory performances in which 
provocative and tightly managed modes of participation abruptly switched into 
seemingly unexpected acts of interactivity from participants or collaborators. 
The first focuses on a moment, described by Jackson, in which a group of 
participants ‘call the bluff’ of Sierra’s socio-political contextualising of his own 
practice.125 The second, as mentioned, documents my own response to being 
invited to participate in Bjørn Venø’s provocative piece Outside In at the 
Flying Dutchman, London (23 June, 2014). After describing these examples, I 
use this opportunity to explain my turn towards practices that seem to fall 
outside of the remits of relational aesthetics and have a less-than-obvious 
relationship to the social turn in art and performance. I then outline my 
argument for how I think user-friendliness should emerge and function in 
relation to the ‘managed/random’ or ‘invited/provoked’ binaries that Bourriaud 
sets up. However, just before describing these installations and performances 
in relation to user-friendliness, manipulation, and openness, I want to outline 
some of my thinking in selecting them as examples. This is because, in 
following a method of argument that continues throughout this thesis, these 
examples lie outside of Bourriaud’s remit for relational aesthetics.  
 
Sierra’s installations focus on the relation between collaborators/employees, 
the artwork in which they are employed, and the gallery attendees who 
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observe those artworks (as opposed to an inter-relation between participants, 
or a relation between participants and artists). It does not appear to invite 
gallery visitors to interact with the work or its employees, nor foreground 
gallery visitor’s interactions with each other as a part of the artwork’s material. 
However, it is a relevant work to bring in here because of its unique relation to 
manipulation and randomness, as grounded in its use of delegation. Also, 
following Harvie’s framing of participation as free labour in participatory 
performance, there is no reason why we might not also think of the 
participants in one of Bourriaud’s relational artworks as labourers in the same 
way that Sierra’s employees are (Bourriaud’s are just unpaid).126 Of course, 
when we are invited, for example, to eat curry cooked by an artist, we are not 
involved in physical labour or made to follow instructions dutifully. However, 
following Harvie, I would argue that we are still subservient to the installation, 
particularly because it relies on our interaction in order to exist: without the 
visitor’s complicity there is no relational artwork. There are many obvious 
differences (primarily related to privilege and access) between Sierra’s 
participants’ and Tiravanija’s (differences Sierra’s practice foregrounds and 
relies on) but both sets of participants are working to initiate and perpetuate 
the artworks in which they find themselves. This is why it is relevant to discuss 
Sierra’s practice in relation to Bourriaud’s observations and claims.  
 
Venø’s performance also lies outside Bourriaud’s criteria, primarily because it 
did not occur within the context of art galleries, markets, and biennales that 
frame relational aesthetics. In fact, Outside In falls on the ‘theatre’ side of 
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Bourriaud’s differentiation between theatre and art exhibitions, a distinction 
based on different manifestations of consumption and conversation:  
 
Actually, [in theatre and cinema] there is no live comment made about 
what is seen (the discussion time is put off until after the show). At an 
exhibition, on the other hand, even when inert forms are involved, there 
is the possibility of an immediate discussion, in both senses of the 
term.127  
 
 
Venø‘s performance was much closer to embracing the blurring of and 
resistance to categorisation related to Live Art than being a piece of theatre. 
However, it was an on-stage performance, and this, along with his 
authoritative presence and a sustained sense of reverence, did make live 
commentary difficult and seemingly unwelcome. Bourriaud’s distinction, based 
on when and where we might inter-subjectively reflect on the work, seems 
fair. However, writers on the social turn in art and performance who have an 
academic investment in the theatre world, as opposed to the visual art world, 
often reiterate Nicholas Ridout’s claim that theatre was ‘always already 
relational, long before Nicolas Bourriaud proclaimed the arrival of relational 
aesthetics’.128 Ridout focuses on experimental theatre practices, such as 
Peter Handke’s, in which ‘theatre is not where we go to see stories acted out, 
although that might happen, it is where we go to watch ourselves watching 
and being watched’.129 The crossovers between such theatre and relational 
art works is summarized in Ridout’s claim that theatre practices can be ‘about 
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what it means to participate, as singular individuals, in the formation of a 
public through the medium of the real, live encounter’.130 Jackson focuses on 
theatre as an exemplary space in which to experience a foregrounding of 
issues of substrate and support as discussed above. She is interested in the 
emphasis on the ‘actor and acting as material substrates’, and following this 
notes, similarly to Ridout, that ‘certainly most anyone in theatre knows that 
Rirkrit Tiravanija was not the first to notice that “material” could be “lots of 
people”’.131 Thus, bringing people together and asking them to reflect on 
being brought together is an aim that spans across relational art, art works 
that foreground delegation and employment, and theatre, even if in the theatre 
talking about being brought together happens after the event. In summary, 
turning to examples that do not fit neatly under the term ‘relational aesthetics’ 
serves to challenge the uniqueness of its remits, as well as constructing new 
criteria through which to discuss its socio-political efficacies.  
 
 Bluff-Calling in 9 Forms 
 
In the second chapter of Social Works: Performing, Supporting Publics, 
Jackson discusses Sierra’s 9 Forms.132 It is part of a series of installations in 
which Sierra facilitates and displays problematic modes of labour, delegation, 
exploitation, and economic precarity. Other controversial installations, 
celebrated by Bishop due to their explicit social antagonisms,133 include Eight 
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 90 
People Paid to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes (Guatemala, 1999) and 
250cm Line Tattooed on Six Paid People (Havana, 1999). For Bishop, 
Sierra’s work ‘can be seen as a grim meditation on the social and political 
conditions that permit disparities in people’s “prices” to emerge’.134  For 
Jackson, Sierra’s position is ‘frustratingly self-exempting’, as exemplified in his 
claim that the ‘problem is the existence of social conditions that allow me to 
make this work’.135 This is frustrating for Jackson because it suggests that 
these social conditions are unchangeable across different contexts and 
geographical locations. As a consequence Sierra’s work problematically 
frames and reproduces social conditions as inevitably limited and limiting.136 
For Jackson the fact that, despite Sierra’s claims, social conditions are subject 
to change, not always ‘allowing’ him to make this work, is exemplified by the 
strike that occurred during the 9 Forms installation at Deitch Projects. In the 
gallery report that Jackson quotes from we learn that after initially performing 
their menial roles some of the paid participants dropped the beams. They then 
gathered together in a discussion, led by ‘a distinguished African American 
man’, about the demeaning nature of what they were being paid to do.137 
They concluded that ‘it was beneath their dignity to be there as props in an 
artwork, and they walked off the job’.138 In other words they forcibly interjected 
an unmanaged moment into a carefully managed provocation, displaying the 
fact that unpredictable responses were possible, if not welcome. Jackson 
summarises the relevance of this refusal by stating that: 
                                                
134 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, p. 70. 
135 Quoted in Jackson, Social Works, p. 70. 
136 Jackson, Social Works, p. 70. 
137 Jackson, Social Works, p. 71. 
138 Hoban, quoted in Jackson, Social Works, p. 71. 
 91 
 
At such a moment, the human materials positioned as support for the 
art object refused their undermounted position; using the time-based 
capacity for alternative action, they altered the social situation by 
walking out of it and, in so doing, questioned the givenness of “social 
conditions that allow [Sierra] to make his work”.139 
 
 
Jackson makes it clear that there is the potential for Sierra’s unrelenting 
indulgences in problematic modes of employment and delegation to become 
undone by spontaneous acts of refusal and reclamations of agency. The 
implication from Jackson is that socially engaged practices might better focus 
on the potential to change social conditions as opposed to dwelling in and re-
performing their limitations.140 My own interest is in relational art and 
participatory performance in which such ‘bluff-calling’ by participants does not 
destroy the installation, or bring an end to the performance, but reveals that 
the potential for such ‘bluff–calling’ was always, already part of the work. My 
own experience of attempting bluff-calling as a provoked participant in Venø’s 
Outside In goes some way to exemplifying this approach.  
Outside In 
 
Outside In took place at the Flying Dutchman, an LGBTQ friendly pub and 
club in Peckham, London that hosts a plethora of regular performance and art 
events, and weekly queer and fetish ‘play parties’.141 The performance was 
part of ‘Discharge Vs. Untouchable’, an event that bought together two of the 
                                                
139 Jackson, Social Works, p. 71. 
140 This implication was also highlighted by Jen Harvie in a panel discussion, 
of which Sierra was part, as part of an event entitled On Publicness at Tate 
Modern, London, UK, 29th September 2014. 
141 ‘Flying Dutchman London’, http://www.flyingdutchmanlondon.com/, 
[accessed 29/09/2014]. 
 92 
pub’s regular performance nights to playfully compete with each other.  Thus 
a mischievous sensibility of friendly antagonism was built into the atmosphere 
of the evening, supported by the put-downs and dismissals banded playfully 
between the evening’s curators and hosts, Live Artists Franko B (curator of 
‘Untouchable’) and Martin O’ Brien (curator of ‘Discharge’) as they announced 
their separately curated acts. Franko B had one of his own interactive 
installations on display. This took the form of a swing, humbly constructed 
from plywood and rope, and hung from the centre of the bar area. This was a 
remnant from a previous performance by Franko B entitled I’m thinking of you 
(National Review of Live Art, Glasgow, 13th February 2009).  As a relevant 
side point, it is worth noting the fact that Franko B describes this performance 
in a way that ties in with the ‘openness’ assigned to the works of relational 
artist such as Tiravanija. His website describes the idea of the piece as being 
‘to allow adults to play, to forget their problems, to let go, or just to have fun - 
in the same way that children are allowed to’.142 Although in the past it has 
been Franko B, or other performers, who have sat on the swing, at the 
beginning of this event, B announced that anyone could go on the swing, but 
only if they were naked. Here participation was triggered not through an 
invitation or a provocation, but through mixture of manipulation and subtle 
goading. Exclusion was, to some extent, brutal. However, it was not facilitated 
through stern, gate-keeping personnel but through the personal choices and 
body confidence of potential participants. As in González-Torres’ Untitled 
(Blue Mirror) the affective and conceptual core of the work was in the object 
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and the invitation. Whether anyone actually took the offer up seemed almost 
superfluous. There was also no ‘bluff’ to be called: if someone had sat on the 
swing without taking their clothes off, it would not have revealed anything new 
about the performance or the themes of adulthood and fun which it evoked. 
This, for me, was where the importance of the work as an interactive 
installation lay: in the fact that those contemplating participation were not 
made to feel that the piece needed them, but instead that it could thrive 
without them (though through their interaction it might be expanded or even 
become something else). 
 
About two hours after the event had started, Venø began Outside In by 
standing on the small stage at one end of the bar area. His clothes and style 
had a mix of Victoriana smartness, well-groomed hirsuteness, and light body-
modification. His look and performance style reminded me of images of Jean-
Martin Charcot’s 19th-century lecture performances in which he opened his 
clinics on hypnosis and hysteria to physicians and the general public. Venø 
held himself stoic and silent in the centre of the stage, shaking his head subtly 
but definitively when an audience member asked if he could take photos. After 
scanning the group of people who were gathered stood up or, like myself, sat 
on the floor in front of the stage, he approached a man who became visibly 
guarded in his body language. Venø started his interaction with this man by 
staring into his eyes. He then removed the man’s backpack before returning 
to fix his gaze. Next he removed the man’s t-shirt. The man’s body language 
grew increasingly protective and twitchy, his arms tightly folded. It was 
awkward. As in Owen Parry’s performance, there was a sense of uneasiness 
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in response to the ambiguity of our responsibilities and the motivations and 
desires of the artist. The pattern of removing clothes and then direct eye 
contact (an action that appeared to simultaneously check for consent and 
dare for resistance) continued until Venø began working on the man’s belt. At 
this point the man used his hands to obstruct Venø’s action, signifying a clear 
refusal to continue. Venø immediately stopped, and returned to the stage 
where he collected a small black cloth bag. He then put this sack over the 
man’s head and left him there, half dressed, in an image uncomfortably close 
to those that emerged from Abu Ghraib prison during the second Iraq war in 
March 2003. This did nothing to resolves the awkward ambiguities of the 
performance. Was the hood a punishment? Was this meant to frame the 
participant as removed from the work, or more visually present in it? Next 
Venø approached a girl standing behind me. The same routine occurred until 
the girl informed Venø that she had “had enough” when he was about to 
remove her bra. Franko B intermittently interjected, reminding those that Venø 
approached that their continued compliance was “up to them”. The girl was 
also bedecked in a black hood. Venø then approached me, guiding me to a 
standing position, fumbling with a headphone cable that ran under my t-shirt 
and into a mobile phone in my pocket. This moment of fumbling brought a 
different form of awkwardness, emerging through an exposure of Venø 
fallibility. With a patient deliberation, occasionally interjected with other micro-
moments of awkward fumbling, Venø stripped me naked. Once he had 
removed my underwear I walked away and sat down on Franko B’s swing 
(located a couple of metres behind the audience). As I swung myself 
backwards and forwards I received a round of applause. Venø continued with 
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his performance, ignoring me until, after a few more bodies were fully 
exposed, the audience dissipated. I would describe the result of my method of 
something akin to finding/constructing a hidden level in a computer game.  
Conclusion: The Contingency of Contingency 
 
I have described these two scenarios next to each other because, despite not 
being strictly ‘relational’ in Bourriaud’s sense, they both appear, at first, to be 
clear examples of what he classifies as interactive ‘machines provoking and 
managing individual and group encounters’.143 However, in both artworks 
participants managed to resist and undo that management and claim the 
position of provocateur for themselves. The crucial difference is that in 
Sierra’s installation it appears to have broken the work, whereas in Venø’s it 
revealed the performance’s openness to unexpectedness and extension. This 
was despite its apparent, surface level signs of authority, inherent in Venø’s 
clothes and demeanor, and the ambiguities around whether he was inviting or 
demanding complicity. Venø’s artist statements support this reading. On his 
website he outlines a concept he calls the ‘licensed fool’, which refers to 
giving participants the means to use the ‘Fool's tools for creative thinking, 
problem solving and idea development’.144 My response in this performance 
(leaving Venø’s performance and using my unclothed state to interact, 
instead, with Franko B’s installation) was revealed not to be an act of refusal 
or vandalism, but to follow the unstated invitation of the work to extend its 
                                                
143 Bourriaud, p. 30.  
144 Bjørn Venø, ‘Aims’, Licenced Fool < http://www.bjornveno.com/> 
[accessed 04/10/2014]. 
 96 
parameters. I had no way of knowing which of these would be the case until I 
walked off and my action was accepted and applauded.  
 
I am invested in participatory artworks and performances like Venø’s in which 
the limitations, possibilities and affects of our interactions are revealed in the 
moment of interaction, as opposed to overly determined by the artist or 
performer. By this, I mean that it is not so important whether a relational 
artwork or participatory performance initially emerges through manipulation or 
invitation, provocation or chance, limitations or openness, but how those 
artworks bend, break, are rearranged, or extended as a consequence of the 
way participants respond. This is why participation-as-research is important. 
An observing academic or one who read about a presentation of Outside In in 
which everyone had either fully refused or submitted to Venø’s apparent 
demands might have read it as either definitively invitational and open or 
totalitarian and limiting. Thus, for me, a work’s ‘user-friendliness’ should relate 
to the fact that the level of contingency in a relational work should itself be 
contingent on the participants’ levels, actions and methods of engagement.  
Equally it should be possible that the level of control and management that a 
relational work holds over its participants is adaptable in response to 
participants’ modes of participation. This is a proposition that lies at the heart 
of my engagement with the performances I discuss in the rest of this thesis. 
Awkwardness is key here in two ways.  
 
Firstly, awkward modes of authority and facilitation, in which the dysfunctions 
and incapabilities of those in charge are foregrounded, expose gaps in which 
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participants can test the malleability of the performance. As a dyspraxic maker 
of participatory performance, I am personally invested in this argument for the 
reasons outlined in the preface to this thesis. My dyspraxia can affect my own 
ability to maintain authority and facilitate situations and interactions smoothly. 
As stated in the preface, I have particular difficulties with executive functioning 
and imposing order on activities.145 In this chapter I have demonstrated that 
the discourse around the social turn in art and performance either overlooks 
such awkwardness, or is critical of its ethics, efficacy and aesthetics. I am 
aware that such exclusions and dismissals can create or maintain the idea 
that those with a potentially awkward mode of being, such as dyspraxia, 
should not be engaged in producing or performing socially engaged, relational 
or participatory practices. This motivates some of the key strategies of this 
thesis, each of which works to break down such prejudices and barriers. 
These strategies include refocusing theoretical approaches to the social turn 
in art and performance towards practices that foreground awkward 
approaches to facilitation and authority, and reframing awkward facilitation 
and authority as efficacious. Both of these approaches act as an essential 
validation of such practices and practitioners.  
 
I am also personally invested in the way that the efficacy of this awkwardness 
relates to the extent to which a participatory performance is malleable in 
response to participants actions and interactions. This means celebrating 
participatory practices that not only refuse to exclude certain types of 
                                                
145 Mazahir Mohamedal, Working with Dyslexia: Dyslexia Assessment 
Consultancy, Confidential Diagnostic Assessment Report, 29th September 
2009. 
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participants and certain approaches to participation, but that also allow for the 
project to be shaped by those participants and their awkward modes of 
interacting. Such practices would embrace the potentially ‘irrelevant’ 
contributions that, according to dyspraxia expert Sharon Drew, someone with 
dyspraxia might make.146 This is because the ‘relevency’ of such contributions 
is confirmed at the moment in which the interaction occurs.   
 
Whilst awkwardness can contribute to or expose a previously unrevealed 
openness to the contingencies of participation, it can also emerge as a result 
of such openness. In each of the main case studies addressed in this thesis 
(a.a.s in Chapter 3, David Hoyle in Chapter 4, and Reactor in Chapter 5) such 
awkwardness is discussed in relation to responsibility. This is less explicit in 
Chapter 3, but the awkwardness described does have a relationship to my 
own demands for a.a.s to take responsibility for generating clearer rules and 
perimeters for the project I was involved in. However, in this case openness 
was not generated or revealed in response to a collaborator or participant’s 
actions. It was identifiable as an aim from the moment one entered the 
project. In Chapter’s 4 and 5 I address the relationship between 
awkwardness, authority and responsibility more directly and explicitly. Both of 
these chapter’s utilise the Lacanian concept of the fallibility of the ‘big Other’, 
and Slavoj Žižek’s supplementation of it. The primary aim of the next chapter 
is to map out these psychoanalytic theories  
 
                                                
146 Sharon Drew, ‘Dyspraxia’, in Neurodiversity in Higher Education: Positive 
Responses to Specific Learning Differences (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2006), pp. 91-123 (p. 109). 
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Chapter 2 
Psychoanalysis and Participatory Performance 
 
In April 2011 I participated in Adrian Howell’s The Pleasure of Being: 
Washing, Feeding, Holding. It occurred as part of the Battersea Art Centre’s 
One-on-One Festival, which ran from 29 March – 9 April 2011. Howell’s 
specialised in creating physically and emotionally intimate interactive 
performances since 2000, when he shifted his practice away from the more 
conventional audience/actor set-ups he was working within. Since then 
Howell’s often used the ‘one to one’ format, in which a performance includes a 
single performer and a single audience member.  
 
The BAC One-on-One Festival was themed around the idea of a ‘menu’ from 
which audience members selected particular experiences, such as 
‘Challenging’, ‘Immersing’, ‘Technologised’ or ‘Personal’. Each of these 
experiences consisted of three performances in which there was always only 
one performer and one audience member. There was one 20-30 minute 
performance (the ‘Main Course’) and two that lasted between five and ten 
minutes. There were also various interventions, installations, and wandering 
performances scattered around the venue, all based on the one-to-one 
format, and which you could experience in the gaps between scheduled 
performances. I selected ‘Intimate’, in which Howell’s performance was the 
‘Main Course’. The two ‘Side Dishes’ were Deborah Pearson’s Indiscreet and 
Barnaby Stone’s A Little Bit of a Beautiful Thing. In Pearson’s performance I 
sat on a wooden chair in BAC’s kitchen eavesdropping on an out-of-sight 
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conversation that was gradually revealed to be a tightly scripted performance. 
Stone’s performance took place in a small room decked out to function as a 
woodwork studio. There was a large oak beam in the space. Stone addressed 
me warmly and informally. He told me about the history of the oak beam, 
which was 700 years old and formerly part of an Elizabethan hall. We chatted 
about the beam’s history and the way it connects us with the past. I was 
asked to select a small wooden peg from a collection. My selected peg was 
hammered into the end of the beam where a collection of other pegs, 
presumably from other participants, had also been hammered in. Stone then 
used a large mechanical saw to slice off a very thin slice of the wood, which I 
was invited to take away with me. This, I assume, was the titular ‘Little Bit of a 
Beautiful Thing’.  
 
Howell’s was the last performance. I knew in advance that I would be bathed 
naked (though I could choose to wear a swimming costume) and that the 
experience was meant to be reminiscent of therapy. I went to the performance 
expecting it to offer an ideal case-study for my research into awkwardness, 
imagining that I would write about the disavowed uneasiness of intimacy. 
However, it turned out to be the least awkward of all the performances I 
experienced as part of my research. The content of the performance was 
written out on a sheet of paper that you could read before entering. The rules 
were made clear, and the potential for embarrassment addressed: there was 
to be no touching of genitals. I entered a waiting room where I was to remove 
my clothes and put on a white dressing gown. I then knocked at the door to 
the performance space and Howells, also dressed in a dressing gown, 
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opened it. The room was decorated with rose petals, gently scented with 
lavender, and had a large bath in the centre. He removed my dressing gown 
and gently directed me into the bath, where I closed my eyes and was bathed. 
After drying, Howells invited me to sit close to him as he embraced me and 
then fed me a chocolate. Howells was confident, open, and projected an 
exuberant sense of his desire to provide care. It was therapeutic: I left feeling 
tingly, warmed, and de-stressed.  
 
Other participants, however, have mentioned a sense of awkwardness. This 
was not, as might be expected, linked to the act of being naked in front of a 
stranger. Instead it occurred because there was, for those participants, an 
insistent, and unsettled questioning of Howell’s motivations. Christine Twite 
writes:  
 
To be bathed by a stranger is one thing, to be held in an embrace, 
which to me signifies strong intimacy and love, is quite another.  I froze 
as Howells pulled me into his chest.  Half of my consciousness was 
busily linking our positioning with the pieta, searching for some kind of 
artistic meaning within the work to interpret and externalise the 
experience.1  
 
Jonny Ensall, who experienced the performance as part of the 2011 
Edinburgh Fringe Festival (26 August 2011) recalls ‘I think to myself, as I’m 
lying in the bath covered in petals, there has to be a catch’.2 Ensall continues, 
                                                
1 Christine Twite, ‘The One-on-One Festival at BAC’, Cultures of 
Spectatorship < 
https://culturesofspectatorship.wordpress.com/2011/04/07/the-one-on-one-
festival-at-bac> [accessed 20 August 2012]. 
2 Jonny Ensall, ‘The Pleasure of Being: Washing, Feeding, Holding: A Cure 
for Loneliness’, The List < https://edinburghfestival.list.co.uk/article/37152-the-
pleasure-of-being-washing-feeding-holding/> [accessed 20 August 2012]. 
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asking ‘Is he doing it purely for the thrill of participatory theatre, or for deeper 
reasons?’3 I have chosen to open with Howells’ performance because it 
merges the approaches to desire and approaches to neighbourly love that 
Claire Bishop keeps separate in her favouring of artists who maintain a 
‘fidelity to a singularised desire’.4 I am interested in the way that, despite the 
clear position of the performance as therapeutic and benevolent, some 
participants, such as Twite and Ensall, have the urge to identify Howell’s 
specific desires in facilitating that experience.  I come back to these points in 
the conclusion to this chapter. I engage with the relationship between 
awkwardness and the pursuit of hidden, or undisclosed meanings, 
motivations, and desires throughout the rest of this thesis. This chapter traces 
the potentials of psychoanalytic approaches to desire from the kind prompted 
by Twite and Ensall, in which we search for hidden desires, and hidden 
reasons behind those desires, through to an engagement with desire as 
relational.   
 
In the following I spend considerable time tracing and describing the Freudian 
roots of various psychoanalytic approaches to participatory art and 
performance. This, along with the previous chapter’s outline of theoretical 
approaches to the social turn provides essential contextualisation for the 
performance-led engagements of the chapters that follow. I begin with an 
introduction to some of the reductive psychoanalytic approaches to art that 
have occurred in the past. I then briefly outline some of the ways in which 
                                                
3 Ensall. 
4 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship (London and New York: Verso, 2012), p. 39. 
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psychoanalysis has already been used in response to relational art and 
participatory performance in the discourses around the social turn in art and 
performance, as introduced in my first chapter. This segues into an account of 
the emergence of the Lacanian theories of desire, the super-ego, and the ‘big 
Other’. This is because these theories are key to Claire Bishop’s approach to 
the ethics of participatory arts practices. This approach can be summarised in 
Bishop’s proposition that ‘the best socially collaborative art does not derive 
from a super-egoic injunction to "love thy neighbour," but from the position of 
"do not give up on your desire."’5 This approach is, in turn, heavily influential 
in my own development of various ‘ideals’ for working with participation.   
 
The Potential Pitfalls of Psychoanalysis 
 
In Artificial Hells Claire Bishop states that it has become ‘unfashionable to 
import psychoanalysis into readings of art and artists, but the discipline 
provides a useful vocabulary for diagnosing the heightened ethical scrutiny 
that so much participatory art engenders.’6 Cultural critic and philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek outlines the potential reasons for a more general ‘death of 
psychoanalysis’ in his introduction to How to Read Lacan:7 
 
                                                
5 Claire Bishop in Jennifer Roche, ‘Socially Engaged Art, Critics and 
Discontents: An Interview with Claire Bishop’, Community Arts Network 
<http://www.communityarts.net/readingroom/archivefiles/2006/07/socially_eng
age.php> [accessed 02/10/2010]. 
6 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship  (London and New York: Verso, 2012), p. 39. 
7 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta, 2006), p. 1. 
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It seems that it is [out-dated] on three connected levels: (1) of scientific 
knowledge, where the cognivist-neurobiologist model of the human 
mind appears to supersede the Freudian model; (2) of the psychiatric 
clinic, where psychoanalytic treatment is rapidly losing ground to pills 
and behavioural therapy; (3) of the social context, where the Freudian 
image of a society and social norms that repress the individual’s sexual 
drives no longer seems a valid account of today’s predominant 
hedonistic permissiveness.8 
 
Despite his clear outline of the outdated position of psychoanalysis, Žižek 
almost immediately follows this by stating his aim ‘to demonstrate that it is 
only today that the time for psychoanalysis has come.’9 Before outlining and 
diving into the vocabulary and concepts of this Žižekian/Lacanian approach 
and introducing a rationale for employing them, I will confront one of the 
potential pitfalls of importing psychoanalysis into reading art and performance. 
Thus I begin this section by briefly outlining a model for using psychoanalysis 
as a critical approach to art and performance that is deemed to be 
inappropriate and ineffective, and which might go some way to accounting for 
its ‘unfashionable’ status. This gives me something to work against for the rest 
of the chapter, but also sets up the groundwork for some of the other 
psychoanalytical concepts and theories that I refer to throughout the rest of 
this thesis.  
 
The problematic psychoanalytic approach to performance that I describe here 
can be summarised as a framing of an artist’s practice as a symptom of an 
artist’s psychological complexes. In other words, approaching the artwork or 
performance as an unconscious message that those versed in psychoanalytic 
theory can decipher in order to gain access to the artist’s psyche. A brief 
                                                
8 Žižek, p. 2. 
9 Žižek, p. 2. 
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focus on this approach will enable me to differentiate Žižek’s, Lacan’s and my 
own use of psychoanalytic tools and vocabularies from that of the art critic as 
amateur clinician. The specificities of this approach are outlined in the 
sections below in which it is put to work in response to specific experiences of 
participatory art and performance.  
 
This section focuses more often on the Freudian concepts that are points of 
origin for these approaches. It acts as a reference for other sections in the 
thesis where I identify where psycho-pathologising accounts are given of 
participatory artworks and performances.  As Dylan Evans points out in his 
entrance on ‘art’ in An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, the 
idea of art offering an access point for an artist’s psyche can be traced back to 
Sigmund Freud’s framing of art as ‘sublimation’.10 Freud discusses the 
concept of sublimation and its relationship to art in ‘Civilisation and its 
Discontent’.11 One of the key arguments of Freud’s text is that, in order for a 
civilisation to emerge and to function effectively, we must inhibit certain 
libidinal needs, desires, and aims. I focus on the development of this 
argument in my section on the super-ego below. The key point, for now, is 
that, for Freud, this inhibition leads to an ‘undeniable diminution in the 
                                                
10 Dylan Evans, ‘art’, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 13-14 (p. 79). 
11 Sigmund Freud, ‘Civilisation and its Discontents’ in The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XXI (1927-
1931): The Future of an Illusion, Civilisation and its Discontents and Other 
Works, ed and trans. by James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 57- 
145 (p. 79). 
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potentials of enjoyment’.12 This theory is linked to Freud’s concepts of the 
‘pleasure principle’ and the ‘reality principle’.  
 
The ‘pleasure principle’ refers to the psyches’ ‘strive towards attaining 
pleasure’ and our psychical avoidance of ‘any event which might arouse 
unpleasure’.13 It is the pursuance of our wishes in a ‘hallucinatory manner’ 
through, for example, our ‘dream-thoughts every night’.14 The ‘reality principle’ 
emerges through the dissatisfaction that arises from this ‘hallucinatory’ 
pursuit.15 We suffer because there is ‘no chance at all’ of the pleasure 
principle being carried through to full realisation: ‘all the regulations of the 
universe run counter to it’.16 Freud outlines three causes for the inevitable 
restrictions to the pleasure principle: our bodies inevitable decay and reliance 
on pain and anxiety as ‘warning signals’, the restriction and ‘merciless forces 
of destruction’ of the external world, and other people.17 Freud focuses on the 
third of these in Civilisation and its Discontent, and, due to its relevance for art 
and performance that foreground inter-relationality, I return to the problem of 
‘other people’ at length in my fifth chapter.  Overall, Freud suggests that in 
response to the suffering we experience as a result of barriers to our pursuit 
of pleasure, we ‘decide to form a conception of the real circumstances of the 
                                                
12 Freud, ‘Civilisation’, p. 79. 
13 Sigmund Freud, ‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’ 
in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud Volume XII (1911-1913): Case History of Schreber, Papers on 
Techniques and Other Works, ed and trans. by James Strachey (London: 
Vintage, 2001), pp. 213- 226 (p. 219). 
14 Freud, ‘Two Principles’, p. 219. 
15 Freud, ‘Two Principles’, p. 219.  
16 Freud, ‘Civilisation’, p. 76. 
17 Freud, ‘Civilisation’, p. 76. 
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external world and to endeavour to make a real alteration in them’.18 Thus the 
‘pleasure principle’ is, ‘under the influence of the external world, changed into 
the more modest reality principle’.19  
 
Freud goes on to suggest that one technique for avoiding the suffering that 
comes through the loss of an unfulfilled pursuit of pleasure is to shift ‘the 
instinctual aims in such a way that they cannot come up against frustration 
from the external world’.20 We adapt and remould our libidinal pleasures in 
order to make them realisable in external ‘reality’. It is this ‘shift’ of libidinal 
aims that Freud refers to as ‘sublimation’. Sublimation is one method for 
transforming the pleasure principle into the reality principle: the ‘instinct is said 
to be sublimated in so far as it is diverted towards a new, non-sexual aim and 
in so far as its objects are socially valued ones’.21 Freud states that art is one 
way of enacting this sublimation, bringing about a ‘reconciliation of the two 
principles [pleasure and reality] in a peculiar way’.22  
 
Thus a psychoanalytic engagement with art that maintained a fidelity to 
Freud’s approach would begin by assuming that the artwork emerged through 
the remoulding or diversion of an inhibited desire. It would follow Freud’s 
framing of the artist: 
 
                                                
18 Freud, ‘Two Principles’, p. 219. 
19 Freud, ‘Civilisation’, p. 77. 
20 Freud, ‘Civilisation’, p. 79. 
21 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, ‘Sublimation’ in The Language 
of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac Books, 
1973), pp. 431-433 (p. 431). 
22 Freud, ‘Two Principles’, p. 220. 
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An artist is originally a man who turns away from reality because he 
cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction 
which it at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious 
wishes full play in the life of fantasy. He finds the way back to reality, 
however, from this world of phantasy by making use of special gifts to 
mould his phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are valued by 
men as precious reflections of reality.23 
 
Such a reading would then look for clues in the artwork that would reveal what 
these remoulded ‘erotic and ambitious wishes’ are. As Anthony Storr points 
out in his short introductory guide to Freud, one example of ‘both the insights 
and the limitations of this approach’ can be found in Freud’s own analysis of 
the artistic and scientific pursuits of Leonardo Da Vinci.24  
 
Early in the essay Freud suggests that Da Vinci’s excessive commitment to 
his work is exemplary of the ‘special disposition’ in which the libido evades the 
fate of repression by being ‘sublimated from the very beginning into curiosity 
and by becoming attached to the powerful instinct for research as a 
reinforcement’.25 In working to pinpoint the sublimated libidinal aim Freud 
focuses on a childhood recollection that Da Vinci inserted into one of his 
scientific notebooks. The story recalls one of Da Vinci’s earliest memories 
(presumed to be a fictional account, due to its content) in which, whilst in his 
cradle, a vulture came down, opened Da Vinci’s mouth with his tail, and struck 
him ‘many times with its tail’ against his lips.26 For Freud, the repressed desire 
                                                
23 Freud, ‘Two Principles’, p. 220. 
24 Anthony Storr, Freud: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), p. 95. 
25 Sigmund Freud, ‘Leonardo Da Vinci and a memory of his childhood’, in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XI (1910): 
Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Leonardo Da Vinci, and Other Works, ed. 
and trans. by James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 57-138 (p. 80). 
26 Sigmund Freud, ‘Da Vinci’, p. 82. 
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revealed in this fictional story is Da Vinci’s ‘inclination to take a man’s organ in 
his mouth and suck on it’.27 Freud arrives at this reading through firstly noting 
that a tail is ‘one of the most familiar symbols and substitutive expressions for 
the male organ’.28 Further to this, he links the vulture to Da Vinci’s 
experiences of his relationship with his mother, by pointing out that in 
Egyptian hieroglyphs, the vulture represents the mother.29 Thus Freud goes 
on to connect the desire to fellate with an infant’s desire to suckle on his or 
her mother’s nipple.30  
 
Da Vinci’s penchant for Vultures is, for Freud, further evidenced through an 
observation by Oskar Pfister of Da Vinci’s painting The Virgin and Child with 
St. Anne (circa 1508), in which he sees the outline of a vulture in Mary’s 
‘curiously arranged and rather confusing drapery’.31 This psychoanalytic 
reading of the story and the details in the painting, coupled with some 
historical research that, for Freud, indicated Da Vinci’s homosexuality, leads 
to the following proposition: 
 
When we remember the historical probability of Leonardo having 
behaved in his life as one who was emotionally homosexual, the 
question is forced upon us whether this phantasy does not indicate the 
existence of a causal connection between Leonardo’s relation with his 
mother and his later manifest, if ideal [sublimated], homosexuality.32 
 
 
                                                
27 Freud. ‘Da Vinci’, p. 86. 
28 Freud, ‘Da Vinci’, p. 85. 
29 Freud, ‘Da Vinci’, p. 88. 
30 Freud, ‘Da Vinci’, p. 87. 
31 Freud, ‘Da Vinci’, p. 115. 
32 Freud, ‘Da Vinci’, p. 98 (’[sublimated]’ in original). 
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As Storr points out, unfortunately this interpretation is ‘based on a 
mistranslation’: the ‘bird was not a vulture, but a kite. Whereas vultures can be 
shown to have mythological connections with the mother, kites cannot’.33 This 
misfire, and the interpretation that surrounds it, exemplifies the crude and 
calamitous nature of engaging in psychoanalytic diagnoses outside of the co-
present, one-to-one setting of the clinic, even if you happen to be the 
forefather of psychoanalysis. It is not, of course, merely the mistranslation that 
is the problem. It is the idea that a detail in a story and a painting can provide 
the trigger and fulcrum for an interpretation of an individual’s sexuality and a 
more general proposition about how and when one’s sexuality emerges. 
 
A contemporary example of this unjustified conflation of the analyst/analysand 
relationship in clinical psychoanalysis and the critic/artist relationship in art 
criticism is to be found in the problematic approaches to the cosmetic surgery-
based performance practice of ORLAN, as discussed by Dominic Johnson.34 
ORLAN is a French multimedia and performance artist who has been making 
performance work since the early 1960s. Her work is described as 
‘consistently feminist, questioning traditional definitions of femininity and 
challenging the institutions – from art historiography to the Catholic Church, to 
the plastic surgery industry – that produce and enforce those definitions’.35 In 
                                                
33 Storr, p. 96. 
34 Dominic Johnson, ‘PSYCHIC WEIGHT: The Pains and Pleasures of 
Performance’, in ORLAN: A HYBRID BODY OF ARTWORKS, ed. by Simon 
Donger with Simon Shepherd and ORLAN (Oxon and NY: Routledge, 2010), 
pp. 85-100. 
35 Paul Allain and Jen Harvie, eds., ‘ORLAN’ in The Routledge Companion to 
Theatre and Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 57-
59 (p. 58).  
 111 
1962 she first ‘reincarnated’ herself by ‘changing her name to the sexually 
ambiguous Orlan [sic]’.36  
 
In the section of his essay subtitled ‘Trauma’, Johnson focuses on The 
Reincarnation of Saint ORLAN, ORLAN’s ‘most ambitious project’, which she 
undertook between 1990 and 1993 and which consisted of ‘nine surgical 
procedures on her face, back, legs and other body parts’.37 Johnson’s own 
approach to this, itself rooted in psychoanalysis, focuses on ORLAN’s 
disavowal of the importance of pain in her project. He argues that despite this 
disavowal, ORLAN’s practice might have ‘entailed one of the most 
sophisticated negotiations’ of the ‘”suture’ that binds pleasure and pain’.38 His 
reference point for this theory of a ‘suture’ between pleasure and pain is 
Lacan’s concept of jouissance. This concept has its roots in Freud’s essay 
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ and its introduction of the concept of the 
‘death-instinct’.39 I will take this opportunity to briefly outline these concepts, 
as I refer to them at various points throughout the rest of the thesis.  
 
Freud posits that the formulas of the ‘pleasure principle’ and the ‘reality 
principle’ do not account for the compulsion to recollect, repeat and work ‘over 
in the mind’ painful experiences.40 Such compulsions can be found in games 
in childhood and artistic ‘imitation’ and ‘play’ in adulthood in which ‘the most 
                                                
36 Allain and Harvie, p. 58.  
37 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 88.  
38 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 86. 
39 Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XVIII (1920-
1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other works, 
ed. and trans. by James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 1-68. 
40 Freud, ‘Beyond’, p. 17. 
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painful experiences’ can be felt as ‘highly enjoyable’.41 This compulsion is 
named the ‘death-instinct’ by Freud. It refers to the subject’s drive to go 
beyond the limits of the pleasure principle and ‘return’ to an ‘inanimate 
state’.42 Freud differentiates the ‘death-instinct’ from the ‘life-instinct’ – a term 
which incorporates both self-preservation (the ‘ego-instinct’) and sexual 
instincts. Lacan develops Freud’s concept of the death-instinct (translated as 
the ‘death-drive’) by detaching it from the biological instinct to ‘return to the 
inanimate’ and undo its distinction from the ‘sexual drives’.43  
 
Jouissance refers to the experience of following the death drive and going 
‘beyond the pleasure principle’.44 Lacan observes that Freud’s ‘pleasure 
principle’ embodied an allusion to a ‘beyond’ even before the ‘formulations of 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, because it is really a formulation of a ‘least-
suffering principle’.45 Here Lacan is referring to Freud’s development of the 
theory of the pleasure principle in ‘Civilisation and its Discontents’. The 
‘pleasure principle’ manages and limits our desires and enjoyments, ensuring 
they do not disturb our place in ‘civilisation’ through the formation of 
boundaries between them and the external world. Jouissance pursues 
pleasure beyond these limitations and boundaries, and in this sense, is 
                                                
41 Freud, ‘Beyond’, p. 17. 
42 Freud, ‘Beyond’, p. 46. 
43 Dylan Evans, ‘Death Drive’, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 33-34 (p. 34). 
44 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII, The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 184. 
45 Lacan, Ethics, p. 185. 
 113 
‘uncivilised’. It does not inhibit itself in response to others, and therefore it ‘is 
suffering because it involves suffering for my neighbor’.46  
 
Johnson’s approach to jouissance is not based on framing ORLAN’s practice 
in terms of her own relationship to pleasure, pain and ‘civilisation’. It does not 
frame The Reincarnation of Saint ORLAN as a pursuit of jouissance or use its 
details to make assumptions about her unconscious relationships to pleasure 
and pain. Instead he demonstrates the ways in which ORLAN’s project 
initiates ‘an otherwise unavailable understanding of the body, identity, or 
desire’.47 Hence, Johnson’s analysis exemplifies a revelatory and productive 
use of the tools and vocabulary of psychoanalysis. By, in his own words, 
resisting the ‘urge to pathologize the artist’, he demonstrates a psychoanalytic 
approach that reveals a performances’ unique provocations and production of 
knowledge.48 This is an approach I aim to partly emulate in my own use of 
psychoanalysis. 
 
Johnson goes on to critique two approaches that exemplify a failure to resist 
this ‘urge to pathologize’. These are by Kristine Stiles and Renata Salecl. 
Stiles’ approach involves a ‘reactionary critique of ORLAN’s post-surgical 
documentation’ in which she insists on reading them as ‘proof of sexual 
abuse’.49 Johnson summarises Stiles’ approach as a ‘pseudo-psychiatric’ 
account, suggesting that its ‘logic of “self-harm”’ is a ‘mostly punitive 
                                                
46 Lacan, Ethics, p. 185. 
47 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 91. 
48 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 92. 
49 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 92. 
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discourse that aims to pathologize invasive knowledge of one’s own body’.50 
Salecl is also accused of indulging in a problematically pathologizing 
approach, diagnosing ‘body art, and by extension any act that employs body 
modification’ as ‘an effect of clinical neurosis’.51 For Johnson, Salecl’s 
approach is most damaging when she compares ORLAN’s objection to 
accusations of self-mutilation to defenders of clitoridectomy. This conflation of 
two very different practices with significantly different contexts amounts to 
‘punishing the artist for her work, whilst aestheticizing the experiences of 
women in non-western cultures’.52 Johnson wraps up his critique of these 
approaches by pointing out that Salecl’s use of psychoanalysis is inherently 
‘flawed’ because it attributes concepts such as ‘neurosis’, ‘psychosis’, and 
‘perversion’ to ‘acts that take place within the mediated realm of artistic 
expression’.53  
 
I have brought in Johnson’s article not only to give a contemporary example of 
the framing of art as a gateway to an artist’s psyche and a clearly outlined 
critique of such approaches. I also refer to it because there are overlaps 
between Johnson’s psychoanalytic approach to art and performance that 
includes live, wounded bodies, or bodies in the process of modification, and 
my own framing of participatory art and performance. One of these overlaps 
lies in Johnson’s observation of the inability or unwillingness to acknowledge 
that the acts of wounding and body modification that both him and Salecl 
discuss occur within the ‘mediated realm of artistic representation’. The 
                                                
50 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 92. 
51 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, pp. 92-93. 
52 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’ p. 93. 
53 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’ p. 93. 
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implication is that the act of cutting oneself as part of an art work or 
performance should be approached with a radically different criteria to the act 
of cutting oneself outside of this context.  
 
The ‘realm’ of art (and performance) to which Johnson refers is, of course, a 
complex and contested one to define. But I agree with the position that 
actions and interactions that occur as or within an artwork or performance 
cannot be assumed to emerge from the same motivations and intentions, or 
have the same affects, as those not framed in this way. Therefore I insist that 
relations of power, control, and delegation in participatory art and 
performance should not be critiqued or evaluated in the same way that one 
might approach such social structures in scenarios that are not contextualised 
as artworks or performance. As Johnson argues, psychoanalytic approaches 
to performance and art that incorporate wounds and body modification risk 
reductively framing those materials as indicators of repressed histories of 
trauma and violence.54 One can imagine a similarly problematic approach to 
Howells’ performance and intimate interactive art and performance in general. 
This would revolve around ascertaining what desires lie behind the artist’s 
pursuits of intimacy with strangers, and presumptively tracing the roots of 
those desires, as opposed to understanding intimacy as a core material in the 
artist’s practice. Further to this I propose that with participatory art and 
performance there is a similar risk of reduction and misdirection when it is 
approached through purely sociological models of art and performance theory 
and criticism. Of course such readings, especially when employed to examine 
                                                
54 Johnson, ‘Psychic Weight’, p. 92.  
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the material conditions of an artwork or performance (as opposed to the 
artwork’s or performance’s materials and content), can contribute valuable 
insights into their complicity with or opposition to dominant ideologies and 
social structures. However, they also risk reducing these practices to being 
merely the product and/or perpetuator of a flawed society.  
 
In Jen Harvie’s Fair Play for example, there is a conflation of the experience 
of the precarious and exploited worker in neoliberal modes of employment 
and the experience of participants who are asked to contribute to or 
collaborate in a performance, sometimes in laborious or unglamorous ways: 
 
Thus, like [Richard] Sennett’s worker in the institutions of the new 
capitalism, the audience member in emerging participatory and art 
‘abandon[s] past experience’ and relinquishes the opportunity to ‘take 
pride in being good at something specific’ (Sennett, 2006, p.5). The 
audience member as worker in this flexible art and performance 
economy is rendered, in many ways, insecure, deskilled and 
alienated.55  
 
Harvie gives the example of Uninvited Guests’ performance The Good 
Neighbour (Battersea Arts Centre, London, 2012), in which a ‘handful of 
audience members were asked to carry large and cumbersome musical 
instruments embedded with speakers which played out soundtracks to 
accompany scenes’.56 For Harvie such ‘subservient’ participation exemplifies 
a problematic ‘delegation of labour to audiences who are usually unpaid and, 
indeed often paying’.57 Harvie is open to the idea that the kinds of ‘uneven 
                                                
55 Jen Harvie, Fair Play: Art, Performance and Neoliberalism (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 47.   
56 Harvie, p. 43. 
57 Harvie, p. 41. Emphasis in original. 
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power dynamics’ exemplified in The Good Neighbour ‘sometimes 
constructively draws attention to such inequalities and to the complicated 
ways that people can find themselves inadvertently embedded in them’.58 
However, Harvie’s focus is mainly on the ways such delegation in 
participatory art and performance ‘can exploit free labour in ways that 
replicate, extend and potentially naturalize exploitative trends in contemporary 
labour markets more broadly’.59 For me this position on participation as ‘free 
labour’ risks, to rephrase Johnson’s approach to Salecl, ‘‘punishing the artist 
for their work, whilst aestheticizing the experiences of precarious, exploited 
labourers”.  
 
I aim to differentiate my position from Harvie’s by framing the modes and 
details of delegation, participation, and collaboration as materials for the 
creation of social structures as artworks and performance. This position has 
similarities to WochenKlausur’s who insist that their direct, ameliorative 
responses to localised social problems are ‘art’. WochenKlausur state, in 
response to the question ‘Does the external form, the outward appearance, 
still have any significance at all for activist art?’, that ‘form’ ‘is of ‘tertiary 
importance today’.60 However, they also insist that ‘the potential to manipulate 
social circumstances is a practice of art just as valid as the manipulation of 
                                                
58 Harvie, p. 43. 
59 Harvie, p. 41. 
60 WochenKlausur, ‘Does the external form, the outward appearance, still 
have any significance at all for activist art?’, WochenKlausur: FAQ < 
http://www.wochenklausur.at/faq_detail.php?lang=en&id=18> [accessed 10 
October 2012]. 
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traditional materials’.61 Thus ‘social circumstances’ are framed as the 
‘materials’ of WochenKlausur’s practice. This is reminiscent of Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s framing of conviviality as a particular kind of formal element in 
Rirkrit Tiravanija’s relational artworks. Here, unlike the definition that 
WochenKlausur use and refer to, ‘form’ is not reduced to the ‘outward 
appearance’. As discussed in chapter one, Bourriaud frames ‘form’ as the 
‘bringing together’ of ‘heterogeneous units’ on a level, in order to create a 
‘relationship to the world’.62   
 
The arguments developed in this chapter rely on an addition to Bourriaud’s 
definition of form. It is also, for me, the bringing together and (re)structuring of 
‘heterogeneous units’ in an attempt to create worlds that are distinct from the 
ones in which we currently co-exist and inter-relate. I write ‘attempt’ to 
acknowledge the probable impossibility of succeeding in creating and 
maintain this distinction. It is important to note that this is not intended as an 
indulgence in what Shannon Jackson describes as the ‘perpetual pursuit of 
autonomy’ that ‘continues to animate a theory of democracy as well as a 
critical concept of aesthetics’.63 My contention is not that the attempt to create 
a distinct world is synonymous with an attempt at autonomy. The major aim of 
this chapter is to explore the potential for Žižekian/Lacanian psychoanalysis to 
emerge as an ideal tool for affirming and critically accounting for the 
                                                
61 WochenKlausur, ‘From the Object to the Concrete Intervention’, 
WochenKlausur: Art www.wochenklausur.at/kunst.php?lang=en [accessed 23 
December 2014]. 
62 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. by Simon Pleasance and 
Fronza Woods (Dijon: Les presses du reel, 2002), p. 111. 
63 Shannon Jackson, Social Works: Performing art, supporting publics (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2011), p. 35. 
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specificities and intricacies of the ‘worlds’ that are created, facilitated, 
manipulated and maintained in participatory art and performance.  
 
As Johnson demonstrates, when used as a tool to critically engage with solo 
practices that include wounding and body modification, it risks reductively 
framing the details of the artwork as symptoms of damaged psyches. 
However, I propose that when psychoanalysis is used as a tool to critically 
engage with participatory art and performance it emerges as a productive 
alternative to approaches that seek to frame them as naturalizing extensions 
or replications of damaged and damaging ideologies and social systems. This 
chapter should demonstrate the details and validity of this proposition, even, 
or especially when applied to performance and art practices in which the 
distinction between what is inside and what is external to the artwork or 
performance is ambiguous.  
 
Psychoanalysis and the Social Turn 
 
Neither Grant Kester nor Jen Harvie turn to psychoanalysis in their critical 
engagements with socially engaged and participatory art and performance. 
The most explicit and elongated engagement with psychoanalysis in 
Relational Aesthetics comes towards the end of the book when Bourriaud 
proceeds with what he describes as a ‘kind of grafting’ of the thinking of 
French philosopher Felix Guattari, a critic of psychoanalysis, ‘in the domain of 
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present-day art’.64 Bourriaud’s employment of Guattari, described as ‘thinking 
about art with Guattari, and with the toolbox he has bequeathed us’, closely 
matches my own employment or ‘grafting’ of a Žižekian critical toolbox in the 
domain of contemporary participatory art and performance.65 Throughout 
Bourriaud’s turn to Guattari he makes clear connections between the role, or 
function, of art and that of psychoanalysis (and, by implication, between the 
artist and the psychoanalyst). This is based firstly on what Bourriaud 
describes as Guattari’s effort to ‘de-naturalize and deterritorialize 
subjectivity’.66 A relational approach to art is important here because of 
Guattari’s ‘plural, polyphonic definition of subjectivity’:67  
 
Subjectivity, he [Guattari] explains, cannot exist in an independent way, 
and in no case can it ground the existence of the subject. It can only 
exist in the pairing mode: association with “human groups, socio-
economic machines, informational machines”.68  
 
 
For Bourriaud both art and psychoanalysis are connected because they are 
two ‘sorts of subjectivity production’.69 Both have the potential to enable us to 
‘learn to “seize, enhance and reinvent” subjectivity’.70 A sense of 
awkwardness in intimate one on one encounters such as Howell’s, might, if 
following this approach, be attached to a sense that some part of us is being 
scrambled or re-arranged by the experience.   
 
                                                
64 Bourriaud, p. 87 (emphasis in original). 
65 Bourriaud, p. 87 (emphasis in original). 
66 Bourriaud, p. 89. 
67 Bourriaud, p. 91.  
68 Bourriaud, p. 91. 
69 Bourriaud, p. 88. 
70 Bourriaud, p. 89. 
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Shannon Jackson’s turn to psychoanalysis emerges from her focus on the 
‘disavowal’ of the support networks  (‘tax breaks, military pensions, public 
schools, wifely labour, housekeepers, off-shoring’) that sustain a ‘perception 
of autonomy’.71 Like Bourriaud, she refers to the idea that subjectivity is 
inevitably entwined with the social. Whereas Bourriaud refers to Guattari in his 
engagement with this concept, Jackson refers to Judith Butler’s insight into 
‘the embeddedness of interiorized selves within a network of relational fields, 
making the social formation of both self and field a recursive and mutually 
dependent operation’.72 Jackson explains that Butler’s approach is a 
development of Michel Foucault’s proposition that ‘the concept of the 
individual in the individual self was in fact produced by the so-called exterior 
structures it would claim to oppose’.73 In developing her position on support 
and maintenance in the arts (as discussed in chapter 1), Jackson relates 
these theories of subjectivity to the ‘Freudian dilemmas of “anaclitic love”’.74 In 
his essay ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ Freud differentiates between two 
types of ‘object-choice’ – ‘narcissistic’ and ‘anaclitic’.75 The term ‘object-
choice’ refers here to the ‘act of selecting a person or a type of person as love 
object’.76 An ‘anaclitic’ object-choice refers to the ‘fact that the persons who 
are concerned with a child’s feeding, care, and protection become his earliest 
                                                
71 Jackson, p. 36. 
72 Jackson, p. 35. 
73 Jackson, p. 35. 
74 Jackson, p. 35. 
75 Sigmund Freud, ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’, in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the 
History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and 
Other Works, ed. and trans. by James Strachey (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 
67-102 (pp. 87-91). 
76 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, ‘Object-choice’, in The 
Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: 
Karnac Books, 1973), p. 277. 
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sexual objects’.77 This ‘original attachment’ forms the basis for later ‘object-
choices’.78 ‘Narcissistic’ object-choices refer to those who, rather than seeking 
a replacement mother-figure, seek ‘themselves as a love-object’.79 In Freud’s 
problematically deterministic approach, homosexuality is given as an example 
of a ‘narcissistic’ object-choice.80 This accounts for Freud’s focus on Da 
Vinci’s relationship to his mother in the troubling analysis described above.  
 
Jackson uses the concept of ‘anaclitic’ love when she focuses on the problem 
of artists pursuing autonomy from the social structures in which their projects 
emerge. Jackson suggests that when social systems are framed by artists as 
restrictive or inhibiting, the idea that the artist, and their practice, is supported 
and maintained by that system is unwelcome: 
 
The problem of this semi-conscious attachment to support is that “the 
Child” paradoxically is annoyed to discover “his” reliance upon it. In 
both art projects and social projects, receivers similarly use the 
language of inconvenience and constraint to manage the psychic 
scandal of being exposed to their own disavowed dependency. It is 
hard to ask someone to get off your back once you realise she has 
your back.81 
 
Later in Social Works Jackson returns to a psychoanalytic approach to issues 
of maintenance and support in a discussion of artist Mierle Laderman Ukeles’ 
‘maintenance art’, which I referred to in my section on Jackson in chapter one. 
Jackson refers to Ukeles’ ‘Manifesto for Maintenance Art 1969!’82 Written 
                                                
77 Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 87. 
78 Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 87. 
79 Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 88. 
80 Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 88. 
81 Jackson, p. 37. 
82 Jackson, p. 85. 
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partly in response to the challenges of being an artist and a mother, the 
manifesto opposed ‘two basic systems: Development and Maintenance’.83 
Jackson refers to the circulation of theories of ‘Freud, Lacan, and eventually 
Winnicott’ in both ‘art worlds and parenting circles’ at the time of Ukeles’ 
manifesto (1969).84 She explains that in this manifesto ‘Ukeles trenchantly 
linked the animating drive of political protest and of avant-garde art with the 
edgier subjective pleasures of the Death Instinct’.85 Jackson goes on to note 
that, in opposition to this ‘Death Instinct’: 
 
“Life” instinct occupied a definitional zone of uncreativity, that is, the 
zone responsible for maintaining the creativity of others. Maintenance 
and the Life-Sustaining Instincts were humdrum, repetitive, earnest, 
lacking an edge –and notably engendered and classed.86 
 
 
Jackson praises Ukeles’ for seeking to ‘redefine the place of radicality, seeing 
it not in the assertion of autonomous personhood, change and disruption but 
in the habits of maintenance and care on which such assertions of 
autonomous personhood depended’.87  
 
Jackson focuses on contesting pursuits of individual desires and artistic 
autonomy with acknowledgment and foregrounding of inter-relational support 
and the often disavowed systems and subjects that maintain artistic practice. 
Put in psychoanalytic terms, she favours performances and artworks that 
engage directly with the tensions of anaclitic love, as opposed to that which 
                                                
83 Jackson, p. 85. 
84 Jackson, p. 86. 
85 Jackson, p. 86. 
86 Jackson, p. 86. 
87 Jackson, p. 86. 
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strives to circumnavigate the ‘uncreative’ zone of the ‘Life Instinct’ via 
sublimation. This seems, at least in part, to respond to Bishop’s opposing 
position, captured in the quote referenced in the introduction to this thesis, in 
which she frames ideal collaborative practice as that which maintains a fidelity 
to the artist’s desire, and not an indulgence in neighbourly love. Whilst there is 
no direct reference to Bishop in the sections of Jackson’s book that I have 
discussed here, there are frequent deconstructions of Bishop’s arguments 
throughout Jackson’s writing on socially engaged performance (as discussed 
in Chapter One). Bishop’s assertion contains references to psychoanalytic 
approaches to desire and the Christian concept of ‘neighbourly love’. The 
majority of the rest of this chapter focuses on these theories.  
 
Super-egoic Injunctions and Desire 
 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, after suggesting that the ‘best 
socially collaborative art does not derive from a super-egoic injunction to "love 
thy neighbour," but from the position of "do not give up on your desire"’, 
Bishop declares that the concept is not worth pursuing.88 I suggest that part of 
the reason Bishop rejects the idea of explicitly discussing collaborative and 
participatory art through the lens of the ‘desire/neighbourly love binary is that 
such an approach relies on the kind of assumptive psycho-pathologising 
discussed above. The critic or theorist who approaches art in line with 
Bishop’s favouring of desire-pursuance over neighbour-loving would, 
presumably, work towards establishing which of these approaches an artist is 
                                                
88 Bishop in Roche. 
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taking. Framing an arts practice as a fidelity to a desire relies on establishing 
what an artist’s desires are. Opposing that position to one of embracing social 
responsibility means assuming that an artist’s desires do not include acting in 
a loving way towards one’s neighbours. How, for example, do we know if 
Howells was bathing, hugging and feeding participants based on a pursuit of 
fulfilling individual desire or on an anaclitc engagement in altruistic love? 
A crucial conclusion of the following writing is that, whilst focusing on an 
artist’s apparent desires is necessarily assumptive and reductive, an 
identification and discussion of  ‘super-egoic injunctions’ does not need to 
lead to crudely diagnosing whether an artist is following them or not. This is 
because ‘super-egoic injunctions’ originate not in an inner psyche of an artist, 
but, as Freud implies and Lacan clarifies, as an outside agency that is partially 
internalized by the subject.89 Žižek usefully defines this super-ego as the 
‘vengeful, sadistic, punishing aspect’ of the agency whose ‘gaze we try to 
impress, the big Other who watches over me and impels me to give my 
best’.90 Following this, I have an interest in the way super-egoic injunctions 
emerge through the various writings on the social turn (including Bishop’s).  
 
Oedipus and Ego-Ideals 
 
In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud proposes the idea that, when 
psychoanalytically interpreted, dreams reveal themselves as the ‘fulfillment of 
                                                
89 Freud, ‘Civilisation’, p. 142; Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan: Book 1 Freud’s Papers on Technique: 1953-1954, ed. by Jacques-
Alain Miller, trans. by John Forrester (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 89-106. 
90 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 80. 
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wishes’.91 As discussed above in reference to the ‘pleasure principle’, the term 
‘wish-fulfillments’ refers to the meeting of certain desires that are inhibited or 
denied in our conscious lives. It is because of this deniability, by our 
consciousness and the social rules that structure it, that the wishes fulfilled in 
dreams are rarely clearly definable. They are encrypted through metaphor, 
allusion, diversion, stand-ins and a plethora of other cryptic and absurd 
methods of what Freud terms ‘distortion’.92 This distortion is, for Freud, a kind 
of psychic censorship, in which unconscious desires are revealed to us in a 
similar manner to a ‘political writer who has unpleasant truths to tell those in 
power’.93 In fear of suppression and censorship, the writer ‘moderates and 
disguises the expression of his opinions’.94 
He finds himself compelled, in accordance with the sensibilities of the 
censor, either to refrain altogether from certain forms of attack, or to 
express himself in allusions instead of by direct assertions; or he must 
conceal his objectionable statement in an apparently innocent 
disguise.95 
 
Freud’s description of an internal ‘censor’, alluded to in this example from the 
‘external’ world, serves as an early introduction to the ‘part of the ego in which 
self-observation, self-criticism, and other reflective activities develop’.96 As 
James Strachey points out, it is in his essay ‘On Narcissism’ that Freud 
develops this ‘self observing’ agency into the concept of the ‘ego ideal’, a 
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Works of Sigmund Freud Volume IV (1900): The Interpretation of Dreams 
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concept that later became synonymous with the ‘super ego’.97 In a paragraph 
that links Bishop’s reference to ‘super-egoic injunctions’ to sublimation, Freud 
writes: 
As we have learnt, the formation of an ideal heightens the demands of 
the ego and is the most powerful factor favouring repression; 
sublimation is a way out, a way by which those demands can be met 
without involving repression.98 
 
This goes someway to clarifying Bishop’s position, in which ‘neighbourly love’ 
is framed as an ‘ideal’ which represses the collaborative artist’s desires. For 
Freud, as discussed, art is one method of avoiding the repressive demands of 
the super ego (here the ‘ideal’) through the sublimation of inhibited desires. In 
following Lacan’s approach to desire, Bishop seems to push art towards 
confronting and breaking through the ego ideal’s repressions, an act inevitably 
entwined with the concept of jouissance. The inevitable suffering that 
accompanies the pleasures of jouissance means this is by no means an easy 
request to follow, as exemplified in Lacan’s rhetorical question: ‘Who is there 
who in the name of pleasure doesn’t start to weaken when the first half-
serious step is taken toward jouissance?’99 I will focus more on the Lacanian 
approaches to desire that both support and complicate Bishop’s position 
below. First it is worthwhile continuing to map out the emergence of the 
concept of the super-ego. This is in order to introduce the Lacanian concepts 
of the big Other and the Symbolic Order, which can be traced back to Freud’s 
concept of the super-ego. They are important concepts in the development of 
                                                
97 James Strachey in Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 70. 
98 Freud, ‘On Narcissism’, p. 95. 
99 Lacan, Ethics, p. 185. 
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my argument through the rest of the thesis, and are implicitly referenced in 
Bishop’s opinion on collaborative art.  
In the 1923 paper ‘The Ego and the Id’ Freud outlines his hypothesis of the 
origin of the super-ego.100 The formation of the super-ego is directly related to 
the Oedipus Complex. 101 Whilst the child develops a strong emotional 
dependence on the mother, through his or her desire for the breast, the 
relationship to the father is based more on becoming like him, by introjecting 
him.102 This introjection ‘confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego 
ideal or super-ego’ (at this point, Freud tends to use the terms ego ideal and 
super-ego interchangeably).103 At first the child identifies fully with the father in 
order to get closer to the mother. However, this is complicated when the 
Oedipus Complex develops, Freud’s theory of ‘the fate of all of us, perhaps’ in 
which we ‘direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first 
hatred and our first murderous wish against our father’.104 The demand, from 
our father, to leave our mothers alone is, for Freud, the first injunction which 
sets us up for a lifetime of rules, laws, restrictions and demands entwined in 
the guilty conscience that makes up the super-ego. Thus, from this point 
onwards, the ego becomes the recipient of tyrannical, double-binding 
demands, rooted in the injunction that ‘you ought to be like’ your father but 
also ‘you may not be’ like your father (for example, you cannot have sex with 
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your mother).105 Therefore the super-ego, as internalized parent, admired, 
feared and taken ‘into ourselves’, henceforth keeps us in check, dishing out 
guilt, keeping an eye on our desires and doing its best to maintain our ‘higher 
natures’.106 It is this mixture of guiding law and ‘mindless’, double-binding 
tyranny that connects with Jacques Lacan’s description of the super-ego, as 
links to his concepts of the symbolic order and the big Other. He addresses 
these internalised demands and denials in his 1953-1954 seminar Freud’s 
Papers on Technique, detailing the unsettling relationship between the super-
ego and the Law:107 
The super-ego is an imperative. As is indicated by common sense and 
by the uses to which it is put, it is consonant with the register and the 
idea of the law, that is to say with the totality of the system of language, 
in so far it [sic] defines the situation of man as such, that is to say in so 
far as he is not just a biological individual. On the other hand, one 
should also emphasise, as a counter to this, its senseless, blind 
character, of pure imperativeness and simple tyranny.108 
 
Three important points can be gathered from this reworking of Freud’s super-
ego. The first is its aforementioned contradictory and tyrannical nature. 
Secondly, the super-ego is at ‘one and the same time the law and its 
destruction’.109 This simultaneous being/destroying of the law is entwined with 
its reduction to the traumatically unfinished injunction ‘You must’, an example 
of the super-ego as ‘speech deprived of all its meaning’.110 Finally, this 
reference to speech deprived of meaning, and the defining of the super-ego 
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as an ‘imperative’, is related to the Lacanian theory that it is not located 
internally, in the ego, but in the symbolic plane of speech and language.  
 
The Symbolic Order and the big Other 
 
The ‘Symbolic Order’ is one of three ‘intertangled levels’ that constitute ‘the 
reality of human beings’.111 The other two are the Imaginary, and the Real. 
Žižek offers a useful, chess-related analogy when explaining this triad. For 
Žižek the Real is the ‘entire complex set of contingent circumstances that 
affect the course of the game’.112 This might include the ‘intelligence of the 
players, the unpredictable intrusions that may disconcert one player or directly 
cut the game short’.113 The shapes and names of the individual pieces 
(‘Knight’, ‘Pawn’) make up the Imaginary dimension of the game; and the 
Symbolic refers to the ‘rules one has to follow in order to play’.114 Hence, in 
the Symbolic Order a ‘Pawn’ or a ‘Knight’ is ‘defined only by the moves this 
figure can make.’115  
So, firstly, the Symbolic Order is a network of rules. Alan Sheridan, the 
translator of Lacan’s The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 
describes the origins of the concept of the Symbolic in the theory of semiotics 
and the ‘signifier’: 
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The symbols referred to here are not icons, stylized figurations, but 
signifiers, in the sense developed by Saussure and Jakobson, 
extended into a generalized definition: differential elements, in 
themselves without meaning, which acquire value only in their mutual 
relations, and forming a closed order – the question is whether this 
order is or is not complete.116 
 
The definition of these ‘Symbols’ as purely differential signifiers, all mutual 
relations and no definitions (no ‘signifieds’) returns us to the ‘You Must’ of 
Lacan’s super-ego. So, in reading Žižek’s and Sheridan’s definitions together 
it is clear that the Symbolic is both the realm of speech ‘without meaning’, but 
also the realm of rules, the ‘rules one has to follow to play the game’. For 
Lacan, the most important ‘game’ that the symbolic order structures and rules 
is subjectivity. As Sheridan explains, the symbolic ‘is the determining order of 
the subject, and its effects are radical: the subject, in Lacan’s sense, is 
himself an effect of the symbolic’.117 This is why it is the order most important 
to psychoanalysis: ‘Everything which is human has to be ordained within a 
universe constituted by the symbolic function’.118 Lacan explains this universal 
nature of the symbolic order, the fact that it always precedes us, by asking us 
to ‘Think about the origins of language’: 
We imagine there must have been a time when people on this earth 
began to speak. So we admit of an emergence. But from the moment 
that the specific structure of this emergence is grasped, we find it 
absolutely impossible to speculate on what preceded it other than by 
symbols which were always applicable. What appears to be new thus 
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always seems to extend itself indefinitely into perpetuity, prior to 
itself.119 
 
This theory of a Symbolic Order, which always precedes us as individuals, 
through which our subjectivity emerges, and in which we find the rules of the 
game, is entwined with the concept of the ‘big Other’.120 It is through the 
concept of the ‘big Other’ that we return to the ‘super-ego’. In fact, in some 
introductory books on Lacan and Žižek the terms are used interchangeably, or 
as different phrases for the same concept. For example in Introducing Slavoj 
Žižek: A Graphic Guide, Christopher Kul-Want and Piero state that ‘Freud 
calls the big Other the super-ego’.121 It is worth noting here that, in referring to 
Lacan’s crucial differentiation between the ‘ideal ego’, the ego-ideal and the 
super-ego, Žižek confuses matters by positioning the super-ego in relation to 
the ‘Real’ as opposed to the Symbolic, which is linked to the Ego-Ideal: 
The underlying structuring principle of these three terms is clearly 
Lacan’s triad Imaginary-Symbolic-Real: ideal ego is imaginary, what 
Lacan calls the ‘small other’, the idealized mirror-image of my ego; 
Ego-Ideal is symbolic, the point of my symbolic identification, the point 
in the big Other from which I observe (and judge) myself; the super-ego 
is real, the cruel and insatiable agency that bombards me with 
impossible demands and then mocks my botched attempts to meet 
them…122 
 
However, for now I will continue to address it in its connection with the 
symbolic order, a connection that I hope to have demonstrated is clearly 
definable in both Žižek’s and Lacan’s approaches to it, despite this digression 
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to the contrary. Lacan, for example, discusses the super-ego, the Symbolic 
Order and the ‘big Other’ together in relation to speech: 
We must distinguish two others, at least two – an other with a capital 
O, and an other with a small o, which is the ego. In the function of 
speech, we are concerned with the Other.123 
 
Here Lacan is differentiating between the objet petit a – the ‘other with a small 
o’ that Žižek connects to the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘ideal ego’, and the big Other, 
which relates to speech, the Law and the symbolic.  Žižek goes someway to 
clarifying the relationship between the symbolic order, the big Other and 
speech in a paragraph which, whilst not entirely collapsing the two into the 
same meaning, begins with the statement ‘The big Other operates at a 
symbolic level’.124 He goes on to describe the ‘complex set of rules and other 
kinds of presuppositions’ that the Symbolic Order is composed of, and which 
are always present ‘when we speak’, but which we are not always aware of.125 
In fact, an awareness of these rules has the potential to break down speech, 
and consequently the social exchange it is part of. They include the 
grammatical rules, as well as the rules that make us understood within the 
context we are speaking, and the rules of politeness and appearances. It is 
the constant presence of this set of rules, against which we are constantly 
measure ourselves, that means that the big Other ‘can be personified or 
reified in a single agent’ (i.e. ‘God’), or ‘the Cause that involves me (Freedom, 
Communism, Nation) and for which I am ready to give my life’.126 Whilst, in its 
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relation to the symbolic order, the big Other is omnipresent and pre-exists us, 
it is important to note that Žižek also describes it as ‘fragile, insubstantial, 
properly virtual, in the sense that its status is that of a subjective 
presupposition. It exists only in so far as subjects act as if it exists’.127 This 
idea is central to my critical approaches to Reactor’s participatory arts practice 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
Super-ego, Civilisation, Neighbourly Love 
 
The approach to a super-ego as big Other, that is as much projected ‘out-
there’, intertwined with speech and the Law as it is introjected into our ego, 
has some basic relations to Freud’s discussion of the ‘cultural super-ego’ in 
the concluding pages of ‘Civilization and Its Discontents’.128 It is here that 
Freud, in a kind of reverse of his use of the political writer and the censor 
thirty years previously, develops an ‘analogy between the process of 
civilization and the path of individual development’ in order to map out his 
theory of the latter.129 For Freud cultural development ‘proceeds’ under the 
influence of a super-ego ‘evolved’ by the community. Thus, whilst for Freud 
the ‘cultural super-ego’ is ‘based on the impression left behind by great 
leaders’ it is clear that, in this concept, we have an early outline of a 
procession of culture under the influence of a big Other: 
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The cultural super-ego has developed its ideals and set up its 
demands. Among the latter, those which deal with the relations of 
human beings to one another are comprised under the heading of 
ethics.130 
 
Here it might be claimed that it is the ‘procession of culture’ itself, the 
development of civilization, that acts as the big Other. 
In returning to Bishop’s prescription for collaborative art, I will now turn to 
Freud’s assertion that the most recent of the ‘cultural super-ego’s’  ‘cultural 
commands’ is to ‘love one’s neighbour as oneself.’131 This command comes 
about in order to rid ourselves of the ‘greatest hindrance to civilization’, 
described by Freud as ‘the constitutional inclination of human beings to be 
aggressive towards one another’.132 Freud’s encounter with this inclination, 
and the injunction which aims to overcome it, is his response to his 
suggestion that ‘we must ask ourselves to what influence the development of 
civilization owes its origin, how it arose, and by what its course has been 
determined’.133 In order to address this question Freud maps out a historical 
narrative (much of which originated in Totem and Taboo) that leads up to the 
emergence of the ‘love thy neighbour’ injunction.134  I will now summarise this 
narrative. I am aware that this summary entails a shift in tone in which it might 
be misread as ‘mocking’ or a little sardonic. In his preface to the latest edition 
of The Plague of Fantasies Žižek refers to the ‘ridicule’ with which this 
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narrative is often met.135 He suggests that this ridicule is fair if the narrative is 
read as ‘a fact of the earliest history of humanity’, but suggests it should 
instead be approached as a ‘libidinal fact’, a fact of ‘”psychic reality”, which 
accompanies, as an obscene shadow, ‘normal’ paternal authority, prospering 
in the dark underground of unconscious fantasies’.136 For me, allowing for the 
apparent ridiculousness of some of the narratives that underlie psychoanalytic 
theory to be momentarily foregrounded is important. This is because of its 
potential to produce brief tremors in the authoritative positions of these 
theories in the development of critical responses, including my own, to 
participatory art and performances. This seems apt in a section that deals with 
the importance of the fragility of the big Other. In my pursuit of awkwardness, 
the apparent ridiculousness of these narratives is what makes psychoanalytic 
theory so appealing. In the chapters that follow it should become clear that my 
arguments emerge not from ridiculing theories, or artworks, but of taking 
ridiculousness seriously as a tool for provoking productively awkward 
relationships with authority and responsibility.  
The emergence of the super-egoic injunction in Freud’s thinking is as follows: 
‘Primitive’ people realized that they needed to work, and that it was easier to 
work together. Thus they lived as groups.137 Men realized that they wanted 
sex all the time, and therefore they held on to their women. Women realised 
that in order to keep their children they had to stay with their men. This led to 
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family groups being formed.138 The father ruled over the group, limiting the 
brothers’ sexual pursuits and denying them access to their mother. This was, 
as explained, the original super-egoic injunction.139 However, the brothers 
realized that if they ganged together they could kill their father. They did so 
and consequently created an inherent sense of guilt in mankind and an 
eternal introjection of this primordial father into the ego of everyone who is 
born after them.140  This means that even though the father figure is dead we 
still are not allowed to go around having sex with whoever and whatever we 
like. This is primarily because the law and restrictions associated with the 
murdered father were re-disseminated by the brothers in order to ensure 
civilization was maintained. Thus, in the logic of this development of 
civilization, the problems to be avoided are the fact that sex causes exclusivity 
and therefore should be maintained within the family unit and that, in order to 
work and develop civilization, we need some of the energy we’d be using up 
having sex everywhere.141 Freud opines that if we could be happy only having 
sexual drives at home with our partners, and then just working innocently 
alongside strangers in the outside world, civilization would work and we would 
be content. However, because we fear that we will lose our partner we can’t 
help but look at everyone as potential lovers.142 Thus in order to develop good 
working relationships with each other without completely denying love, we 
develop the concept of ‘aim-inhibited love’. 143 This means love without sex. 
This is encouraged because love binds groups of people together more 
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intensively than the interest of work in common. The super-egoic injunction 
‘love thy neighbour’ is the demand for us to practice this ‘aim-inhibited love’ 
universally (except, of course, towards our actual lovers, who also get the 
sex), and hence work well together to develop civilization without falling into 
the disruptive exclusivity of genital love.144 
Having mapped out the origin of this injunction, Freud quickly moves on to 
outlining various reasons why it is doomed to fail, why, in the words of Lacan, 
he was ‘literally horrified by the idea of love of one’s neighbour’.145 The 
reasons for Freud’s horror at these injunctions are, firstly, the idea that it is 
wrong to love everyone because ‘my love is valued by all my own people as a 
sign of preferring them, and it is an injustice to them if I put a stranger on a 
par with them’.146 Things become a little more antagonistic when Freud 
suggests that if the commandment was ‘Love thy neighbour as thy neighbour 
loves thee’ then it would seem much fairer.147 However, because my 
neighbour ‘seems not to have the least trace of love for me’ and is, in fact, 
‘likely to want to injure or jeer at me’, it would make more sense for me to feel 
‘hostility and even hatred’ towards him.148 This leads to the grander and more 
troubling declaration of the ‘element of truth behind all of this’.149 This ‘truth’ is 
the commonly disavowed idea that ‘men are not gentle creatures who want to 
be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; 
they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is 
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to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness.’150 The final problem for 
Freud is that the more we deny ourselves this aggressiveness against our 
neighbour the stronger the aggressiveness of the super-egoic injunction to 
love him grows, as well as our sense of guilt for feeling aggressive in the first 
place.151 Unable to direct it at our neighbour, we turn our aggressiveness in on 
ourselves. This is why Žižek describes the super-ego as ‘the agency in whose 
eyes I am all the more guilty, the more I try to suppress my ‘sinful’ strivings 
and meet its demands’.152  
It is this concept of inherent and introjected aggressiveness that Lacan 
develops in his own writing on ‘Love of one’s neighbour’.153 Lacan describes 
how the ‘presence of that fundamental evil which dwells within this neighbour’ 
reminds us that the same fundamental evil dwells within ourselves.154 He 
furthers this reflection by asking ‘And what is more of a neighbour to me than 
this heart within which is that of my jouissance and which I daren’t go near?’155 
In asking this he connects the problems of loving one’s neighbour with the 
problems of desire in a way that begins to problematise Bishop’s position.  
Desire 
 
According to Rycroft ‘If there is one concept which can claim to be the very 
centre of Lacan’s thought, it is the concept of desire’.156 He then goes on to 
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state that the aim of psychoanalysis is to ‘lead the analysand to recognize the 
truth about his desire’.157 Bishop draws on this, but in so doing, she risks 
substituting an art context for a clinical one. On top of this, a misreading that 
Bishop’s prescription implies is one enwrapped in the theory of repression. 
This position in relation to ‘repression’ is given further clarification when 
Bishop goes on to say that following the injunction to ‘love thy neighbor’ 
‘involves a sacrificial stance: it is the politically correct position of doing what 
seems right in the eyes of others’.158 The problem with this idea of the artist’s 
desire repressed by do-gooder politics is firstly that, as we have seen above, 
the subject emerges through the big Other, and thus isn’t a separate, private 
entity that needs saving from it.  The second problem with Bishop’s reading is 
to be found in the key statement that Lacan makes in relation to desire: ‘it is 
qua Other that man desires’.159 We desire to be the object of the other’s 
desire, and our own desires are inevitably entwined with the desires others 
have of us.  
 
As Sherry Turkle points out, for Lacan, ‘even the infant’s first desire for the 
mother signifies something beyond itself: it signifies the wish to be what the 
mother most desires’.160 Žižek explains that ‘desire is structured by the 
“decentred” big Other, the symbolic order: what I desire is predetermined by 
                                                
157 Rycroft, P. 37. 
158 Bishop in Roche. 
159 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics of 
Desire’, in Écrits: The First complete Edition in English, trans. by Bruce Fink 
(New York: Norton, 2006), pp. 671- 702 (p. 690).  
160 Sherry Turkle, Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud’s French Revolution (London: 
Burnett Books, 1979), p. 55. 
 141 
the big Other, the symbolic space within which I dwell’.161 Thus, through 
Lacan’s later work, our desires are no longer framed as internal wishes that 
we need to express (in clinical analyses or collaborative art practices), but 
rather it is through language, as Rycroft points out, that these desires emerge: 
‘by articulating desire in speech, the analysand brings it into existence’.162 Tim 
Dean clarifies this reading of desire in his article on Lacan and queer 
theory.163 He usefully outlines the crucial point, that for ‘Lacan desire is no 
longer a psychological category, since it is an effect of language – that is, as 
unconscious’.164 Thus, there is a danger that the strand of psychoanalysis that 
underlies Bishop’s approach to collaborative art aligns with what Dean 
describes as the ‘liberationist strand of psychoanalysis whose readings of 
Freud recommended freeing desire from social repression’.165  
 
This writing challenges Bishop’s privileging of explicitly antagonistic practices 
in three ways. Firstly, it reminds us that there is always an implicit antagonism 
in any social encounter, and that, in fact, the more we push ourselves to love 
our neighbours the stronger the underlying antagonism becomes. In other 
words, as I suggested in my first chapter, so called ‘feel good’ practices might 
be a more appropriate place to look for a politics of antagonism than those 
practices which willfully pursue a negation of neighbourly love. Secondly 
Bishop’s implicit use of the ‘repressive’ model of psychoanalysis, in which 
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society denies us our desires, misses Lacan’s positioning of the emergence of 
the subject and his or her desires through the realm of the symbolic. Thirdly, it 
is easy to see that, even if many of the works that Bishop celebrates might 
allow for the artist to pursue his or her desires, the participants’ desires are far 
less welcome. That is not to say that the artwork or artist ‘represses’ the 
participants’ desires. However, it does suggest a domestication of the 
participants that leaves no room for the emergence of their own desires 
through the symbolic space of the project.  
Conclusion 
 
In Twite’s reflections on her experience of The Pleasure of Being: Washing, 
Feeding, Holding she admits to wanting to ‘externalise the experience’.  She 
suggests that the academic work of ‘finding some kind of artistic meaning’ 
would enable this externalisation. Psychoanalytic readings of participatory 
performance might also serve as a means of escaping them. Performing such 
readings in the most clumsy and damaging way would shift the focus away 
from Twite’s own role in her discomfort and onto Howell’s psychopathology. 
Taking a sociological approach and framing the performance purely in relation 
to, for example, contemporary society’s restriction of physical intimacy with 
strangers would ‘externalise’ the experience. I understand Twite’s wish to 
retreat from an experience she finds awkward, but I also propose that one of 
the unique efficacies of participatory performance is to be found in the fact 
that we are not external to the action, or its ‘meaning’, but that we are directly 
caught up in it. Howells’ performance offers the opportunity to experience the 
inter-relationality of desire, to reflect on the way in which our own desires 
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emerge in relation to the other. Part of my enjoyment of being bathed is 
related to my sense that Howells enjoys my enjoyment, and that my 
enjoyment plays an integral role in the performance I am part of. My 
enjoyment is not only a response to elements arranged by Howells to produce 
The Pleasure of Being: Washing, Feeding, Holding, it is one of those 
elements. Thus, for me the ‘meaning’ of the performance is to found through 
reflecting on the ways our own pleasures or displeasures in the performance 
emerge in response to those performed by Howells. As I stated at the 
beginning, Howells exuded the sense that he wanted to care for you. 
Psychoanalysis is not to be put to work here in order to ascertain Howells’ 
‘real’ desires, to hypothesise on the sociological or psychological causes of 
those desires, or to clarify whether Howells’ actions are actually related to his 
desires at all, instead emerging through a duty to do good. Instead 
psychoanalysis provides a tool for thinking through the network of desires of a 
situation in which we are embedded without becoming external to that 
situation. In Chapter 4 I engage further with this idea of participatory 
performance and inter-relational desires by focusing on the unwavering, yet 
awkward pursuit and affirmation of desires in the performance practice of 
David Hoyle. Before that, in Chapter 3, I focus on the awkwardness 
experienced in my brief collaboration with art collective a.a.s. a.a.s’ 
relationship with inter-relationality and desire is complicated by their recurring 
allegiance to the Bartleby-like ethical position of ‘preferring not to’. 
  144 
Chapter 3 
Awkward Alliancing with a.a.s 
 
In this chapter I critically reflect on my experience of collaborating with UK-
based art group a.a.s on their project Xe54 in Walsall, UK (4-16 January 
2011). The core members of a.a.s have described themselves as ‘four, 
intense people (two men, two women) who make very demanding work’.1 
These four people are Stuart Tait, Ana Benlloch, Alex Marzeta and Vanessa 
Page. I was invited to join Xe54 alongside Luke Ferris: my long-term 
collaborator in performance art duo ‘AuntyNazi’, and performance artist Calum 
F. Kerr. 
 
The awkwardness I discuss in this chapter is related to the self-identified 
intensity of a.a.s, the demanding nature of their work, and their drifts, 
digressions, irresolution and general resistance to fixity. It was produced as a 
result of a.a.s’ practice of preferring ‘not to’, their immersion in 
deterritorialisation and what Tait describes as their existence as a ‘molecular 
collaboration’.2 Therefore I describe these approaches below. However, I do 
not claim that a.a.s intended to cause awkwardness. The awkwardness 
produced through these approaches is contingent on the personalities of 
those involved, myself included, and on unfolding events. This distinguishes 
this chapter from those that follow, in which I focus on awkwardness as an 
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efficacious tactic or strategy. Unlike a.a.s, David Hoyle (Chapter 4) and 
Reactor (Chapter 5) appear to intentionally pursue awkwardness.  
 
My focus here on awkwardness as a contingent outcome allows me to 
elaborate and test the ‘dyspraxic C/PPaR’ (dyspraxic collaborator/performer-
participation-as-research) methodology described in the introduction of this 
thesis. This is the first of three chapters in which I immerse myself in 
participatory art and performance projects in order to identify and experience 
moments in which difficulties are caused for participants and collaborators, in 
which interactivity is made hard to do, or interactions are hard to deal with, or 
in which relational encounters do not run smoothly. This relates to the 
dominant definition of awkwardness used in this thesis: ‘causing difficulty; 
hard to do or deal with’ or ‘not smooth or graceful; ungainly’.3  A potential 
problem of this methodology lies in the risk that it will produce a series of 
reflections on situations that I have subjectively experienced as difficult, 
unsmooth or ungainly. There are, I admit, times in which my research and 
writing on a.a.s is engaged with this problematic approach, particular in my 
descriptions and theorisations of what Tait described as ‘the extreme 
tensions’ that arose as a result of ‘differences in working practices and 
glitches in communication’ between a.a.s and AuntyNazi.4  
 
My dyspraxia can contribute to such ‘glitches in communication’ is also 
dyspraxic. Ferris is also dyspraxic. Reflecting on this engagement is important 
                                                
3 ‘Awkward’, Oxford Dictionaries < 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/awkward> [accessed 20 
May 2011]. 
4 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
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because it allows me to clearly distinguish this version of my dyspraxic 
C/PPaR methodology, in which the experience of awkwardness is potentially 
contingent upon my involvement, from that of the following chapters. The 
strategic and intentional nature of the awkwardness in Chapter 4 and 5 means 
I am not relying upon my subjective experience of awkwardness, but instead 
am attentive to the ways in which awkwardness has an integral role in the 
projects’ strategies and aims.    
 
In the main body of this chapter I provide a description of Xe54, offering 
insights into a.a.s’ approach to collaboration, participation and social 
engagement. This is followed by a section that connects a.a.s’ intense and 
demanding mode of being with theories of social and political resistance 
based on Herman Melville’s short story ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’.5 In my 
conclusion I re-iterate the role of this chapter in the thesis as a whole. This 
includes further reflection on the contingent nature of awkwardness in some of 
the situations and interactions I have discussed and clarification of the relation 
of a.a.s’ participatory practice to that of David Hoyle (Chapter 4) and Reactor 
(Chapter 5).  
a.a.s and Xe54 
 
a.a.s’ arts practice includes improvisational and noise-based music projects, 
sci-fi inspired installations, social interventions and relational projects, cultish 
rituals that reference sigilistic magick (magic based on symbols), and a 
                                                
5 Hermann Melville, ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’ in Billy Budd and Other Stories 
(Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) pp. 1-38. 
  147 
‘tangled web of internet sites’.6 During Xe54 the group wrote their name as 
‘a.a.s’, always using lower case letters. Therefore I follow this presentation of 
the title throughout my writing about them, as it is predominantly to this 
residency that I critically respond. The letters have been presented in various 
ways since they emerged in 2001, though always in the same order. In my 
footnotes I follow the presentation and punctuation used in the publication 
quoted from. At the time of writing it is written as AAS and they suggest that it 
should be pronounced as a word and not as three separate letters - like the 
word ‘ass’ but with an extended ‘ah’ sound at the beginning. At other times 
they have pronounced it by spelling out the letters. They say that the letters 
do not stand for anything, however as a.a.s was initiated by artists Ana 
Benlloch and Stuart Tait (in Birmingham in 2001), it could be assumed that it 
originally stood for ‘Ana and Stuart’. Part of the reason for briefly dwelling on 
this simultaneously pernickety and slippery relationship with titling is because 
it provides an initial glimpse into the ‘intense’ and ‘demanding’ approach and 
mode of being that a.a.s identify with. Importantly, as evidenced in this case of 
the group’s name and the multiplicity and scope of their practice, a key 
approach that is intensely demanded through a.a.s’ practice is a resistance of 
fixity. Xe54 acts as a clear example of this approach.  
 
Xe54 was a two-week participatory art project that occurred as part of a.a.s’ 
three-month residency at The New Art Gallery Walsall. The residency was 
called The Cage. The Cage and Xe54 were part of a series of projects that 
are collected together under the meta-title The Other Place. The Other Place 
                                                
6 Pil and Galia Kollectiv, ‘Paranoid Androids’, Plan B Issue 17 (Dec 2006), 95. 
  148 
projects are participatory, collaborative, publically engaged and relational 
artworks in which a.a.s ‘create openings to The Other Place: a collective 
space of thought or dreams, the space of the future or potential, as well as the 
collaborative process or assemblage that produces those ideas’.7 During 
Xe54, everything we did was loosely framed as an attempt to create an 
opening to ‘The Other Place’.8  Whilst the referent of the term ‘The Other 
Place’ remained ambiguous, there was a sense that we were trying to reach 
somewhere outside of our current reality. It alluded to such science fiction 
concepts as portals to other dimensions and time travel, as well as esoteric 
ideas of transcending consciousness, attempting out-of-body experiences and 
striving towards the attainment of psychic abilities.  
 
Xe54 involved a series of rituals, mini-performances, investigative and 
interventionist tasks, and activities inspired by the Situationists, such as Guy 
Debord’s ‘dérives’:  
In a dérive one or more persons during a certain period drop their 
relations, their work and leisure activities, and all their other usual 
motives for movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the 
attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there.9 
 
These activities mainly took place in public spaces in Walsall, particular the 
town centre, but we also made extensive use of gallery and project spaces, 
                                                
7 a.a.s, ‘Other Place’, Projects http://aasgroup.net/projects/the-other-place/ 
[accessed 25th October 2012]. 
8 Throughout this chapter The Other Place (in italics) refers to the series of 
participatory projects, whereas ‘The Other Place’ (in single quotation marks) 
refers to the concept or space pursued in these projects.   
9 Guy Debord, ‘Theory of the Dérive’, Situationist International ANTHOLOGY, 
revised and expanded version, ed. and tran. by Ken Knabb (Berkeley: Bureau 
of Public Secrets, 2006), pp. 144-154 (p. 144). 
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the library, and backspaces of The New Art Gallery Walsall. This meant 
spending many days wondering around the town following whims, trying out 
micro-interventions, making insistent, but tenuous links between the objects, 
interactions, and images we experienced, and dwelling in derelict and 
underused spaces that we felt could expand or contribute to the project. We 
(a.a.s, collaborators, and participants) joined queues in shops before waving 
those behind us to go ahead of us for no reason, often whilst other 
participants took notes. We attempted to meticulously reconstruct incidental 
interactions with members of the public from memory, repeating them in the 
spaces in which they first occurred with the aim of getting them right or 
revealing something new. We rummaged through boxes of unwanted 
donations at the back of charity shops. We constructed ‘kits’ from items 
bought from Pound Shops, assembling them into apparatus for exorcisms, 
‘table top-rituals’, ‘catastrophe prevention’ and ‘bee rescues’, and produced 
short instructional videos on how to assemble and use them. We were 
encouraged to engage in activities and methodologies that embraced 
serendipity and chance in order to create performance scores and trigger new 
threads of tasks and explorations.  
 
Materials apt for absorption into the language and narrative of Xe54 included 
our memories of conversations with shop keepers, gallery staff, and market-
traders in Walsall city centre, text on billboard advertisements, automated 
instructions for how to safely alight from an escalator, and books in The New 
Art Gallery Walsall’s library. It is important to note that a large part of the work 
of being in this project, whether as an employed collaborator or a participating 
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member of the public, was not only to engage in these drifting wanderings and 
partially formed activities, but to initiate, formalise, and facilitate new activities, 
rituals and performances. This amounted to a continual and relentless 
engagement in developing and reworking processes. Our activities never led 
to a product or staged performance, we drifted from one task to the next, 
sometimes leaving tasks half-way through or becoming absorbed for hours in 
working over a particular detail.  
 
‘Extreme Tensions’ 
 
It was in the midst of the production, initiation and playing out of Xe54’s 
activities that the ‘extreme tensions between individuals’ that Tait identified 
occurred.10 It was primarily between a.a.s and AuntyNazi that these ‘extreme 
tensions’ arose, though Tait also describes how a.a.s’ ‘engagement with the 
gallery was judged as difficult’, citing the fact that one ‘Christian member of 
staff even resigned because we performed a cleansing ritual around the 
building’.11  
 
Ferris and I have worked together since 2003, making calamitous 
participatory performances together as ‘AuntyNazi’, experimenting with 
unstable modes of authority and totalitarianism. Our performances tend to last 
between 15 and 45 minutes and occur as either one-to-one consultations or 
partially improvised shows in the midst of a loosely organised cluster of 
                                                
10 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
11 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
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audience members. The durational, public, and task-based elements of Xe54 
all lay outside of AuntyNazi’s usual practice. However, these aspects of the 
project were not the trigger of the tensions. The tensions between a.a.s and 
AuntyNazi were, in my experience, largely a result of differences in our 
approaches to collaboration and audience participation. These differences 
can be summarised as followed: AuntyNazi lampoon fascism, a.a.s embrace 
anarchy; AuntyNazi drag participants into performances and hold them there, 
a.a.s allow them to drift in and out of their own accord; AuntyNazi’s 
methodology for collaborating with others is based on positioning themselves 
as the underdog, a.a.s refuse hierarchy and deny that they are in charge; 
AuntyNazi make scrambled shows that inevitably fall apart, a.a.s scramble (or 
‘deterritorialise’ – see below) but do not make shows.  
 
These differences led to a mode of awkwardness defined by Adam Kotsko as 
‘radical’.12 As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, in his short book 
Awkwardness Kotsko approaches his subject through a discussion of the 
ways implicit rules are maintained, broken, ignored, or misunderstood. He 
identifies three different types of awkwardness: ‘everyday awkwardness’, 
‘radical awkwardness’ and ‘cultural awkwardness’. ‘Everyday awkwardness’ 
refers to the breaking of the ‘unspoken norms of a community’.13 ‘Cultural 
awkwardness’ describes situations in which ‘there seems to be a set of norms 
in force, but it feels somehow impossible to follow them or even fully know 
them’.14 ‘Radical awkwardness’ arises ‘when there doesn’t seem to be any 
                                                
12 Adam Kotsko, Awkwardness (Ropley: 0-Books, 2010), p. 7.  
13 Kotsko, p. 6.  
14 Kotsko, pp. 16-17. 
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norm governing a given situation at all’.15 a.a.s’ commitment to instability and 
flux across their approaches to definition, titling, membership, collaboration, 
and tasks and activities in individual projects, can be aptly described as an 
avoidance, or undoing of governing norms. Kotsko suggests that dangerous 
reactions and antagonisms can arise in such scenarios through a struggle to 
establish norms.16 In Xe54 the intensity of this struggle was no doubt related 
to AuntyNazi’s reliance on ‘norms’, due to our approaches to collaboration 
and our subjective dispositions.  
 
As mention, both Ferris and I are dyspraxic. Our dyspraxia can lead to 
difficulties with executive planning and in making relevant contributions in 
group situations. Dyspraxia plays an integral role in AuntyNazi’s practice, 
particularly in terms of collaboration. This means that often the material we 
develop for performances emerges from misunderstandings and inappropriate 
responses to each other and to the rules and norms of the site and context in 
which we are working. This aligns our approach with Kotsko’s description of 
‘everyday awkwardness’, which arises through the breaking (and subsequent 
exposure) of unspoken rules.  
 
Collaborating on a project like Xe54 in which the idea of rules and norms are 
continually undermined and resisted challenges our methodology and causes 
us frustration and anxiety. Ironically, our practice of pursuing (or strategically 
embracing) the efficacious everyday awkwardness that our conditions trigger 
was a key factor in producing a radical awkwardness. A core argument of this 
                                                
15 Kotsko, p. 7.  
16 Kotsko, pp. 7-8. 
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thesis is that the efficacy of awkwardness lies partly in its relationship to the 
exposure of unspoken rules. In Chapter 1 I introduced the argument that 
awkwardness might also reveal that the rules we assume are guiding a 
project are in fact open to change in response to participants actions and 
interactions. Such practices would be ideal for Ferris and I to collaborate on, 
because we would attempt a dysfunctional following of the rules and then the 
project would adapt and change in response to those attempts.  Neither of 
these arguments apply to Xe54’s radical awkwardness because of its reliance 
on the explicit non-existence of such rules. 
 
I have described these details and summarised the differing approaches of 
a.a.s and AuntyNazi in order to clarify that the awkwardness that Tait defines 
as ‘extreme tension’ was not an aim or strategy. It was a contingent result of 
specific situations, outcomes and personalities. It is important to note, 
therefore, that I do not claim that every participant or collaborator that 
experiences The Other Place projects would experience this awkwardness. 
Other collaborators with different approaches and modes of being would be 
able to work on an a.a.s project without instances of awkward tension. In this 
case, my dyspraxic C/PPaR approach could be deemed as flawed because it 
risks framing awkwardness as an inevitable and integral part of a participatory 
project, when it was in fact contingent on my participation. However, it is 
important to note that the awkwardness that did arise became a core part of 
the project. No attempt was made to contain or bypass it. As Tait observed 
the tensions that arose lead to ‘new, anxious, work that was outside anything 
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either group usually produced’.17 In the next section I elaborate on the 
approach to collaboration that AuntyNazi found so difficult and provide a more 
detailed account of the ‘extreme tensions’ that I frame as ‘awkward’. I do this 
is in order to revisit the non-intentionality of the resulting awkwardness, but 
also to support my suggestion that there is a heightened potential for 
awkwardness in a.a.s’ The Other Place projects. It also allows me to address 
some of the important outcomes that a.a.s were aiming for. 
 
a.a.s’ Approach to Membership and Collaboration  
 
As discussed, throughout Xe54 AuntyNazi experienced a.a.s’ unsettled 
relationship with membership. Tait, Benlloch, Marzeta, and Page took care of 
administrative duties throughout the project and advised and guided those 
who got involved. However, we were informed that, at least for the duration 
of Xe54, we were to think of ourselves as members of a.a.s, as was anyone 
else who collaborated on or participated in the project. This was complicated 
due to an ongoing ambiguity around when we were ‘in’ the project and when 
we were outside of it. The boundaries of the project were not clearly framed 
by a space or a time. Consequently there was some confusion as to if and 
when those who were not core-members were part of a.a.s. This ambiguity 
was intensified by the fact that Ferris and I lived with Tait and Benlloch in their 
flat in Birmingham for the duration of the project. Everything we did during 
those two weeks could end up having an important role in the development of 
Xe54. Our awareness of this created a light sense of paranoia around our 
                                                
17 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
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daily interactions with each other.  At first it was difficult to ascertain whether 
the tensions that arose between core and temporary members were part of 
the project, triggered intentionally in order to generate material, or genuine 
inter-personal frustrations. This meant that when we collated and built upon 
experiences and interactions in order to develop the project, we often had to 
check whether snappy outbursts or sulky silences were appropriate material 
to revisit. 
 
This ambiguity and tension was linked to a.a.s dedicated commitment to the 
contingencies of participation and to a philosophy and politics of anarchy and 
flux. This is influenced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s theory of 
‘molecularity’.18 Tait described ‘molecular collaboration’ in a paper he gave at 
the A thousand lines of flight – Anarchist Network Conference at 
Loughborough University in September 2012. Following Deleuze, Tait 
differentiates what he defines as ‘molecular collaboration’ from ‘molarity’, 
which refers to groups, ‘such as trade unions’ that are defined ‘in terms of a 
theme, a style, an identity or a “program” that categorises, defines and 
delimits a group, so that it can be grasped in its entirety’.19 ‘Molecular 
collaboration’, on the other hand, incorporates overlaps, intersectionality and 
the privileging of ‘becoming’ over ‘being’.20 Tait furthers his descriptions of 
a.a.s’ model of ‘Molecular collaboration’ through reference to the concept of 
the ‘assemblage’.21 Again, his use of this term is rooted in the philosophy of 
                                                
18 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
19 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
20 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
21 Stuart Tait, ‘Chapter Two: Assemblages’, in ‘Becoming Multiple: 
Collaboration in Contemporary Art Practice’ (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, 
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Deleuze and Guattari. In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, the second 
volume of their philosophical project Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to their theory of ‘assemblages’ in their explanation of why 
a book ‘has neither object nor subject’:22 
 
In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, 
strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movement, 
deterritorialization and destratification. Comparative rates of flow on 
these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, 
on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and 
measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage. A book is an 
assemblage of this kind, and as such is unattributable.23  
 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, to attribute the ‘book to a subject’ is to ‘fabricate a 
beneficent God to explain geological movements’.24 Thus Deleuze and 
Guattari refuse the idea of the book coming together under the auspice of 
being about one particular subject, or of referring to one particular object. It is 
a collection of assembled parts that function together, but can also function 
apart, which affect each other and produce new pathways and excesses 
when brought together, but which also exist as a multiplicity of individual 
entities. a.a.s’ self-declared existence as an ‘assemblage’ suggests that they 
bring together individuals with the aim of producing something new or different 
when assembled, but which are not organised around a singular subject, or 
aiming to become a unified whole. This links to the concept of 
                                                                                                                                      
Birmingham City University, 2009) <http://stuarttait.com/writing/phd-
thesis/chapter-2>  [accessed 14/12/2014]. 
22 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (London and New York: Continuum, 
2004), p. 5. 
23 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 4. 
24 Deleuze and Guattari, p. 4. 
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‘deterritorialisation’, which was first developed by Deleuze and Guattari in 
Anti-Oedipus, the first book of their Capitalism and Schizophrenia project.25  
 
a.a.s were not intending to cause awkwardness, but they were intending to 
deterritorialise. Tait defines ‘deterritorialisation’ as follows: 
 
The term is often used together with the terms ‘territorialisation’ and/or 
‘reterritorialisation’. While territorialising forces tend to compose, define 
and limit a territory, practice, or individual, deterritorialising forces 
‘undo’ bonds, scramble a territory, or move beyond established limits. 
The two types of force are not opposed to each other but tend to 
operate in mutual flux.26 
 
Understanding a.a.s’ mode of collaboration through these concepts of 
‘assemblage’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ sheds some light on the privileging of 
process and resistance to fixity in the project. The encounters and interaction 
prompted and facilitated in Xe54 were not engaged in order to produce, but in 
order to undo, to perpetually ‘scramble’ the territories of the New Art Gallery 
Walsall and Walsall’s town centre, of The Cage and Xe54, and of a.a.s and 
their collaborators.  
 
Significantly for this chapter, a.a.s have demonstrated an awareness of the 
potential awkwardness that could arise through this pursuit of 
deterritorialisation, especially in relation to membership and collaboration. 
However, they deny that this awkwardness as an intention. This is evident in a 
                                                
25 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004).  
26 Stuart Tait, ‘Glossary’ in ‘Becoming Multiple: Collaboration in Contemporary 
Art Practice’ (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Birmingham City University, 2009) 
<http://stuarttait.com/writing/phd-thesis/glossary>  [accessed 14/12/2014]. 
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recent interview in which a.a.s (appearing as ‘AAS’) explain the way 
membership of the group functions: 
 
Core membership of the group is relatively stable at the moment, but at 
various points in AAS’s history the group stated that there were no 
members and that AAS was an imaginary art group. This was not done 
in order to be awkward or deceptive, but to attempt to explore the 
notion that the nature of collectivity depended on imagination and belief 
in the life of the collective.27  
 
 
This quote aligns aspects of a.a.s’ practice with awkwardness, despite the 
group’s definitive statement that this is not intended. The quote demonstrates 
that even though a.a.s’ motivations revolve around deterritorialisation, they 
acknowledge the reasonable possibility that their methods could be 
interpreted and experienced as an awkward mode of being. In the next 
section I define this ‘awkward mode of being’ as a Bartleby-like ethics.  
 
a.a.s’ Practice of Preferring ‘Not To’ 
 
 
As explained, during Xe54 our activities never led to a product or staged 
performance, we drifted from one activity to the next, sometimes leaving tasks 
half-way through or becoming absorbed for hours in working over a particular 
detail. Also, despite the fact that it was a participatory project occurring 
primarily in public spaces, there was rarely any active drive towards getting 
others involved.  We were occasionally joined by one or two friends who had 
travelled to Walsall, or by curious gallery visitors who had seen posters for 
                                                
27 AAS, ‘AAS’ in Francesco Spampinato, Come Together: The Rise of 
Cooperative Art and Design (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2015), 
pp. 16-19 (p. 16). Emphasis added.  
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The Cage project space and spoken with gallery staff. However, on more than 
one occasion rituals, interventions, and activities were performed solely by 
a.a.s, AuntyNazi and Calum F. Kerr, often with little attention paid by or to 
those around us. During the project, as AuntyNazi attempted to grasp the 
transitory processes that we were drawn into, a.a.s and ourselves playfully 
agreed that the group were like teenagers who wanted to stay in their rooms 
producing and listening to noise music, but who had been forced to make 
participatory art.  
 
A little research into the titles of various The Other Place projects reinforces 
the idea that a.a.s wilfully engage in this contradictory approach to 
participation and social engagement. ‘Xe54’ is the chemical symbol for Xenon. 
Xenon is a colourless, odourless gas that is ‘very unreactive’.28 Its name is 
derived from the Greek word ‘xenos’, which means ‘stranger’.29 It was one of 
twelve projects that are collected together under the title The Other Place. 
Two other The Other Place projects have chemical symbols as titles: KR-36 
(2007) and DY-66 (2007). ‘KR-36’ is the chemical symbol for Krypton, which, 
like Xenon, is a colourless and odourless gas that is unreactive (it only reacts 
with fluorine gas).30 Its name derives from the Greek ‘kryptos’, which means 
‘hidden’.31 ‘DY-66’ is Dysprosium: a ‘bright, silvery metallic element’.32 Its 
                                                
28 Royal Society of Chemistry, ‘Xenon’, Periodic Table < 
http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/54/xenon> [accessed 11th October 
2014].  
29 ‘Xenon’. 
30 Royal Society of Chemistry, ‘Krypton’, Periodic Table 
<http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/36/krypton> [accessed 10th 
December 2014]. 
31 ‘Krypton’. 
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name derives from the Greek ‘dysprositos’, which means ‘hard to get’.33 
Taken together these titles hint at a concealed acknowledgement of a.a.s’ 
interest in producing participatory, publicly sited projects that are ‘unreactive’, 
‘hidden’ and ‘hard to get’ and in which a.a.s maintain a position as ‘strangers’. 
It is the combination of this interest in withdrawal and obfuscation with their 
engagement in a practice that is publically sited, participatory and unavoidably 
social that links a.a.s to the character of Bartleby and his particular mode of 
awkwardness. The previous chapter set up a psychoanalytical influenced 
approach to awkwardness and participatory performance based on the desire 
of the Other and the question “what do they want?”. Here I argue that the 
questions that a.a.s’ Bartleby-like ethics prompt are “why do they not want?” 
and “what do they want to not want?” 
 
In Hermann Melville’s short story Bartleby the Scrivener, the title character is 
hired as a scrivener to copy legal documents in a law firm.34 The character 
begins to refuse to work. He goes on to refuse to leave the workplace, 
sleeping there, and then, when evicted and imprisoned he refuses to eat until 
he starves to death. Throughout he only ever offers the phrase ‘I prefer not to’ 
as an explanation for his refusal and inaction.35 Through this Bartleby 
manages to simultaneously withdraw and remain disturbingly present. He 
does not wilfully leave any of the situations described. He ‘prefers not to’ 
leave just as vehemently as he ‘prefers not to’ take on any of the roles 
                                                                                                                                      
32 Royal Society of Chemistry, ‘Dysprosium’, Periodic Table 
http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/66/dysprosium [accessed 10h 
December 2014]. 
33 ‘Dysprosium’. 
34 Melville. 
35 Melville. 
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assigned to him. Herein lies Bartleby’s awkwardness. As Sianne Ngai states 
in Ugly Feelings, ‘what seems intolerable about Bartleby is how paradoxically 
visible he makes his social invisibility’.36 I would describe a.a.s’ relationship to 
collaboration, to participation, and to social engagement as awkward and as 
an ethics similar to the ethics of Bartleby because, as outlined above, they 
embrace this paradox. They place themselves in the context of collaborative, 
participatory practice and in physical sites of public and social interactions and 
then withdraw from concrete, active and visibly productive engagements with 
those sites and contexts.  
 
Both Slavoj Žižek and Gilles Deleuze have discussed the political potential of 
Bartleby’s attitude in terms of opening up new spaces outside of the dominant 
social system. Deleuze writes: 
 
If Bartleby had refused, he could be seen as a rebel or insurrectionary, 
and as such would have a social role. But the formula stymies all 
speech acts, and at the same time, it makes Bartleby a pure outsider 
[exclu] to whom no social position can be attributed.’37 
 
 
Focussing on the phrase ‘I prefer not to’, Žižek observes that ‘Bartleby does 
not negate the predicate; rather, he affirms a non-predicate: he does not say 
that he doesn’t want to do it; he says that he prefers (wants) not to do it.’38 
Žižek goes on to ascertain that this is ‘how we pass from the politics of 
                                                
36 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 332. 
37 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Bartleby; Or, The Formula’, Essays Critical and Clinical 
Trans. by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 68-90, (p. 73).  
38 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 
381-382 (italics original). 
  162 
“resistance” or “protestation,” which parasitizes upon what it negates, to a 
politics which opens up a new space outside the hegemonic position and its 
negation’.39 Bartleby’s status as ‘pure outsider’ (Deleuze) and his opening up 
of ‘new spaces’ (Žižek) is productively complicated when aligned with Ngai’s 
observation that he remains stubbornly present within the spaces he disturbs. 
Through this complication Bartleby emerges as a character who is able to 
stay within a situation whilst existing as ‘pure outsider’ and to create ‘new 
spaces’ that open up within the spaces in which he already resides.  This 
seems a neat summary of the way a.a.s position themselves within the sites 
and contexts in which they are situated and of their construction/pursuit of 
new spaces through the concept of ‘The Other Place’. It relates to the 
argument for the efficacy of awkwardness that runs throughout this thesis. 
  
This argument links to Kotsko’s suggestion that ‘awkwardness is a breakdown 
in our normal experience of social interaction while itself remaining irreducibly 
social’.40 Thus awkwardness, like Bartleby and a.a.s, has the potential to 
create disturbances in social situations that simultaneously throw us outside 
of them and keep us in them. This creates space for us to critically examine 
those situations from the outside without having to leave them. The existence 
of such paradoxical opportunities for simultaneous involvement and reflection 
is, I argue, only discoverable through participation. The spaces that a.a.s’ 
open up, and which we reached via awkwardness in Xe54, are not available 
for those outside the project. This re-confirms the importance of my C/PPaR 
methodology.  
                                                
39 Žižek, The Parallax View, pp. 381-382. Emphasis in original. 
40 Kotsko, p. 15. 
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Conclusion 
 
The chapter has both elaborated and tested my dyspraxic C/PPAR 
methodology, addressing a situation in which the awkwardness that arose 
was, at least in part, contingent upon my involvement. Whilst a.a.s 
acknowledge the heightened potential of such awkwardness arising in 
response to their approaches, it is denied as an intention. a.a.s’ motivations 
are rooted in a commitment to scrambling territories, opening up new spaces, 
and maintaining flows instead of producing clear outcomes. Importantly, these 
aims are each linked to an embracing of the contingencies of collaboration 
and participation. During the two-weeks of the project, all our interactions and 
their outcomes were framed as part of Xe54. This, of course, included the 
awkwardness that arose. Although it was not pursued, awkwardness became, 
in this case, an integral part of the project.  
 
The importance of a.a.s’ practice in relation to the arguments and 
methodology of this thesis lies in this response to awkwardness. My 
engagement with Xe54 highlights a blind spot in the present discourse around 
the social turn in art and performance. The lack of critical approaches to the 
contingent awkwardness that must occasionally arise in any practice that 
foregrounds social interaction reinforces the idea that such awkwardness is, 
or should be, ignored, contained, or overcome. a.a.s allowed the 
awkwardness that arose in Xe54 to become a core material of the project with 
a key role in its development and our pursuit of ‘The Other Place’.  
 
  164 
The second mode of awkwardness explored in this chapter is awkwardness 
as a mode of being. My dyspraxic C/PPaR methodology enabled a direct 
experience of a.a.s’ Bartleby-like ethics, and of the affects, experiences and 
ambiguities it triggers. It is clear that a.a.s do not engage in Bartleby-like 
ethics in order to produce awkwardness. However, I argue that an ethics 
similar to the ethics of Bartlebycan be defined as an awkward mode of being. 
Like dyspraxia, it intervenes in the smooth flow of social interaction, causing 
difficulties and being hard to deal with.  In the opening paragraph of Ugly 
Feelings, Ngai asks whether we should read Bartleby’s ‘inertness’ as ‘part of a 
volitional strategy that anticipates styles of nonviolent political activism to 
come, or merely as a sign of what we now call depression?’41 Here Ngai 
identifies an ambiguity around whether Bartleby’s extreme inaction 
demonstrates an intentionally disruptive tactic or a subjective disposition. This 
is an ambiguity that is familiar to me due to my experience of dyspraxia and 
its existence as a hidden disability. AuntyNazi happily embrace this ambiguity, 
drawing participants into awkward situations in which they are unsure of the 
difference between carefully structured experiences of cognitive dissonance 
and the chaos that emerges from an inability to properly plan and manage 
interactivity.  
 
There are two reasons for discussing this idea of an ‘awkward mode of being’ 
here. It is not to attempt to diagnose the mental health of core members of 
a.a.s from through their arts practice. In the previous chapter I outlined the 
problems and pitfalls of diagnosing an artist’s subjective dispositions through 
                                                
41 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 1. 
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experience of their art. However, I do propose that the impact of awkwardness 
is often connected to the difficulty in framing it as either intentional or 
contingent, or aligning it with dysfunction or strategy. This becomes more 
relevant in chapters 4 and 5 in which experiences of awkwardness are related 
to participants’ sense of responsibility, both in terms of ethics and in terms of 
the success of the performance they are part of.  
 
The examples of awkwardness in these projects are implicitly framed as 
integral to the performances. I approach the ungainliness, difficulties and 
disruptions that arise in these projects as tactical and intentionally efficacious. 
However, I acknowledge the possibility that awkwardness might also emerge 
from an artist’s, performer’s or participant’s capabilities being challenged or 
their dysfunctions being exposed. This ambiguity has, I argue, the potential to 
heighten the participants’ sense of personal, ethical, and aesthetic 
responsibility. I discuss this length in the next chapter, which addresses the 
performance practice of anarchic post-drag performance artist David Hoyle
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Chapter 4 
David Hoyle’s Awkward Affirmation, Abrupt 
Antagonism and ‘Car-Crash’ Conviviality 
 
David Hoyle’s creative career spans painting, installation, television, 
filmmaking and stage and screen acting, but he is most well known as an 
improvising performance artist who appears with an anarchically androgynous 
aesthetic on the UK’s LGBTQ avant-garde cabaret scene. The first part of this 
chapter addresses this thread of Hoyle’s practices. Avant-garde cabaret 
means, for Hoyle, the juxtaposition of jaunty songs and explicit performance 
art and humorously mocking exchanges with audience members that spill 
over into jarring and uncompromising political diatribes. It brings the avant-
garde ideologies of the twentieth century, defined by Günter Berghaus as an 
‘opposition to the established canons of art [that] went hand in hand with a 
battle against the guardians of tradition and social propriety’ into pub and club 
performance and entertainment.1  
 
Unlike the majority of artists and performers I discuss in this thesis, Hoyle’s 
performances are rarely solely participatory. Participation often arises in line 
with the traditions of stand-up comedy and other forms of stage-based 
entertainment and cabaret, such as magic shows and stage hypnotism.  
Audience members are temporarily invited to cross the line between spectator 
and participant. They might be jovially mocked from the stage or coerced into 
conversations that contribute material to improvised shows. Individuals might 
                                                
1 Günter Berghaus, ‘Avant Garde’, ‘A-F’, Performance Research 11:3 (2006): 
14-16 
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choose to cross that line themselves, heckling from their position in the 
audience. Following a similar rationale for my engagement with Outside In in 
Chapter 1, based on fracturing the boundaries between relational artwork and 
participatory performance, I frame Hoyle’s practice within the context of the 
social turn in art and performance.  
 
This chapter discusses Hoyle’s approach to the ethics of participatory 
performance. In Theatre & Ethics Nicholas Ridout describes how ethical 
philosophy is rooted in the questions ‘How shall I act?’2 When a performance 
or artwork frames us as participants as opposed to spectators this ethical 
question is, I argue, foregrounded. When a participant leaves a participatory 
performance or artwork it is more likely that they will think through how they 
acted and how they might have acted differently than if they had been a 
spectator. In my experience of producing, performing and participating in 
participatory performance, post-performance conversations often involve 
speculation on what a participant might have done differently. It seems less 
likely that an individual reflecting on a theatre production that they have 
watched or an exhibition that they have viewed would reflect on how they 
might have acted differently during that performance or exhibition. This is 
because the invitation to act was not there in the first place. In participatory art 
and performance participants are often prompted to ask themselves if they did 
the right thing for the show, for the performer or artist, for other participants, 
and for themselves. This chapter discusses the ways in which Hoyle’s 
practice foregrounds these questions.  
                                                
2 Nicholas Ridout, Theatre & Ethics (Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p.  
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I do this by critically engaging with Hoyle’s awkward engagement with 
participation as affirmation. Participation is framed here as an invitation, or 
demand, for us to affirm an intertwined series of causes, actions, ideologies 
and lifestyles.  Affirmation is defined as an act of agreeing with something and 
of perpetuating that thing through agreement. Such affirmation has, for 
philosopher Simon Critchley, a direct role in the structure of ethical 
experience.3 In his view, ‘ethical experience begins with the experience of a 
demand to which I give my approval’.4 He goes on to claim that there can be 
‘no sense of the good (…) without an act of approval, affirmation or 
approbation’.5 This chapter looks at the experience of ethics that Hoyle 
provides. This experience is awkward because of Hoyle’s practice of 
demanding that his audience affirms potentially destructive acts and awkward 
modes of being. These demands are entwined with his own unwavering 
affirmation of, and commitment to a complex and contradictory ‘sense of the 
good’.  
 
Awkwardness arises in the relationship between affirmation and responsibility 
– responsibility for each other, for the performers, and for the performance. 
The position of Hoyle’s performances within the context of cabaret and 
entertainment foregrounds the latter of these: responsibility to the 
performance. Participants have responsibilities that are different, I would 
argue, from those involved in socialising whilst eating curry for Rirkrit 
Tiravanija or conversing in a meeting between sex workers and councillors for 
                                                
3, Simon Critchey, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of 
Resistance (London and New York: Verso, 2012). p. 14-15. 
4 Critchley, p. 14. 
5 Critchley, pp. 14-15. 
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WochenKlausur. There are not, in these relational and socially engaged 
scenarios the feedback loops of enjoyment between the entertainer and the 
entertained that one finds in club, cabaret, and theatre shows. Such ‘loops’ 
are identified and described by Erica Fische-Lichte, who observes the way 
performers (‘actors’ in her terms), ‘perceive and, in turn respond’ to the 
reactions of the audience: 
 
In short, whatever the actors do elicits a response from the spectators, 
which impacts on the entire performance. In this sense, performances 
are generated and determined by a self-referential feedback-loop.6 
 
 
Gareth White develops Fische-Lichte’s observation as a means of opening 
out his own proposition that ‘becoming an audience participant involves 
perceiving a horizon, and accepting a responsibility to act within that horizon’.7 
Thus the ‘self-referential loop’ relates back to Critchley’s own circuit of ethical 
demands and approval. My own focus is on the way in which, in Hoyle’s 
performance practice, the ‘horizon’ of feedback loops of entertainment is 
triggered, and maintained awkwardly. This sense of awkwardness in turn 
spreads from circuits of pleasure and leisure in performance to the horizon of 
causes, ideologies and ethics that our actions and lifestyles (unwittingly) 
affirm.  
 
My engagement with these themes involves critical analyses of Hoyle’s camp 
sincerity, raucous pedagogy, unabashed self-exposure and radical 
                                                
6 Erica Fische-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance: A New 
Aesthetics (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 38. 
7 Gareth White, Audience Participation in Theatre: Aesthetics of the Invitation 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 163.  
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spontaneity. I expand these readings by engaging with the blurred layering of 
authority and unequivocality with fragility and ambiguity that amount to 
Hoyle’s awkward affirmation of awkwardness. In my experience, this 
awkwardness productively troubles attempts to capture succinctly the causes, 
acts, ideologies and ethics that he affirms, or to perform a straightforward 
reading of the words and actions that affirm them. I argue that despite the 
elusiveness and contradictory nature of the causes that Hoyle affirms, his 
commitment to them is disturbingly unwavering. I compare this position to that 
of Sophocle’s Antigone due to Hoyle’s seeming willingness to allow himself to 
be destroyed by such commitment.8 
 
The two performances that I discuss here are Lauren Harries Sober (2008), 
performed at the Royal Vauxhall Tavern on 22 April and David Hoyle’s 
Factory: A sweatshop for the soul (2011), performed at the Chelsea Theatre, 
London, on 12 and 13 November, as part of the ‘Sacred’ festival. I watched 
video documentation of Lauren Harries Sober and was in the audience on the 
second evening of David Hoyle’s Factory: A sweatshop for the soul. I have 
been to many of Hoyle’s shows throughout my PhD and have been cajoled 
into participation several times. The first of the moments of participation that I 
focus on, which occurred in Lauren Harries Sober, consisted of an audience 
member shouting “Don’t be fucking mean” at Hoyle during his on-stage 
interview with Harries. The second, at the Chelsea Theatre, involved a 
comparatively docile and benevolent Hoyle being criticised by an audience 
member for not being angry enough and, consequently, not being funny 
                                                
8 Sophocles, ‘Antigone’ in The Three Theban Plays, trans. Robert Fagles, 
(London: Penguin Classics, 1984), pp. 55-128 
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enough. My reading of these moments emerges from the observation that 
Hoyle immerses his audiences in a hilarious and awkward menagerie of 
affirmation, allegiance, responsibility and complicity. In expanding my 
attention to a wider engagement with Hoyle’s practice, I discuss what I see as 
his implicit request for a commitment to an on-going performance project and 
a series of fragmentary and occasionally contradictory causes. In summary, 
my interest is in how Hoyle manages to immerse himself and his audiences in 
awkwardly affirming awkwardness, by repeatedly performing and 
demonstrating the complexities and limitations of the subjects and causes 
affirmed. 
 
The second part of this chapter focuses on two examples of Hoyle’s film-work. 
I discuss the abrupt shifts in tone that undermine any easy categorisation of 
his practice as either convivial or antagonistic. I observe ‘car-crash’ moments 
in publically-engaged performances where seemingly convivial encounters 
with participants slipped into acerbic outbursts of vitriol, or where an 
unnerving trajectory towards outrage and provocation was overturned as 
Hoyle conjured a mood of ecstatic geniality. My interest lies in the initial 
agenda of these films, which appear to be an efficacious confrontation and 
engagement with a series of localized social issues (LGBTQ identities and 
consumerism), investigated through a participatory methodology 
(conversations with participants). Thus it exemplifies a strand of Hoyle’s 
practice that, like the moments of audience participation in his cabaret 
performance practice, can be usefully framed as an intervention into the social 
turn in art and performance.  
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Divine David Hoyle 
 
 In 1986 Hoyle arrived in London (from Manchester) along with his 
anarchically transgender, acerbic and attention-grabbing alter ego ‘The Divine 
David’. From this time until 2000 he developed a reputation for performances 
that would see him ‘lacerating the shallowness of the gay scene and cutting 
up his own skin’.9 Although he reached a level of success which led to him 
having two television series on the UK’s Channel 4, The Divine David Heals,10 
and The Divine David Presents,11 in 2000 he killed off his alter ego in a show 
at Streatham Ice-Rink entitled The Divine David on-ice. The title irreverently 
entwined references to Disney On Ice family shows, a method for keeping 
bodies or body-parts fresh, and the act of postponing something.  After the 
performance Hoyle took a six-year hiatus from performance. He explains the 
reasons for this as follows: 
 
I got on the ride and I ended up on the telly. I felt out of my depth. I 
became quite frightened and felt it was time to dare to live my life 
without the raison d'etre of the previous ten years. I had to kill off The 
Divine David, who had given me so much but at an inestimable cost. I 
learned to live with deep trauma while bouncing on the trampoline of 
humour in stilettos.12 
 
 
He now performs mildly less lacerating, anarchically transgender, acerbic and 
attention-grabbing shows under his own name. In a 2011 interview with 
                                                
9 Paul Burston, ‘David Hoyle stripped down’, Time Out London, October 2010, 
http://www.timeout.com/london/gay-lesbian/article/1658/david-hoyle-stripped-
down [accessed 12/01/2011]. 
10 The Divine David Heals, dir. by Bernadette O’Brien, pres. by David Hoyle 
and Jay Cloth (Allied Forces) [broadcast on Channel 4, 2000]. 
11 The Divine David Presents, dir. by Lucian James, pres. by David Hoyle 
(World of Wonder) [broadcast on Channel 4, 1999]. 
12 David Hoyle in Burston. 
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myself he implied that a further shift away from trauma and stilettos was 
approaching: ‘I am fast approaching fifty and I just think, “I’ve enjoyed it, loved 
it, but I don’t just want the rest of my life to be screaming and shouting and 
being drunk, you know what I mean, dressed in mini-skirts and that”’.13  
 
Despite the span and longevity of Hoyle’s practice, there is a scarcity of 
academic writing about his output. Three critics who have engaged with his 
work are Gavin Butt, Dominic Johnson, and Fintan Walsh. It is useful here to 
bring summaries of their approaches together to contextualise the experience 
Hoyle offers, which I will then develop in my analysis of audience interaction. 
Butt observes how Hoyle’s performances are immersed in a tone he 
describes as a ‘peculiar mix of camp and sincerity’.14 For Butt, there is a 
persistent foregrounding of playfulness, desire and irreverence that 
productively interferes with the sincerity and seriousness of Hoyle’s outspoken 
politics. Butt identifies a striking example of this phenomenon in Hoyle’s 
frequent castigation of ‘his male spectators for aping oppressive forms of 
machismo with their gym-honed bodies, only to admit, in the next breath, his 
own desire to fuck them’.15 Through analysis of this tone, Butt celebrates how 
Hoyle works against the problematic, elitist posturing of earnestness and 
conviction that can be found in much mainstream politics and academia. 
Hoyle’s fluxing and irreverent material and delivery is framed by Butt as a vital 
method of undermining the exclusivity (enveloped in issues of class) that art 
                                                
13 David Hoyle, Interview with the Author, London, 03/08/2011. 
14 Gavin Butt  ‘Just a camp laugh? David Hoyle’s laden levity’, in Gavin Butt 
and Irit Rogoff (eds) Visual Culture as Seriousness (London: Goldsmiths, 
University of London and Sternberg Press, 2013), pp. 39-60 (p. 44). 
15 Butt, ‘Just a camp laugh?’, p. 50.  
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and scholarly worlds maintain. Thus, Butt’s approach to Hoyle’s 
performances, which informs my reading, describes the inclusive, 
democratising effect of this refusal of reverence.  
 
In an article pitting Hoyle’s spontaneity and radicality against dominant, 
normative forms of theatre and performance, Johnson neatly captures Hoyle’s 
gender-queer aesthetic in the term ‘a maquillage car-crash’.16 He also notes 
Hoyle’s didactic attachment to resisting normativity and consumerism. 
Johnson observes how Hoyle drags his audience into collusion with this 
cause through an ‘abrasive pedogogy, formulating this style as terroristic 
tactics to be launched against the shibboleths of both mainstream and 
minority cultures’.17 In Theatre & Therapy Walsh describes how Hoyle’s 
performances are entangled, in a complex and raucous manner, with 
therapeutic formats and exchanges.18 Concentrating on Dave’s Drop-in 
Centre (2009), a series of shows that also occurred at the Royal Vauxhall 
Tavern, Walsh, like Johnson, notes Hoyle’s explicit openness about his own 
history of being subject to brutal, homophobic bullying as well as his 
unabashed challenges to the ‘self-loathing, narcissism and complacency that 
Hoyle perceives among the gay community’.19 For Walsh, Hoyle’s 
performance practice displays a ‘marrying’ of ‘cabaret with Theatre of Cruelty’ 
that, in the case of Dave’s Drop-in Centre, ‘transforms the social space of a 
                                                
16 Dominic Johnson ‘It only hurts because it's true: Recent live art and 
performance in the UK’, Western European Stages 19(1), 9-14, (12). 
Emphasis in original.  
17 Johnson, 12.  
18 Fintan Walsh Theatre & Therapy, (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 66-69. 
19 Walsh, p. 67. 
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London pub into a place where defences are dropped, if not bludgeoned, and 
you come away feeling all the better for it’.20 
 
Lauren Harries Sober 
 
Lauren Harries Sober was the seventh of eleven weekly shows, collectively 
entitled Magazine (2008). This was the third and final run of Hoyle’s Magazine 
performances (2006, 2007, 2008), in which each interlinked show addressed 
a different ‘issue’. In the second series of Magazine performances (2007), 
Lauren Harries, a post-op male-to-female transsexual who was briefly famous 
as a young boy due his television appearances as an expert in antiques, was 
invited to contribute as an interviewee in Hoyle’s Antiques Roadshow issue 
(2007). The degeneration of this previous interview into a drunken 
confrontation led to Harries being invited to return for the third series. The 
show opened with Hoyle dancing whimsically to Noel Coward’s ‘Don’t Put 
Your Daughter on the Stage’, possibly chosen as a light poke at Harries’ 
previous gin-soaked appearance.  
 
Many of Hoyle’s performances open with a similar song and dance routine, in 
which he points and smiles at members of the audience he recognises, takes 
on ‘expressionist dance’ poses, and shows off particularly compelling parts of 
his outfit (his long decorated nails in this instance). He often cuts off the 
record halfway through, saying, ‘that’s enough’, and then shifts abruptly from 
a heavily stylised performance to a more pedestrian tone as he introduces the 
                                                
20 Walsh, p.68. 
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show. The audience were warned that things were going to get ‘quite cerebral’ 
and Lauren Harries was invited onstage as a ‘beautiful human being’. After a 
friendly start, in which they laughed about their previous intoxicated 
altercation, an unsettling edge developed when Harries suggested that Hoyle 
should show his sensitive side more often. This led to a reference to the 
previous week’s ‘issue’, Arts Council (15 April 2013), which included a short 
piece by guest performance artist Puta that involved onstage defecation. 
Harries described this act as ‘disgusting’ and it is at this point that the tone 
quickly shifted and a stream of increasingly unpleasant insults and 
accusations were exchanged. By 20 minutes into the performance, the 
audience had split into supporters of either Hoyle or Harries. Loud, supportive 
chanting of ‘Lauren’ disrupted the interview, alongside similar interventions on 
behalf of Hoyle.  
 
These interventions from both factions of the audience continued to build, and 
included a moment in which a man declared that whilst he has ‘adored’ and 
‘respected’ Hoyle ‘for many years’ he wants him to stop being ‘mean’. Despite 
this intervention and the open vilification toward Hoyle from both Harries’ 
followers and some of his own, the exchange of insults continued. Later, in an 
interview with Butt, Hoyle showed no sign of remorse, remaining insistent that 
Harries lacks humility, is reactionary and uninformed, and ‘started it’.21 This 
defence made up part of a defiant stance in response to the refusal by many 
members of the audience to affirm Hoyle’s words and actions: 
 
                                                
21 Gavin Butt, ‘Hoyle’s humility’, in Dance Theatre Journal, 23:1, 30-34, (31). 
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Being vilified by his own audience was, he says, a ‘horrific feeling’ but ‘I 
also knew there was an integrity to it. If I wanted to maintain where I 
was coming from it wasn’t going to be an easy ride for anybody, me 
included, because I was bringing elements of northern stand up, and 
northern brusque, and being very direct with the questions. But I did 
find it difficult.’ He impresses upon me the importance of taking such 
risks, of even being prepared to lose his audience. ‘I think it makes it 
livelier. When we’re grown up and mature we realise that not everyone 
is going to like us. And that’s OK.22  
 
   
In the heckler’s intervention we have an example of an audience member who 
has committed to the over-arching Hoylian ‘project’: ‘adoring’ and ‘respecting’ 
Hoyle for many years but refusing to act affirmatively towards Hoyle’s actions 
and words that evening. Hoyle rejects any need for this affirmation, wilfully 
risking an unpopularity that could, in turn, compromise the continuation of his 
practice.  
 
It is this rejection that connects the ethics of Hoyle’s performance practice to 
Jacques Lacan’s reading of Antigone.23 Antigone never gives up on her desire 
to bury her brother within the walls of Thebes, despite Creon’s ruling against it 
and the certainty that this act will lead to her banishment and death. Her 
commitment is totally unwavering, and even her own sister believes she is 
going too far. For Lacan the act of going to far, pursuing a desire that is in 
conflict with laws that are ‘acknowledged by the community’ to be ‘just’, is an 
ethical act.24 Antigone not only accepts actual death as a consequence of her 
pursuit, but also a symbolic death.  
                                                
22 Butt, ‘Hoyle’s humility’, 32-33. 
23 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII, The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 243-287.  
24 Lacan, Ethics, p. 243.  
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In my chapter on psychoanalysis I discussed Lacan’s concept of the symbolic 
order and the ‘big Other’, describing them as structures through which our 
subjectivity emerges. The big Other constitutes a Law that we cannot go 
beyond without sacrificing our position within the symbolic order and 
consequently isolating ourselves to the point of destroying our existence as a 
subject. Doing so constitutes a breakthrough to the register of the ‘Real’, the 
traumatic, unreachable dimension which ‘resists symbolization completely’.25  
For Lacan this is a heroically tragic ethical act. He writes that ‘tragic heroes 
are always isolated, they are always beyond established limits, always in an 
exposed position and, as a result, separated in one way or another from the 
structure’.26 Hoyle emerges as a tragic hero in the Lacanian sense due to his 
own willingness to isolate himself from his audiences and wilfully risk death, if 
not physically, then of his existence as a performance artist.  
 
However, despite Hoyle’s extreme commitment to a cause, demonstrated 
through a willingness to risk his livelihood for it, the cause itself is difficult to 
pin down and emerges as fragmented and unfixed. The contradictory and 
unfixed nature of the causes Hoyle affirms is exemplified in his interview with 
Butt. On the one hand Hoyle articulates his commitment to humility and 
tolerance and his aggressive stance against the superiority, conservatism, 
and judgementalism he observed in Harries’ comments and attitude.27 On the 
other hand, there is a dedication to brashness (attributed to being from the 
                                                
25 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 1 Freud’s Papers on 
Technique, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by John Forrester (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.66. 
26 Lacan, Ethics, p. 271. 
27 Butt, ‘Hoyle’s humility’, 32-33. 
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north of England), liveliness and keeping things ‘real’ that leads to an 
unabashed positioning of racist English comedian Bernard Manning as ‘the 
greatest avant garde artist that there is’.28 There is also Hoyle’s insistence 
that he should betray his own ‘ignorance and prejudice’ instead of being 
‘PC’ed up to the eyeballs’.29 Butt concludes his article by summarising and 
celebrating these ideological flips and turns as part of the ‘glorious and 
unpredictable performances of contradictions’.30 For me, the potential glory 
lies in the way Hoyle indulges in, and offers up, the satisfaction and security of 
commitment and affirmation without the need for a problematically totalising 
and unobtainably infallible cause to commit to and affirm. Hoyle repeatedly 
affirms, and invites his audience to affirm, the act of being awkward. It is to 
this awkwardness that Hoyle makes an Antigonian commitment, and that acts, 
to use Critchley’s terms, as the demand that audiences and participants are 
caught up in approving.  
 
David Hoyle’s Factory: A Sweatshop for the Soul 
 
David Hoyle’s Factory: A Sweatshop for the Soul presented its audience with 
a collision of trade union slogans and rhetoric with the artsy decadence and 
glitter of a 1960s studio party. As I entered the bar area of the Chelsea 
Theatre a man asked if I would be ‘joining the union?’ I replied ‘yes’, and was 
relieved I had done so when I saw that all the seating was labelled ‘reserved 
for union members’. A woman, costumed between 1960s New York glamour 
                                                
28 Butt, ‘Hoyle’s humility’, 34. 
29 Butt, ‘Hoyle’s humility’, 31.  
30 Butt, ‘Hoyle’s humility’, 34. 
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and kinky science laboratory assistant, invited us to a long table in order to 
begin our interactive experience by doing some colouring in. Whilst we could 
choose the colours, design and type of pen we used to engage in this activity, 
all the images to be decorated were identical - an outline of Hoyle’s face 
reminiscent of the black and white images in Andy Warhol’s silkscreen 
painting Marilyn Diptych (1962). There was, for me, the sense that the 
interactivity of this event was indulging a degree of mockery, possibly at the 
expense of the feel-good ethics and aesthetics of other contemporary, 
participatory performances. The dynamic was one of an awkwardly autocratic 
conviviality, in which an irreverent yet triumphantly rousing performance tone 
was layered with a deceptive, bait-and-switch attitude towards audience 
interaction and communal, relational activities. Instead of Hoyle’s usual 
acerbic and abrasive outbursts, the uneasiness of this performance seemed 
to emerge more from his desire ‘to promise things and not deliver’.31 In this 
show, the things Hoyle promised beforehand, in an interview with Paul 
Burston, were ‘creative participation’, ‘communal work’, and ‘immortality’.32 
Hoyle’s delivery on these promises was partial, generating a humorous and 
awkward contradiction between the causes affirmed in his words and the 
experience that the performance offered. This contradiction is captured in the 
moment of audience interaction that I describe below.   
 
Having completed my colouring in and had my picture displayed amongst 
everyone else’s at the back of the stage, I took my seat as Hoyle and his 
                                                
31 Hoyle, quoted in Butt, ‘Just a camp laugh?’, p. 51. 
32 Paul Burston, ‘David Hoyle Stripped Down’, TimeOut, 29 October, 2010 
<http://www.timeout.com/london/lgbt/david-hoyle-stripped-down>, [accessed 
5 December 2013]. 
  181 
musicians entered. The rest of the show consisted of a friendlier version of the 
improvisatory avant-garde cabaret that Hoyle is known for. The interactions 
with audience members were gentler than the criticisms and insults that I 
have witnessed at the RVT. In Butt’s reference to these merrier performances, 
he describes how fans ‘remark upon the change of tone from one show to 
another. Sometimes audience members after a particular performance say 
that he [Hoyle] was in a good, cheery mood, explaining perhaps an unusually 
“light” show’.33 Whilst this suggests a positive response to Hoyle’s intermittent 
cheeriness, linked to Hoyle’s canny ability to maintain unexpectedness on a 
show-by-show basis, in the midst of this particular ‘light’ show an audience 
member reacted by shouting out that Hoyle should “get angry”. In her opinion, 
this was because he was “funnier when he was angry”. Hoyle’s response 
maintained the good feeling as he described his current good health, his love 
for all present and his refusal to pretend. Unlike the moments I discuss in the 
second part of this chapter, he did not allow the performance to slip from 
conviviality to antagonism.  
 
This performance, and its moment of audience interjection, relates to my 
analysis of affirmation and commitment in several ways. Despite its apparent 
cheeriness, the performance still resisted easy acquiescence to audience 
affirmation. Hoyle maintains the risks of turning his audience against him. 
Whilst this is partly due to his bait-and-switch relationship to the communal 
creativity he promised, it is also embroiled in his refusal, this time, to play the 
‘pantomime villain’. Instead of performing as the entertaining baddie he rejects 
                                                
33 Butt, ‘Just a camp laugh?’, p. 56. 
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a pursuit of approval by staying true to his less-titillating good mood. He 
resists the opportunism of reducing himself to a constructed character, ready 
to be summoned up for boos, hisses, thrills and hilarity and maintains a fidelity 
to an elusive cause that is dominated by a pursuit of integrity. 
 
Commitment and Responsibility  
 
Hoyle’s explicit reference to his “good health” in response to the heckler’s 
demand for anger reminds those who encourage and affirm his performance 
practice of the potential irresponsibility of that affirmation. The implication is 
that, if cheeriness and lightness emerge from Hoyle being in good health, then 
his wilder, angrier and potentially more exhilarating performances might rely 
on, perpetuate, or even trigger a harmful and destructive state of health. 
Hoyle frequently and explicitly reminds audiences of the possible connection 
between his most reckless, radical and hilarious acts and words, and his 
battles with mental health problems, alcoholism and a traumatic past. As 
discussed, he also, in performances such as Lauren Harries Sober, continues 
with a perceived destructive behavior, despite the clear indication by many in 
the audience that they refuse to affirm it. This has the potential to intervene 
into any sense of responsibility an audience has for Hoyle or the success of 
his performances. Again, Hoyle confronts his audience with an unclear 
overlap of affirmation, justification and responsibility. However, despite this 
occasional sense of ambivalence around the level of complicity we have in 
Hoyle’s performances, there are occasions when we cannot escape our role 
in perpetuating shows that contain, or even rely on, (self-) destructive 
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activities. Importantly, this is not just the case with our affirmative acts within 
individual performances but also in our response to the appeal to a long-term 
fidelity to Hoyle and his practice. This appeal is most clearly exemplified in the 
structuring of some of his performances into blocks of weekly shows. For 
example, the positioning of Lauren Harries Sober as a kind of sequel, with a 
titular in-joke for those who were present at Antiques Roadshow, implies a 
reward for those committed to returning to Hoyle and his performances. Such 
commitment is, in turn, an act of affirmation.  
 
A continued return to Hoyle’s shows implies a statement of “yes, keep going”. 
This is important in a practice that persistently embraces the risk of mayhem 
and mishap, resulting not only in the provision of guiltily titillating spectacles, 
but also occasionally falling into potentially tedious displays of awkward 
mishaps and trite unpleasantness. Such moments have ranged from Hoyle, in 
his previous incarnation as ‘The Divine David’, ‘injecting mysterious 
substances onstage’ to an alcohol-influenced demonstration of ‘less-than-
perfect race politics’.34  
 
My aim in addressing these activities is not to moralise on Hoyle’s 
performances or audience reactions to them, nor to presume what makes a 
healthy or destructive activity for Hoyle (I address such psychopathologising 
approaches in the next chapter). Instead, I argue that there are onstage 
moments (for example, injecting ‘unknown substances’) that confront 
                                                
34 David Hoyle in Rupert Smith, Face to Face: An interview with David Hoyle, 
by Rupert Smith, Homotopia TV, Unity Theatre Liverpool, 10 November 2011, 
http://vimeo.com/32191999, [accessed 10 September 2013]; Butt, ‘Just a 
camp laugh?’, p. 50. 
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audiences with an immanent and complex sense of responsibility in relation to 
their decision to act affirmatively when responding. This sense of uneasiness 
around affirmation connects with the neologism ‘response-ability’. The term 
appears at the end of Hans-Thies Lehman’s Postdramatic Theatre.35 Lehman 
refers to the ‘mutual implication of actors and spectators in the theatrical 
production of images’.36 Rachel Zerihan develops the term in accordance with 
her discussion of the intimate encounters of performances involving one 
performer and one participant/ audience member.37 For her, it is a committed 
response in a format in which ‘questions around one’s individual role in the 
performance’s agency - in terms of cultural politics, erotic encounters, sacred 
moments, therapeutic interactions and risky opportunities - are brought to the 
foreground’.38  
 
In my reading of Hoyle’s practice ‘response-ability’ refers, firstly, to the way he 
confronts his audience with their conflicted responsibilities in perpetuating, on 
the one hand, potentially destructive words and actions, and on the other, a 
hysterically funny and affirmative individual show and ongoing performance 
practice. Hoyle has the potential to immerse audiences in uneasiness about 
their ability to respond appropriately both in their role as ethical subjects and 
as audience members contributing to the success of a show. In his interview 
with Hoyle, author Rupert Smith captures this conflicted sense of 
                                                
35 Hans-Thies Lehman, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. by Karen Jürs-Munby, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 185-186. 
36 Lehman, p. 186. Emphasis original. 
37 Lehman, p. 186. Emphasis original. 
38 Zerihan, 3. 
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responsibility in relation to acting affirmatively in response to moments that 
are simultaneously upsetting and funny:  
 
I sometimes think that your work must be an intolerable burden. 
Because you go out onto that stage and you do things that make me 
feel, as a friend of yours, quite upset sometimes, even though I’m 
laughing so much that my face hurts. But I’ve actually seen you do 
things that really upset me.39 (2011) 
 
 
By confronting audiences with the predicaments inherent in acts of affirmation 
(for example, laughing whilst finding something upsetting), the social space 
that Hoyle commands emerges as a microcosm of our lives outside of it. 
Across both we are burdened by the ‘intolerable burden’ of others, thus 
undermining our ability to affirm fully the projects we involve ourselves in. 
 
The unwelcome nature of this burden links to what R. Jay Wallace describes 
as a ‘bourgeois predicament’, in which affirmation of certain projects that we 
have come to build our lives around ‘arguably commits us to affirming the 
social inequalities that are their historical and contemporary conditions, even 
though we continue to view those inequalities as objectively lamentable’.40 
Wallace gives the example of ‘academic pursuits that are carried out in the 
context of elite research universities, which would not be possible in a social 
world that did not involve massive deprivation and inequality in human life 
prospects’.41 Hoyle’s acerbic pedagogy is played out against the narcissistic, 
complacent and consumerist ‘projects’ that are, for him, affirmed through 
                                                
39 Smith. 
40 R. Jay Wallace, The View From Here: On affirmation, attachment and the 
limits of regret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 7.  
41 Wallace, p. 7. 
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some elements of contemporary gay culture. Hoyle’s position in the face of 
such projects is captured in his rants against ‘the homogenized gay world, 
which doesn’t like to acknowledge that some gay people are homeless and 
penniless, and which likes to pretend that collectively we don’t have any 
responsibility for anybody’.42  
 
Hoyle’s attacks are not only targeted towards conservative and consumerist 
elements in ‘gay culture’. For example, as a dad I have felt awkwardly self-
conscious when hearing Hoyle’s definitive and graphic disapproval of human 
reproduction. At various performances I have sat with my rucksack full of 
nappies and rusk crumbs whilst Hoyle raged against the idea of having 
children when there are so many wars that need to be stopped. I was brutally 
reminded of the intensely inward looking duties of the parenthood ‘project’ that 
has become central to my life and its potential to perpetuate an oppressive 
heteronormative ideal and divert attention away from my responsibilities in 
overcoming global inequality and violence. Thus I experienced Hoyle’s 
foregrounding of what Wallace describes as the ‘affirmation dynamic’, which 
‘leads to a rift between ourselves and the larger world in which we live, one 
that frustrates our ambition to live lives that are worthy of unconditional 
affirmation’.43 Whether these projects involve immersing ourselves in hilarity 
on an evening out, or building lifelong responsibilities, lifestyles, careers and 
other attachments that affirm our subjectivity, Hoyle productively infects such 
affirmation with a sense of response-ability and awkwardness.  
                                                
42 David Hoyle quoted in Johnson, 12.  
43 Wallace, p. 7. 
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Affirming Awkward Affirmation 
 
Hoyle’s acts and words of affirmation are performed with Butt’s ‘camp and 
queer sincerity’ and an unsteady didacticism that embraces fragility and 
contradiction.44 This does not take away from the commitment Hoyle makes 
to the causes he affirms, as demonstrated in his willingness to risk an 
unpopularity that might compromise his livelihood as a performer. Instead it 
offers up the awkward pleasures of affirmation whilst refusing to ignore the 
potential exclusivity and ignorance it relies on. On top of this, despite his 
inclusive, irreverent and infectious performance of unwavering affirmation, the 
actual causes that Hoyle affirms are difficult to ascertain. The most easily 
graspable, but by no means definitive elements of this multi-faceted, 
precariously layered accumulation of causes, is a rampant and addictive drive 
towards living ‘experientially’,45 an ecstatic celebration of the marginalised and 
the excluded, and a ceaseless rage against the oppressively normative and 
the damagingly judgemental. However, recklessly pursuing new experiences 
does not always support the attentive care for others that Hoyle’s other 
causes require. On top of this, as exemplified above, is the commitment to the 
elusive and unfixed act of pursuing integrity, or doing what feels right in the 
moment, which has the potential to undermine spontaneously any other ideal 
that Hoyle’s projects aim to affirm. 
 
Lauren Harries Sober is a prime example of how Hoyle embraces the disorder 
that occurs when multiple causes seem to vie for his affirmation. The 
                                                
44 Butt, ‘Just a camp laugh?’, p. 44. 
45 Hoyle in Smith.   
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presence of Harries herself contributed to the tension and trouble of this 
disorder, due to her position both as a marginalised identity at the receiving 
end of brutal judgements and, for Hoyle, as an individual willing to judge 
others dismissively from a perceived position of superiority. A peculiar 
affirmation emerges from these vying pursuits of integrity, care and anti-
judgementalism. Ultimately, this is an affirmation of the ambiguities, fragments 
and contradictions that arise through the impossibility of any project or cause 
to be totally stable and uncompromised. In my case, this means that even 
though I experienced discomfort when acting affirmatively (laughing, clapping, 
nodding) in response to Hoyle’s vicious attacks on reproduction, the position 
of contradiction and even betrayal that I found myself in felt accommodated. 
 
It is this committed relationship to contradiction that distinguishes Hoyle’s 
ethical position from that which Claire Bishop demands of socially engaged 
artists. Bishop is referring to Antigonian ethics when she suggests that ‘the 
best socially collaborative art does not derive from a super-egoic injunction to 
"love thy neighbour," but from the position of "do not give up on your 
desire"’.46 I critiqued Bishop’s position in Chapter 2, by pointing out that it 
relies on two problematic approaches to psychoanalysis. The first is the 
assumption that a critic can access an artist’s desires through experience of 
their artwork. The second is the framing of desire as something that is 
hindered and disciplined by the big Other, instead of, following Lacan, 
                                                
46 Bishop in Jennifer Roche,  ‘Socially Engaged Art, Critics and Discontents: 
An Interview with Claire Bishop’, Community Arts Network 
<http://www.communityarts.net/readingroom/archivefiles/2006/07/socially_eng
age.php> [accessed 02/10/2010] 
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something that emerges through our relationship with the big Other.47 The 
seemingly impenetrable and contradictory nature of the causes Hoyle 
commits to with such ferocity is important here. Like Antigone, Hoyle’s 
ruthless defiance is not reducible to a pursuit of a personal desire over 
affirmation by the community. Antigone insists that Creon’s ruling is against 
the gods, and her sacrifice is for a greater cause than the ‘good’ that Creon 
seeks for Thebians.48 However, the impact of Antigone’s defiance lies in the 
impenetrability of her motivations. For Slavoj Žižek Antigone’s sacrifice affirms 
an ambiguous, and ‘unconditional’ demand.49 In doing so she emerges as a 
key example in his understanding of the experience of subjectivity ‘being 
infinitely indebted and responsible to the call of an Otherness which never 
acquires positive features, but always remains withdrawn, the trace of its own 
absence’.50  
 
Approached in this way Hoyle’s own unpredictable and contradictory 
relationship with affirmation in his audiences begins to appear as a 
consequence of his own affirmation of an absent, withdrawn, uncontainable 
‘call’. This connects Hoyle to Antigone’s relationship to the Lacanian Real. 
Hoyle’s ethics pushes himself and his audience towards a register of un-
containable and contradictory orders and causes in which subjectivity 
becomes unfixed and fragmented.  This returns us to the observation, stated 
                                                
47 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, ed. 
by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London and New York: 
Karnac, 1977), p. 235. 
48 Lacan, Ethics, p. 258. 
49 Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the 
(Mis)Use of a Notion ( London and New York: Verso, 2002), p. 22. 
50 Žižek, p. 153. 
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above, that Hoyle repeatedly affirms, and invites his audience to affirm the act 
of being awkward – to become hard to deal with and cause difficulties within 
the social structures that simultaneously limit and produce our subjectivities. 
As stated, to use Critchley’s explanation, it provides an ethical experience 
based upon the demand for the approval of a ‘sense of the good’ that is 
rooted in awkwardness. This requires us, firstly, to let go of a sense of 
subjectivity that is, as Wallace suggests, sustained through the ‘bourgeois 
predicament’ of being attached to projects that go against our ethics. 
Secondly, it requires us to affirm an experience of subjectivity that emerges 
through a relationship to an unpredictable, uncontainable and impenetrable 
Other.  
 
So Much to Answer For 
 
This section focuses on the awkwardness of two ‘car-crash’ moments in 
Hoyle’s film works that suddenly and significantly altered the tone of his 
interactions with the public. The first car-crash incident that I will discuss 
occurred during the making of the 2009 short documentary film Manchester 
(So Much To Answer For).51  The film followed Hoyle as he meandered 
through Canal Street and the area of Manchester, UK, described as the ‘Gay 
Village’.52  Along the way he interviewed the partygoers, pub clients, club-
managers and publicans that he met.  His outfit for this outing was a black tie 
                                                
51 ‘Manchester (So Much To Answer For)’, on Dave’s Drop in Centre, dir. by 
Nathan Evans, perf. by David Hoyle (Arts Council England, 2009 [on DVD]). 
52 ‘Gay Village’, Canal-St,  <http://www.canal-st.co.uk/?Gay-village> 
[accessed 03/07/2012]. 
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with a large anarchy sign on the bottom, a black jacket and knee-length skirt, 
and a pair of very long black and white socks. He was, as usual, decorated 
with thick layers of make up and a reddish-black wig, all applied and adorned 
with the anarchic imprecision that occurs throughout his performance attitude 
and style. The general tone of his encounters with the public was dominated 
by an unnervingly volatile conviviality and a deceptive and sinisterly insistent 
enthusiasm. It is, ironically, through a relentless optimism that Hoyle managed 
to pluck at some of the murkier consumerist and exploitative agendas of what 
might at first appear as a site for the liberating celebration of life outside the 
heteronormative hegemony.53  Here he puts affirmation to work, performing 
agreement in order to draw out the unsavoury attitudes. At one point, for 
example, he chats with a bar-owner who revels in his ability to “rip-off” (i.e. 
charge to much to) tourists “morning, noon and night” and gleefully 
acknowledges the fact that ‘gays will pay through the nose’ (i.e. pay too 
much).54 Thus Hoyle displays a crafty ability to lead the interviewee into the 
hidden underside of his business and his capacity to draw out the darker 
sides of individual’s motivations and opinions.  
 
The car-crash section of the film began in the doorway of a nightclub, and 
then abruptly spilled out onto the pavement. It began with Hoyle, holding a 
suspicious glass of clear liquid in his hand, chatting with a young clubber who 
frequents the area in order to get “pissed every night”.55 It was a wholly 
                                                
53 Unknown Author ‘They’re Only Here for the Queers’, The Independent, 06 
April 2000, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/theyre-only-
here-for-the-queers-721341.html [accessed 09/09/2011]. 
54 ‘Manchester’ 
55 ‘Manchester’ 
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convivial encounter at first, though Hoyle’s response that the young man’s 
alcohol drenched experience of the ‘village’ “sounds like a dream come true” 
was again entwined with the queerly sincere affirmation of potentially 
destructive behaviour that runs throughout these encounters and his wider 
performance practice. The tone then took a swift, uncomfortable turn when an 
employee of the nightclub asked the pair to move away from the club’s 
doorway. I have written out the sections of Hoyle’s hyperbolic response to her 
request in full here. This is in order to show how quickly it developed into an 
all out personal and political attack and clarify the relentless nature of his 
outburst: 
 
Well we’re allowed to film where we want. You don’t own the 
pavement. You’re a mere business. And we’re not homing in, we’re not 
interested in Baa Bar. We’re not interested in you one bit.56 
 
After this initial snap, and as the young man who Hoyle was originally 
interviewing stares determinedly ahead, grinning nervously as if it’s not 
happening, Hoyle continues his bombardment: 
 
I know it’s your world love, but, you know, you work within the 
corporate structure. Some of us don’t, and therefore we don’t have that 
neurosis. Get me? You’re working on behalf of capitalism. It’s making 
you very vigilant and very, like, ugh ugh ugh ugh ugh. Relax. You know 
the world will keep on turning. The world will keep on turning 
irrespective of the filming that’s going on at this street corner.57 
 
At this point the interviewee skulked off, despite Hoyle’s plea for him to come 
back. The club’s employee attempted to interject, explaining that all she was 
                                                
56 ‘Manchester’  
57 ‘Manchester’ 
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asking them to do was move away from the door, Hoyle cut her off, stating 
“We’ve lost the interview now. Forget it”. Then he turned to direct his sardonic 
stream of outrage and irritation to the camera: 
 
You know, there’s too much in this country, where people are making 
decisions on behalf of their employers. Your employer doesn’t give a 
shit about you. You are but a living unit. That’s all you can ever hope to 
be. And should you die, your employer will replace you with another 
living unit. End of. So those of you who are like ‘don’t film, don’t do this, 
don’t do that, my employer won’t like it’, I curse you, I hope you die, I 
hope you’re HIV, you deserve to be. You’re cunts. Anybody who 
speaks on behalf of their employer, to me, is a stupid cunt. And you 
have negated yourself and allowed somebody to be more powerful 
than you.58 
 
In the next scene, which looked like it takes place in a different location, Hoyle 
continued on in a similar manner. The reason I have described the details of 
this section, which takes up about four minutes of this fifteen minute film, is 
firstly, because it offers a clear example of the kind of awkward and eye-
watering car-crash moments that Hoyle is infamous for, and to which this 
writing responds. Secondly, this personal and public collision can be 
reasonably framed as unintended. However, it was left in the film and allowed 
to take up nearly a third of its timeframe. The outburst was an abrupt shift 
away from the far more subtly interrogative and humorously revealing tone of 
his words and actions in the rest of the film. It confronted the viewer with a 
project that captured and displayed an awkward flip between celebration, 
conviviality and subtle criticality and a relentless outburst of antagonism.  
 
 
                                                
58 ‘Manchester’ 
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A Village Stroll 
 
An unexpected blossoming of conviviality occurred in the short documentary 
entitled A Village Stroll with David Hoyle.59 In the second part of the film Hoyle 
is shown around Vauxhall City Farm, Vauxhall, South London, by a small 
group of young children. The film follows much the same premise as 
Manchester (So Much To Answer For), Vauxhall being an area of London 
known for its plethora of LGBTQ bars, clubs and saunas. The motivation, 
according to Hoyle, for visiting the farm is his mischievous declaration that 
once homosexuality has been fully accepted then the taboo of interspecies 
love should also be tackled. The film starts with a discussion of the various 
merits of taking animals for lovers (“think of the colour and texture of a 
budgie”60) as Hoyle totters amongst the pigs, ducks, goats and other livestock 
of a city farm. It ends with Hoyle being emotionally overwhelmed by the non-
judgemental nature of a group of children who volunteer at the farm. Having 
enthusiastically shown him to the pumpkins, discussed the merits of animal 
faeces for growing flowers, and detailed the activities of their summer holidays 
at the farm, these children brought out the following response from Hoyle: 
 
Can I just say that I’ve loved my time with you and I’m also… you 
know… You don’t seem to have a problem with my look or the way I 
am, and it’s so sweet of you. Because some adults, they can be really 
funny, and a bit odd and a bit weird, but you’ve been beautiful and 
you’ve made me feel very, very comfortable and I thank you very much 
                                                
59 ‘A Village Stroll with David Hoyle’, on Dave’s Drop in Centre, dir. by Nathan 
Evans, perf. by David Hoyle, (Arts Council England, 2009 [on DVD])  
60 Hoyle, ‘A Village Stroll’. 
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for that. Thank you.61 
 
Next, he gave away his necklace to a young girl, they had a group hug and 
finally an emotional and overwhelmingly grateful goodbye. As in Manchester 
(so much to answer for) the encounter is followed by a speech to camera. 
However, this time Hoyle is celebrating how refreshing it was to be with 
children who accepted someone who “doesn’t believe in gender”, and ends 
with him declaring that he hasn’t been spoken to with such ‘courtesy and 
kindness for a very long time’.62 In a sense, this second incident is also a kind 
of car-crash, unexpectedly knocking the titillating risk of confrontation and the 
hilarious trajectory of increasing provocation wildly off course.  
 
The incidents I have described in these two documentaries are the antithesis 
of each other. One starts in strategically convivial conversation and ends in 
brutal antagonism. The other starts out with a titillating provocation (exploring 
and promoting bestiality) and ends with heart warming, child-friendly 
conviviality. The unabashed inclusion in the films affirms the importance of 
these abrupt shift of tone in Hoyle’s practice. As well as linking to the pursuit 
of being ‘real’ discussed in the section on affirmation above, it also challenges 
the idea of constructing and facilitating participatory performances based on a 
particular tone (i.e. conviviality or antagonism).  
Conclusion 
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Hoyle immerses audiences and participants in complex, contradictory and 
fragile modes of affirmation, has acerbic, volatile outbursts in ‘feel-good’ 
participatory projects, and embraces heart-melting moments of good feeling in 
titillating and antagonistic interventions. In my first chapter I mentioned that 
Claire Bishop’s critique of aesthetic and socio-political validity within the social 
turn is examined and challenged by Shannon Jackson.63 Particularly 
important for me here is Jackson’s plotting of the ways Bishop’s argument 
relies on a reductive reliance on oppositional polarizations such as “1) social 
incorporation versus social antagonism; 2) legibility versus illegibility; 3) 
radically functional versus radically nonfunctional; 4) artistic heteronomy 
versus artistic autonomy”.64 Jackson works meticulously and cannily to trouble 
the aesthetic work vs. social work polemic that underlies Bishop’s critique. 
However, for me, it is Bishop’s pitting of social conviviality against social 
antagonism, of ‘feel good’ art against ‘feel bad’ art that is reductive and 
exclusionary. Hoyle’s practice goes someway to demonstrating what is 
ignored in Bishop’s loose and presumptive categorization of work into feel-
good and feel-bad. It is these over-simplified categorizations of conviviality 
and antagonism that have the potential to ignore and undermine the potential 
for practices and identities such as Hoyle’s to enrich our understanding of 
what it means to be socially engaged. Hoyle’s insistent injection of 
awkwardness into acts of affirmation, and his allowance for conviviality and 
                                                
63 Shannon Jackson, ‘Social Practice’, in ‘P-S’, Performance Research, 11:3, 
(2006) 87-126; ‘What is the “Social” in Social Practice?: comparing 
experiments in performance’ in The Cambridge Companion to Performance 
Studies, ed. by Tracy C. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008),136-150; Social Works: performing arts, supporting publics (Oxon and 
NY: Routledge, 2011). 
64 Jackson, ‘Social Practice’, 115. 
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antagonism to collide can be usefully framed as an intervention into the social 
turn art and performance. This is because it troubles both normative notions 
of social and artistic responsibility and accountability and underlying demands 
for anti-social antagonism in experimental art practice.  
 
In this sense Hoyle’s ethical position pushes himself and his audiences to cut 
through the varying demands made upon performers and artists through 
discourses such as those that surround the social turn in art and performance. 
In doing so he commits himself to a ‘Real’ beyond the categorisations and 
clarifications of such discourses, wilfully risking the kind of symbolic death that 
results from rejecting such acknowledgement. The participatory elements of 
his live performances demand that participants affirm and join him in this 
commitment. The awkwardness arises through the unstable, uncontainable 
and self-destructive nature of this commitment. However, this awkwardness 
also has the potential to frame instability, uncontainability and self-destruction 
as causes themselves. By demanding our affirmation of such causes, Hoyle 
implicitly affirms and celebrates the existence of those for whom they are 
essential attachments and ways of being.  
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Chapter 5 
Getting involved with the Neighbour’s Thing:  
Reactor and their big Others 
 
The first part of this chapter responds, once again, to Claire Bishop’s 
statement that collaborative artists should pursue desires instead of following 
the duty of neighbourly love. Here I focus on the psychoanalytic concept of  
neighbourly love, as outlined in the previous chapter. However, this chapter 
does not frame Reactor’s participatory projects as a display of their own love, 
or not, for their neighbours (a.k.a. their participants). Instead I focus on the 
way in which Reactor’s work engages participants with the complications and 
problems of following the ‘love thy neighbour’ injunction. My approach to 
these complication follows Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian approach to neighbourly 
love, which is based on Jacques Lacan’s three ‘orders’ that structure reality: 
the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic.1  
 
The second half of the chapter focuses specifically on the figure of the ‘big 
Other’, which, as discussed, is related to the Symbolic Order. This responds, 
in part, to the concluding statements of the first section of this chapter, in 
which I propose that Reactor’s model of structuring participatory 
performances reinforces the idea that the big Other is, at best, fallible, fragile, 
                                                
1 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence,’ in 
The Neighbor: Three Enquiries in Political Theology, Kenneth Reinhard, Eric 
L. Santner, and Slavoj Žižek (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), pp.134-190. 
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and dysfunctional, and, at worst, non-existent. This means that there is no 
authoritative figure, or single, infallible cause that acts as a guarantor of our 
decisions and actions as we interact with others (our ‘neighbours’), or onto 
whom/which we can delegate responsibility for those decisions and actions. 
As Žižek writes, there is ‘no “big Other” guaranteeing the consistency of the 
symbolic space within which we dwell: there are just contingent, punctual and 
fragile points of stability’.2 The second section of this chapter explores the 
opportunity, offered in Reactor’s Big Lizard’s Big Idea project to playfully 
explore the paranoia that emerges through the belief that there is an 
organising figure or cause behind our interactions. Reactor have described 
the aim of their practice as being to  ‘explore the ways in which cohesion of 
social groups is maintained through shared belief systems and collective 
action’.3  Thus, my reading of their work through the concept of the big Other 
follows their own interests. This section is supported by the Žižekian argument 
that it is not enough to simply approach the big Other as non-existent, but that 
we should acknowldedge its status as a ‘subjective presupposition’, meaning 
it ‘exists only in so far as subjects act as if it exists’.4 In other words, there is 
an external, organising principle or ideology behind our interactions because 
we behave as if there is one. This ‘organising principle’ is revealed to be not, 
as Bishop would suggest, based on being good to one another (loving thy 
neighbour), but one based on the relentless pursuance of enjoyment.   
 
 
                                                
2 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Real of Sexual Difference’, in Interrogating the Real 
(London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2005), pp. 293-316, (p. 306).  
3 ‘Reactor’, Reactor, http://reactor.org.uk/, [accessed April 30, 2013].  
4 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta, 2006), p. 10.  
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Reactor and Neighbourly Love 
 
Reactor is an art collective based in Nottingham, UK that develops immersive, 
participatory projects. The group emerged from a curated event entitled 
Reactor that occurred throughout four floors of a Nottingham warehouse in 
2002. Their early works, typified by this and the series of numbered events 
called Function (2000-2005, 2012) showcased individual members’ artworks 
alongside a variety of invited performance and installation artists who 
specialise in interaction and participation. These were tightly scheduled 
showcase-style events that occurred most often at Reactor Towers, Arkwright 
Street, Nottingham, as well as other artist-occupied buildings and art galleries. 
Those attending were invited to experience a series of overlapping 
encounters, participatory performances and interactive games, each devised 
by a different Reactor member or guest artist. Participants in the first event, 
for example, could add to a flock of origami birds, lie on a deflating air 
mattress and squeeze the air out through a tin whistle attached to its nozzle, 
or interact with a large string puppet monkey. More recent projects, since 
2005, such as Total Ghaos (Crocus Street, Nottingham, 2005), Big Lizard’s 
Big Idea (Donau Festival, Krems, Austria, 2009; Wunderbar, Newcastle, 2009; 
“Playing the City 2” Schirn Kunsthalle, Frankfurt, Germany, 2010) and The 
Green Man and Regular Fellows (Trade Gallery, Nottingham, 2011), have 
taken the form of conspiratorial role-play games, sinister social experiments, 
and theatricalised relational aesthetics, each with an idiosyncratic ramshackle 
tone of irreverence, farce and frivolity. Rather than a curated series of 
individual artworks by a range of different artists, they are intricately 
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constructed fantastical ‘worlds’ with playful and complex hierarchical systems 
of knowledge and authority. Reactor, their guest artists and performers, and 
their participants take on and switch between predetermined roles, 
characters, and administrative positions with varying degrees of immersion 
and pretence.  
 
Total Ghaos, Reactor’s largest project to date, is the clearest example of their 
interactive role-play events. It was a three-day participatory project, preceded 
by two years of publically sited interventions, rallies, campaigns and 
performances, each of which claimed to be promoting and developing the 
elusive ‘Ghaotic’ political system. They define ‘Ghaos’ as the ‘method by 
which the Reactor Party govern its behaviour and actions’: 
 
The 4 definitions  of Ghaos are as follows: 1) utter light-hearted 
confusion. 2) cheerful formless matter supposed to have existed before 
the universe's carefree creation. 3) dissolute. 4) showy behaviour so 
unpredictable as to appear random.5 
 
In the final three-day event, from 7-9 October 2005, participants took on 
various changeable roles and shifting hierarchical statuses in a slapstick 
totalitarian theme-park raucously constructed out of cardboard and scaffolding 
in another disused Nottingham warehouse. Individuals would arrive, hand in 
their mobile phones, watches and bags, be given a new identity, and be 
systematically inducted into the ‘Ghaotic’ society. Once in, they were given a 
role in the system, ranging from a cloak-room attendant to digging on their 
                                                
5 Reactor, ‘FAQs’, Ghaos <http://reactor.org.uk/totalghaos/faq.html> , 
[accessed 20 October 2010] 
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knees in a polystyrene ‘gem mine’, through to joining the Ghaos Army or 
working undercover for the ‘RBI’ (Reactor Bureau of Investigation). Each role 
came with its own level of accessibility and benefits and participants, 
performers and Reactor members would swap between these roles 
throughout the event. There were only a limited number of key positions that 
were unavailable for participants to take on. These included ‘Uncle Commi’, 
the mythical, pantomimic despot who developed and ran the Ghaotic system, 
and ‘Big Nurse’, the boss of the ‘Asylum’ to which participants would be sent if 
they transgressed the rules or failed to fully participate. Curator and writer 
Jennie Syson, who attended the Total Ghaos event, describes a familiar 
experience of this unfixed relationship between knowledge, experience, and 
hierarchy:  
 
Just as at school, the people in the middle management positions were 
just as ignorant as me: not yet working on the highest echelons of the 
hierarchy – individuals who had not created the strata system 
themselves, but swept along by the euphoric theatricality of it all.6 
 
 
This allowance for participants to quickly find themselves in positions of 
authority and ‘knowledge’ in various Reactor projects interferes with our 
understanding of the degree to which fellow participants are ‘involved’, and 
who is and who isn’t ‘in charge’. Syson’s response provides a brief insight into 
the unstable yet potentially exhilarating nature of the gatherings Reactor 
facilitate.  Summarising this approach, artist and researcher Mel Jordan, 
states that, in these projects ‘Reactor see to it that working with others is 
                                                
6 Jennie Syson, ‘Ghaos Theory” Left Lion, 23 October 2005, 
<http://www.leftlion.co.uk/articles.cfm/title/ghaos-
theory/id/941#.UYD0BoIlabM> [accessed 30 April 2013].  
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understood as complex and dirty’.7 By reading their recent practice through 
Slavoj Žižek’s engagement with the Imaginary, Real and Symbolic dimensions 
of neighbourly love, I aim to unpick the complexity and dirtiness of the 
encounters they facilitate and add ‘awkward’ to this list of descriptors. 
 
Žižek has engaged with the theological, socio-political and philosophical 
problems of the Christian injunction to ‘Love Thy Neighbour’ throughout his 
works.8 My analysis of Reactor’s practice relies specifically on Žižek’s 
descriptions of neighbourly love in line with the three Lacanian registers that 
structure our reality, introduced above.9 The first of these registers is the 
‘Imaginary’, the element of the neighbour I recognise as similar to myself. The 
second is the ‘Symbolic Order’ (the big Other), the unwritten rules that 
structure and facilitate my encounter with him or her. Thirdly is the ‘Real’, the 
monstrous impenetrable ‘Thing’ that lies beneath our neighbour’s 
recognisable surface and which Lacan defines as ‘impossible for us to 
imagine’.10 Žižek describes the essential part that each of Lacan’s three 
registers play in our encounter with our neighbours:  
 
So no axis between the two terms can subsist without the third one: if 
the functioning of the big Other is suspended, the friendly neighbor 
                                                
7 Mel Jordan, ‘Ivan’s Dogs, We Provide the Smiles: Interview with Mel 
Jordan,’ Reactor 2006-2011 (Reactor, 2012 [on DVD]). 
8 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Love Thy Neighbour, No Thanks!’, in The Plague of Fantasies, 
2nd ed, (London and New York: Verso, 2008), pp. 55-106; ‘Fear Thy 
Neighbour as Thyself’, in Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London: Profile 
Books, 2008), pp. 34-62; ‘Slap Thy Neighbor!’, in Living in the End Times, 
(London and New York: Verso, 2010), pp. 119-127. 
9 Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters, p. 144. 
10 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII: The Ethics of 
Psychoanalyis 1959-1960, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans, by Dannis 
Porter (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 125. 
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coincides with the monstrous Thing (Antigone); if there is no neighbor 
to whom I can relate as a human partner, the symbolic Order itself 
turns into the monstrous Thing which directly parasitizes upon me (like 
Daniel Paul Schreber's God who directly controls me, penetrating me 
with the rays of jouissance). If there is no Thing to underpin our 
everyday symbolically regulated exchange with others, we find 
ourselves in a Habermasian "flat," aseptic universe in which subjects 
are deprived of their hubris of excessive passion, reduced to lifeless 
pawns in the regulated game of communication.11  
 
 
For me this theory of the neighbour provides an exemplary description of 
Reactor’s participatory practice. They construct worlds that, on the surface 
appear like an ‘aseptic’, ‘regulated game of communication’, but which are 
underpinned by a persistent sense of impenetrable ‘Thing-ness’. This duality 
demonstrates a recognisable Žižekian approach in Reactor’s facilitation of 
neighbourly encounters.  
 
In my reading, Reactor insistently return to the sinister, unpredictable and 
unknowable elements of interactions between neighbours. Thus, in the 
section on ‘Imaginary Neighbours’ below, I discuss how Reactor often make it 
difficult to ascertain who is a facilitating artist (i.e. a member of Reactor) and 
who is a participant at their events. This can mean that unnerving questions 
around the position and motivations of others haunt the neighbourly 
encounters Reactor facilitate. Thus, any sense of an aseptic, convivial get-
together of recognisable ‘Imaginary’ others is undermined. In the section 
entitled ‘Reactor’s big Others’ I will discuss how Reactor playfully over-identify 
with the reliance of the friendliness of our interactions on a facilitating big 
Other. They construct farcical Symbolic networks in which pantomimic 
despots watch over neighbourly encounters. Layered on top of this is the 
                                                
11 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters’, p. 144. 
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peculiar positioning of Reactor itself as a subjectivised big Other whose 
elusive desires seems to motivate their on-going participatory practice. This 
exemplifies the psychoanalytic concept of a big Other that enables neighbours 
to interact without direct exposure to each other’s monstrous ‘Thing’. It 
simultaneously alludes to the way these friendly interactions between 
recognisable neighbours play a key role in containing the disastrous potential 
of monstrous tyranny inherent in the Symbolic Order. For me, the farcical 
tyrants and unstable structures of Reactor’s projects foreground this symbiotic 
relationship between the Symbolic and the Imaginary in neighbourly 
encounters.   
 
Reactor as the Imaginary Neighbour  
 
In Žižek’s discussion of the neighbour he describes the ‘Imaginary other’ as 
‘my fellow human beings with whom I am engaged in the mirrorlike 
relationships of competition, mutual recognition, and so forth’.12 Reactor’s use 
of character and role-play, their insistence on a committed fidelity from 
participants to the fantasy of the systems they are immersed in, the ambiguity 
of fellow participant’s proximity to the core of the project and its creators, and 
the tightly structured nature of individual interactions and participation all work 
to avoid a domesticated gathering of fellow humans based on mutual-
recognition. It should already be clear that Reactor do not readily encourage a 
hollow and tolerant love of our neighbour as an easily recognisable fellow 
                                                
12 Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters,’ p. 143. 
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human. Importantly, this attitude towards Otherness spills out of individual 
events and into Reactor’s on-going practice as a collaboration.  
 
The Imaginary dimension of Reactor itself would be the individual, 
recognisable human beings that make up the collective: the individuals who 
meet to collaborate, devise, develop, produce and administrate the frame 
work of each project. It is these individuals who answer questions in 
interviews and who present and discuss documentation of their work with 
audiences at artist’s talks. They are the element of Reactor that we might look 
at, listen to, or address in other ways whilst making the assumption ‘so this is 
who Reactor are’. We could have an ‘Imaginary relation’ with them, defined 
not through ‘illusion’ but through a meeting of egos ‘played out in terms of but 
one opposition: same or different’.13 When we encounter them, we might 
experience love or hate depending on their similarities or differences to our 
own Imaginary selves. Unfortunately, Reactor often makes it difficult to know if 
and when we are encountering the individuals that devise and facilitate each 
project.  
 
As far as I know, at the time of writing, Reactor is made up of four men. Niki 
Russell, Daniel Williamson and Phillip Henderson have, and continue to be 
‘core’ members since the first Reactor event in 2002. The fourth member is 
Bruce Asbestos, who joined through the ‘secret membership’ scheme. Each 
year, on 11 November, Reactor attempt to recruit a ‘secret member’ through a 
covert initiation procedure called ‘Martinmas Interviews’. Secret membership 
                                                
13 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance 
(New Jersey and West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 84. 
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lasts for one year. Whilst it is unknown if there is a current secret member, or 
what the role of this member entails, they have declared that for the six years 
before 2013 no-one was capable of filling the role.14 Reactor have now 
revealed that artist and curator Asbestos was the secret member from 2013-
2014, and is now a publically acknowledged member. I do not know if there is 
a current secret member (it is not me).15   
 
The existence of secret membership, as well as the insistence that ‘the group 
expands and contracts from project to project through inclusion of other 
collaborating artists and co-participating audience members’ makes it 
awkward to qualify Reactor’s practice in terms of the individual cultural 
positions of its members.16 It certainly does not allow for the 
psychopathologising approach discussed in my chapter on psychoanalysis. 
Reactor’s secretive and fluxing membership scheme can be read as one of a 
series of intentional avoidances of attempted humanisation. Through this, they 
persistently resist the contemporary ideology, identified and critiqued by 
Žižek, of ‘understanding’ through engagement with personal stories.17 By 
burying their individual, Imaginary selves in a tangled matrix of shifting 
memberships, role-play games, red herrings, and false identities, Reactor 
refuse to engage their participants as tolerable, recognisable, mundane 
neighbours. In other words, they avoid the humanising, qualifying, revelatory 
positioning that theatre scholar Alan Read describes as ‘azza’s, (for example, 
                                                
14 Reactor, ‘Project: Martinmas Interviews,’ 
<http://reactor.org.uk/projects/martinmas> [accessed April 30, 2013].  
15 Reactor, ‘Project: Martinmas Interviews,’ 
<http://reactor.org.uk/projects/martinmas> [accessed December 4, 2014]. 
16 ‘Primary: Reactor’. 
17 Žižek, Violence, p. 46.  
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‘as a male academic’).18 Exemplifying such self-positing, it is appropriate here 
to state that I write ‘azza’ lightly dyspraxic, male performance art academic/ 
performance artist who has, on and off since 2003, worked with, for, and 
alongside Reactor without ever getting beyond the proximity level of ‘guest 
artist’. From this position I read Reactor’s secretive and fluxing membership 
scheme as one of a series of intentional avoidances of attempted 
humanisation and the reduction of Reactor to a collection of Imaginary 
individuals.  
 
Reactor’s big Others 
 
Žižek’s description of a Thing-less world in which subjects are ‘reduced to 
lifeless pawns in the regulated game of communication’ is reminiscent of the 
critique Bishop aims at collaborative, relational, and participatory works such 
as Rirkrit Tiravanija’s.19 Recent Reactor projects, with their unabashed 
indulgence in frivolity and their cartoonish, theme-park aesthetic could also be 
mistaken as the kind of convivial-gathering as artwork criticized by Bishop. 
However, as well as obscuring any sense of ‘unified subjects’ through 
unstable role-play and blurred artist-participant boundaries, there is another 
disruptive position that troubles the surface coziness of their events. This is 
the unsettling sense that in Reactor projects interactions between participants 
might not be occurring primarily for those participating, but for a mysteriously 
motivated big Other. This big Other’s enjoyment seems to entail an unsavoury 
                                                
18 Alan Read, Theatre, Intimacy & Engagement: The Last Human Venue 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 76. 
19 Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters’, p. 144. 
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reliance on the outcomes of our interactions, thus heightening our trepidation 
in fully immersing ourselves in getting along with our neighbours.  
 
The big Other is usefully summarised by Žižek as the ‘uncanny subject who is 
not simply another human being, but the Third, the subject who stands above 
the interaction of real human individuals’.20 Thus, in any interaction or 
collaboration with my neighbour there is always a third figure facilitating, 
judging and manipulating our encounters. As Žižek explains, when I 
encounter others, ‘I am never merely a ‘small other’ (individual) interacting 
with other ‘small others’: the big Other must always be there’.21 This 
consistent presence is essential for our relationship with our neighbour: 
 
In order to render our coexistence with the Thing minimally bearable, 
the symbolic order qua Third, the pacifying mediator, has to intervene: 
the ‘gentrification’ of the Other-Thing into a ‘normal fellow human’ 
cannot occur through our direct interaction, but presupposes the third 
agency to which we both submit – there is no intersubjectivity (no 
symmetrical, shared relationship between humans) without the 
impersonal symbolic Order.22 
 
Reactor perform an over-identification with the importance of this ‘impersonal 
symbolic Order’ (and its development into a ‘personal big Other’) in their 
provision of a dubious description of their working methodology:  
 
The way that it is now, and it wasn’t always this way in the past, is that 
Reactor is an individual. Reactor is an entity and we work for Reactor. 
Rather than it being a kind of collaboration whereby I work with these 
two people and we come up with whatever we come up with, we come 
                                                
20 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 41. 
21 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 9. 
22 Žižek, Did Someone Say Totalitarianism?: Five Interventions on the 
(Mis)Use of a Notion (London and New York: Verso, 2002), p. 165; ‘Neighbors 
and Other Monsters,’ pp. 143-144. 
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up with what Reactor comes up with.23 
 
Thus they name and subjectivise the Symbolic Order that structures their 
creative work as ‘Reactor’. When I asked members to expand on the 
existence of Reactor as an ‘entity’ or an ‘individual’, Williamson described how, 
although each member might have clear, but different ways of approaching an 
idea or responding to a situation, they have developed a reference point of 
‘What would Reactor do?’.24 Again, this aligns with Žižek’s description of a big 
Other that operates as a ‘symbolic space’ that acts ‘like a yardstick against 
which I can measure myself’.25 Reactor are explicit and open about the 
importance of a big Other that not only facilitates neighbourly encounters, but 
that also provides a figure for whom these encounters take place.  
 
Reactor’s apparent fascination with what Žižek describes as the  ‘anonymous 
mechanism of the symbolic order’ becoming ‘personified as a deity, a cause 
or an ideology’ is further explored in the systems they provide for their 
participants.26  Each of the worlds they conceive and facilitate includes a 
farcical leader that holds the place of a demanding Third in any interactions 
between participants. In Total Ghaos this was the character ‘Uncle Commi’, 
and in Green Man and Regular Fellows it shifted from the Landlord, to the 
titular vegetative deity (depending on how far into the project you delved).  In 
Big Lizard’s Big Idea it is the character of Big Lizard and his/her elusive 
                                                
23 Niki Russell in Bruce Asbestos, ‘Reactor Interviewed by Bruce Asbestos,’ 
thisisnotacircular, Trade Gallery, 24 June 2010. 
<http://www.tradegallery.org/thisisnotacircular.html> [accessed 23 April 2013].  
24 Daniel Williamson, ‘Interview with author’, Skype, 29th January 2013. 
25 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, 9. 
26 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, pp. 40-41. 
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ideology of a Big Idea. Reactor describe the Big Lizard project as being 
‘centred on a Disney-esque mascot, whose irrepressible “fun” persona 
examined the nature of such characters’.27 As demonstrated in my section on 
paranoia below, this project in particular demonstrates Reactor’s apparent 
fascination with a surface of unreflective, convivial interactions between 
neighbours that is underpinned by sinister and impenetrable Otherness. In 
each of these projects encounters between participants were not framed 
around a unhindered ‘getting to know each other’ exchange of personal 
attributes, but through a mutual, antagonistic relationship to a deceptive and 
potentially manipulative big Other for whom they were enacted. 
 
This playful over-identification with the necessity of a Third in any neighbourly 
encounter is the key to differentiating between the awkwardness of a Reactor 
project and the antagonism encouraged in the works that Bishop favours. 
Bishop’s brand of antagonism is displayed, for example, in Sierra’s Workers 
Who Cannot Be Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes 
(September 2000) for his exhibition at Kunst-Werke in Berlin.28 The piece 
consisted of six Chechnyan asylum seekers concealed inside a series of 
makeshift cardboard boxes for four hours a day for six weeks. For Bishop, art 
works such as this are important because instead of offering ‘an experience of 
transcendent human empathy that smooths over the awkward situation before 
us’ they confront the spectator with ‘a pointed racial and economic non-
                                                
27 Reactor, ‘Big Lizard’s Big Idea’, http://reactor.org.uk/projects/big-lizards-big-
idea [accessed 4 September 2013].  
28 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 78-79. 
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identification: “this is not me”’.29 Bishop’s critical work, and the antagonistic 
practices she favours are thus helpful in supporting an understanding of the 
problems of relentlessly pursuing the recognizable in our encounters with 
neighbours. In other words, she also demands more from participatory and 
collaborative encounter than ‘feel-good’ gatherings that take place solely in 
the Imaginary register. Reactor, like Sierra, also do not ‘smooth over the 
awkward situation’ of neighbourly love. However, I would argue that the 
poignancy of a Reactor project also comes from an awkward experience of 
‘this is me’. This is not to suggest that the experience on offer at a Reactor 
event is in any way comparable with the experience of a Chechnyan asylum 
seeker residing in a cardboard box. I merely suggest that, unlike Sierra’s work 
in which our privileged cultural positions are exposed for us, in front of us, in 
Reactor’s projects we are confronted with the domesticated and potentially 
exploited nature of our interactions in relation to a big Other. Reactor facilitate 
an uncomfortable confrontation with the impenetrable, demanding systems 
that structure and feed off my relations with my neighbour, whether that 
relationship is convivial or antagonistic, empathetic or ignorant. Of course this 
does not mean we can delegate responsibility for the tone or outcome of our 
encounters onto a tyrannical Other. Throughout Reactor’s practice they 
repeatedly confront us with our own complicity in constructing and 
perpetuating the systems that frame our interactions and the despotic 
characters for whom we interact.  
 
 
                                                
29 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 79. 
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Reactor and Neighbourly Love 
 
For Žižek and, in my reading, for Reactor, the demand for neighbourly love 
‘smooths over awkwardness’ when it negates one or more of the three 
Lacanian registers of reality. Particularly troubling is the reliance on an 
understanding of the neighbour solely as a recognisable fellow human with 
whom we can freely compare ourselves. This means an over-determination of 
the realm of the Imaginary and consequently an unwillingness to engage with 
the Real register of the neighbour’s ‘Thing-ness’ or the Symbolic register that 
frames our interactions with him or her. In addressing the politics of this 
disavowal, Žižek provides two key critical observations. Firstly, in ignoring the 
Real of the neighbour we develop a mere ‘tolerance of the Other in its aseptic, 
benign form’.30 Thus, love for our neighbour risks becoming an act of 
depoliticised liberal tolerance through violent domestication. This results in 
justice being replaced with tolerance, and nobody wants to be merely 
tolerated. By obscuring their own recognisable, individual selves, and insisting 
that those who participate leave their own recognisable subjectivities and 
personal histories at the door Reactor work to side-step this benign form of 
neighbourly interaction. Secondly, Žižek emphasises the importance of 
acknowledging the omnipresence of a Third in any one-to-one encounter. This 
‘Third’ is the Symbolic Order: the desiring ‘big Other’ that facilitates and 
potentially manipulates our encounters. The existence of the entity ‘Reactor’ 
to whom Russell, Williamson, and Tait (and potentially others) answer 
playfully alludes to our reliance on this desiring Other when meeting with 
                                                
30 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational 
Capitalism’, New Left Review 225 (September-October 1997), 37. 
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neighbours. Meanwhile the farcical tyrants and deities that rule each world 
remind participants that the systems that structure their neighbourly 
encounters can be pathetically fragile and needy, or perhaps not exist at all. 
 
Post-Relational Paranoid Play in Reactor’s Big Lizard’s Big Idea project 
 
During my time with, for, and alongside ‘Reactor’ I have had various 
conversations in which it has been suggested that they ‘get people to do stuff’. 
This is a claim often made by those who avoid participating in Reactor 
projects. The point of origin for the second half of this chapter lies in a desire 
to critically engage with this claim’s uneasy suspicion and implied accusation 
of manipulation and conspiracy. This has developed into an engagement both 
with the paranoid assumptions about agency and honesty in Reactor’s on-
going practice, and with the paranoia that, I claim, Reactor encourages 
participants to playfully immerse themselves in during individual projects. 
 
Bishop’s monograph, Artificial Hells, examines the development of 
participatory art from the hostile provocations of Italian Futurists in the 1910’s 
through to the seemingly benevolent experiments in delegation and 
exploitation that occur at galleries and biennales in the 21st Century. In her 
conclusion she summarises this development as follows: 
  
From the audience’s perspective, we can chart this as a shift from an 
audience that demands a role (expressed as hostility towards avant-
garde artists who keep control of the proscenium), to an audience that 
enjoys its subordination to strange experiences devised for them by an 
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artist, to an audience that is encouraged to be a co-producer of the 
work (and who, occasionally, can even get paid for this involvement).31  
 
My own framing of the experience offered to participants in Big Lizard’s Big 
Idea incorporates a complex and contradictory overlapping between the latter 
two perspectives. The mixture of enjoyment and subordination in Reactor 
projects is key to the experience of paranoia and play that I attribute to them. 
Reactor participants, I argue, are able to play at subordination, to critically 
reflect on where that subordination emerges from, and to confront their 
potential co-production in that subordination. These experiences loosely 
follow the definitions of clinical, critical and constructive paranoia that I outline 
below. Overall, my use of the term paranoia refers, firstly, to the unnerving 
sense that something more is going on than appears. In other words that 
there is a discrepancy between what we are being told or shown is happening 
and what is actually happening. Secondly, it refers to the belief that there is a 
single agent, or group of agents who control what is actually happening, who 
develop and perpetuate a hidden, but totalising concept and agenda. This 
second point, of course, relates to the awkward relationship Reactor develop 
and maintain with clarifying who they are and with maintaining an elusive idea 
of a big Other.  
 
My examination of the complex entwining of playfulness and paranoia in Big 
Lizard’s Big Idea is read through my own navigation between the 
psychoanalytic understanding of ‘play’ developed by Donald Winnicott and the 
Lacanian dissection of contemporary modes of ‘enjoyment’ developed and 
                                                
31 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship (London and New York: Verso, 2012), p. 277. 
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supplemented by Žižek.32 The specific appropriateness of my application of 
psychoanalytic theory in this section half of the chapter is captured in Žižek’s 
description of the desire by many in the 21st Century to bury it ‘in the lumber-
room of pre-scientific obscurantist quests for hidden meanings’.33 The appeal 
of psychoanalysis here lies primarily in the fact that an ‘obscurantist quest for 
hidden meanings’ would, I suggest, make for a pithy description of the 
experience offered by the Big Lizard project and stands as a dominant 
definition of the types of paranoia that this chapter discusses. Thus, in 
employing psychoanalysis I am rigorously and playfully performing a response 
to what I see as the project’s core invitation. My own awkward conflation of 
Žižekian and Winnicotian theory is, I argue, also appropriate because it 
matches the awkward vacillation between secure, maternal benevolence, and 
an insistent, contradictory, demands inherent in the character ‘Big Lizard’.  
 
As my argument develops through the theories of Winnicott and Žižek my use 
of the term ‘play’ begins to flicker between two awkwardly conflicting 
definitions. The first of these is the productive developmental activity reliant on 
the presence of a benevolent other and a supportive, clearly defined system. 
The second is the meeting of a demand for non-seriousness and enjoyment 
from a tyrannical master in a fragmented structure of incompleteness and 
contradiction. Thus, there is an uneasy ambiguity around whether participants 
in Reactor projects are participating under the auspices of a Winnicottian 
Mother, or the injunctions of a Lacanian Other.  Throughout I address the 
                                                
32 D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (Routledge Classics ed. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2005), pp.51-70; Žižek, How to Read Lacan, pp. 103-104.  
33 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (London: Granta Books, 2006), p. 1.  
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various paranoid positions that might emerge in response to these 
Mother/Other figures. The ultimate aim of this response is to demonstrate how 
a paranoid position is not only about investigating and revealing hidden 
structures and characters, but also how such a position can be unwittingly 
complicit is constructing and perpetuating them. Thus, overall my 
psychoanalytic engagement with the various forms of paranoia present in Big 
Lizard argues that the project might, like Žižek’s psychoanalysis, provide a 
space for play in which we can dwell upon the contemporary, insistent and 
‘strange ethical duty’ to ‘enjoy’ and, more importantly, confront our complicit 
role in its perpetuation.34  
Fun 
 
I interviewed members of Reactor for the Reactor 2006-2011 DVD, and used 
the opportunity to  discuss their playful experiments with participation.35 
Adopting the term ‘fun’ to refer to the play that Reactor facilitate (the term ‘fun’ 
occurs throughout the texts and scripts of Big Lizard) I asked Russell how 
relevant he felt it was to their practice. In his answer he concluded that it was 
‘relevant’ but compared the invitation to have ‘fun’ in Big Lizard to an invitation 
made in the Munkanon project, which also took place at the Donau Festival in 
Austria in 2009. During my interview Russell describes how, in Munkanon, 
participants were invited to go on “the ride of a lifetime”. He went on to assert 
that despite this invitation, there “isn’t really a ride is there. Well there is. You 
end up in a car for a bit, then you end up in a space where there’s no real 
                                                
34 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 104. 
35 Daniel Oliver, ‘Munkanon: Interview with Daniel Oliver,’ Reactor 2006-2011 
(Reactor, 2012 [on DVD]). 
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ride. You’re kind of sat down, or you’re doing this or that”. He concluded that 
this is similar to Big Lizard, which is “presented as fun, and then the activities 
don’t really equate to that”. This clearly demonstrates a deceptive relationship 
with promotion and a playful attitude towards participants’ expectations, 
something akin to Hoyle’s desire to ‘to promise things and not deliver’.36 
However, in the same interview, Williamson interjected into Russell’s reply, 
undermining the simple and reductive idea of a mere bait and switch attitude 
towards experience, by insisting that ‘when you look back at the Munkanon 
documentation, clearly people are having a lot of fun with these kind of 
activities’.  Finally, ex-member Waring contributed by critiquing the position of 
the ‘casual observers’ that Reactor have worked hard to exclude from their 
projects, but who inevitably peer in and make assumptions about the kind of 
play that people are engaging and the agency they have in doing so. He 
stated that he thinks this concern with other people’s playfulness is ‘very 
characteristic of a particular moment that we’re in where people worry that 
other people look like they’re having fun, but they might have been tricked into 
having fun’.   
 
Thus we have at least two layers of paranoia in relation to Reactor and 
Reactor’s projects. Firstly, there is the paranoia of participants who develop 
an understanding that there is a level of deception, and secondly, there is the 
paranoia that observers and non-participants have about the agency and 
understanding of those participating and the motivations of those in charge. In 
other words, those who remain outside the project might develop concerns 
                                                
36 Hoyle, quoted in Butt, ‘Just a camp laugh?’, p. 51. 
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that those on the inside are not being appropriately informed on what is really 
going on. To summarise, Reactor admit to having a deceptive relationship 
towards playfulness. They invite us to play their game, but are deceptive and 
slippery in their disclosures of what this game entails. However, they also 
insist that this deception does not mean that people are not actually playing, 
suggesting that outsiders should be wary of making assumptions about the 
agency and understanding participants have or don’t have as they play. 
Hence, whilst in my understanding, they invite participants to play a complex 
and multi-layered game of paranoia and investigation; they are simultaneously 
dismissive of the potential paranoid, critical readings of participants’ 
experiences that emerge from those who have not participated.  
 
The key questions that emerge from this practice pivot around agency, 
authorship and accountability. To what extent are participants given access to 
an understanding of the project they are in and what their role in it is? How 
much agency do participants really have in authoring and developing the 
project, and how much is the project is tightly pre-authored by Reactor? Who 
is accountable for the ethics in a project when its authorship is fragmentary 
and unfixed? Instead of working towards providing clear answers to these 
questions, my response here is to examine the potential efficacy of provoking 
and encouraging the sense of paranoia that they imply. In reference to current 
discussions around agency and emancipation in participatory performance, 
the key point here is that Reactor not only cause us to worry about the agency 
of participants, but they also create immersive role-plays in which participants 
are encouraged to play at worrying about their own agency. 
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Big Lizard  
 
Anyone walking through Newcastle city centre in November 2009 would have 
passed by a mobile stage adorned with, and surrounded by, inflatable palm-
trees, fold-down tables, green balloons, stickers, banners, bunting, childish 
crayon drawings, and a plethora of badges, banners and posters depicting a 
large cartoonish lizard and the words ‘Big Lizard’s Big Idea’. Here they would 
have been approached by one of several individuals dressed in chinos, blue 
plimsolls, and a Hawaiian shirt over a t-shirt with an image of the cartoon 
lizard on the front. This member of Big Lizard’s ‘entourage’ would have 
invited, encouraged, and coerced them into finding out more about the ‘Big 
Lizard’ character and to get involved with the ‘Big Idea’. The tone of the 
conversation would have been reminiscent of uncomfortably over-familiar 
encounters with street-based charity fundraisers, passive aggressive sales-
people, sinisterly benevolent spreaders of religion, or scientologist stress 
testers. The potential participant might have become awkwardly aware of the 
occasional use of clumsy and unsubtle physical and verbal persuasion 
techniques. Series of questions to which he or she could only answer “Yes” 
would be followed by “So do you want to come on board with the Big Idea? 
Yeh?” All sensible queries on what this Big Idea is are met with evasive, 
unconvincing analogies - “The Big Idea is like a big bowl of soup. I once tried 
to drink a big bowl of soup all at once, and I caused a terrible mess” - and the 
insistence that the only way to really grasp what the Big Idea is, is to come 
“on board” and get involved. Importantly “having fun” is a key lure in the 
collection of participants. This is evident in the cartoonish aesthetics of the 
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work, the crass colourful costumes, the description of the mobile stage as a 
‘fun’ bus, and the frequent use of the word ‘fun’ as bait in the entourage’s 
conversations with potential participants.  
 
Those who chose to get involved in the fun would learn that the first step for a 
participant wanting to ‘get down’ with Big Lizard and the Big Idea is to go up 
onto the mobile stage, sit at one of the tables, and draw a picture of him or 
herself and Big Lizard ‘doing something’. Hours, or even days later, having 
fully committed him or herself to pursuing Big Lizard’s Big Idea and 
enthusiastically engaged in a series of jolly team-building games, childish 
micro-performances, and esoteric one-to-one encounters, a participant could 
attend a ‘champagne party’ in a function room at Newcastle’s Theatre Royal. 
The games and scenarios of play experienced by participants include hula-
hoop and speed-stack competitions, a secretive ritualistic encounter with an 
alien oracle called ‘Raman-Caa’, being a guest in a television studio for the 
hand-puppet-based ‘Big Lizard’s Fun-Time Message Show’, getting one’s 
tongue checked and measured, and donning a cardboard Big Lizard mask 
and joining other participants and Big Lizard for a celebratory parade through 
Newcastle city-centre. As a guest at the party (on more than one occasion 
only one participant delved this far into the project), a participant might find 
themselves in fancy dress, playing blindfold-musical-chairs with nine other 
people they only know through their involvement in the project that day. 
Alternatively they may be recruited to host this party, organise games, 
decorate the room, and keeping the champagne flowing. Either way, it is 
unlikely they would be any closer to gathering an objective and totalising 
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understanding of who Big Lizard is, what he or she represents, or what his or 
her Big Idea might be. They might also be questioning why, and for whom, 
they’ve engaged in the activities and encounters that they experienced 
throughout the day.  
Paranoia 
 
I read Big Lizard as partly a playful microcosm of Frederic Jameson’s 
postmodernism, in which attempts at ‘cognitive mapping’ are undermined by a 
non-representable totality and an experience of partial, fragmented and 
disparate cultural logics, occasionally resulting in paranoid conspiracy 
theories.37 Importantly, instead of trying to resolve this fragmentation, allowing 
us to cognitively map ourselves through the provision of an easily consumable 
message, concept or ideal, Big Lizard further immerses us in this experience 
of partialities and the ominous sense of a ‘non-representable totality’. 
References to our pursuit of the consumable and blameable conspiracy 
theories that Jameson refers to make up a key part of the material of Big 
Lizard. The use of a costume that resembles a ‘Grey’ at the champagne party, 
the pseudo-psychological tests disguised as games and the (clumsy) attempts 
at hypnosis-based manipulation techniques all work to immerse participants in 
a world of recognisable clandestine knowledge and secret agendas. 
Participants are offered the opportunity to play at paranoia, potentially 
recognising and performing themselves as obsessive conspiracy theorists, 
wildly connecting dots in order to access the ‘truth’ of the ‘Big Idea’. The most 
                                                
37 Frederick Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the 
World System (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992); Douglas Kellner, Media 
Spectacle (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 156.  
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prominent of the conspiracy theories referenced in Big Lizard is what Tyson 
Lewis and Richard Khan describe as the Reptoid Hypothesis: the belief, most 
commonly associated with controversial ex-football commentator David Ike, 
that the world is secretly run by big lizards.38 Thus, there is sense of 
conspiratorial paranoia built into the fictional world of the role-play, where 
participants are asked to play at the paranoid pursuit of knowledge, 
‘discovering’ the fantastical theories, back-stories and characters that lurk 
behind the Big Lizard micro-system.  Of course, layered on top of this ‘fun’ 
paranoia, internal to the project itself, is the more realistic drive to understand 
the actual agenda of Reactor in relation to the agency and understanding of 
those who choose to participate. This exemplifies the layering of a playful 
‘clinical’ paranoia with an unsettling ‘critical’ paranoia, definitions outlined by 
Douglas Kellner in his discussion of The X-Files. Kellner’s ‘critical paranoia’ is 
a means to ‘map the forces behind political, social, and personal events’.39 
Participants might employ this critical paranoia when thinking through what 
this participatory project is for and who the ‘forces’ that might be gaining from 
their participation are. ‘Clinical paranoia’ is less judicial and rational, instead 
disassociating itself ‘from a reality principle’ and retreating into a ‘solipsistic 
world of persecutorial or occult fantasies’.40 The merging of Big Lizard’s 
references to far-fetched fantastical conspiracy theories with the very real 
questions about the desires and motivations of the collective Reactor 
facilitates a complex response to the work’s play with critical and clinical 
                                                
38 Tyson Lewis and Richard Kahn, ‘The Reptoid Hypothesis: Utopian and 
Dystopian Representational Motifs in David Icke's Alien Conspiracy Theory’, 
Utopian Studies 16:1: 45–75. 
39 Kellner, p. 140.  
40 Kellner, p. 140.  
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paranoia. Thus, the project is ambiguous about whether participants should 
play at being concerned about the fantastical characters and fictional systems 
of power that run the Big Lizard system (to play at ‘clinical paranoia’), or be 
genuinely concerned about the motives of the covert collective of people 
facilitating, encouraging and defining that play (to harbour and employ a 
critical paranoia). In other words, participants are not sure if they are being 
really duped by an art group, or just being asked to play the role of 
participants being duped by a Big Lizard. Not only might those who are 
participating worry about their agency whilst playing, but they also have the 
opportunity to play at worrying about agency. Of course as participants step in 
and out of the project, whether physically or through the manner of their 
private thoughts and interactions, they play across the critical and clinical 
approaches to paranoid investigation.  
 
Reactor’s Play 
  
As stated above, my definition of the ‘play’ (referred to more often as ‘fun’ in 
the project’s texts and scripts) on offer in Big Lizard emerges from select 
elements of the observations and analyses of child development developed 
by Donald Winnicott and the dissection of contemporary modes of Lacanian 
‘enjoyment’ developed and supplemented by Žižek.41 The personification of 
these vying psychoanalytic characters in the overseeing persona of ‘Big 
Lizard‘ goes someway to explaining why the entourage were consistently non-
committal when describing the reptile’s gender. In the following I describe 
                                                
41 Winnicott, pp. 51-70; Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 104.  
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how, on the one hand Big Lizard is the maternal facilitator essential to 
Winnicott’s play, and on the other he or she is the dictatorial paternal figure, 
pushing us to fully enjoy ourselves and taking pleasure in our inability to do 
so.  
 
The element of Winnicott’s observations and analyses that is important here is 
the crucial third stage of a child’s development in relation to play.42 To 
summarise, after the first stage, in which baby and object (the mother) are 
merged, and the second, in which the presence of a mother figure facilitates a 
repudiation and re-acceptance of the object as separate from the subject, 
comes the third stage, in which a child is ‘alone in the presence of 
someone’.43 It is here that play emerges, reliant on a ‘person who loves and 
who is therefore reliable’, this person ‘is available and continues to be 
available when remembered after a period of being forgotten’.44 Here 
Winnicott is describing an essential outsider, a maternal figure whose 
presence allows for us to play in a state of solitude, whether we grow up with 
a mother in that role or a different adult.   
 
I suggest that Big Lizard’s ‘entourage’ sell themselves, the character of ‘Big 
Lizard’, and the elusive concept of the ‘Big Idea’ as an enmeshed collection of 
omnipresent, benevolent (M)Others that facilitates our play within the Big 
Lizard game. Thus, in Big Lizard the figure of the maternal Other appears not 
as a single adult agent, but as a mixture of characters, concepts and 
                                                
42 Winnicott, pp. 51-70. 
43 Winnicott, pp. 63-64. 
44 Winnicott, p. 41.  
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structures which encourages productive play. Play relies on the participant’s 
ability to recall and dwell upon the relationship of their actions to the maternal 
Otherness associated both with the character ‘Big Lizard’, and with the 
enveloping nature of the project itself.  Alongside this, whilst many of the 
activities on offer rely on an interaction and engagement with other 
participants, there is also the potential for the development of an internal, 
solipsistic investigation of the relationship of individuals’ actions and 
encounters to an elusive character and concept (‘Big Lizard’ and the ‘Big 
Idea’). Thus both the character ‘Big Lizard’ and the elusive but omnipresent 
concept of the ‘Big Idea’ provide the Winnicottian notion of being ‘alone in the 
presence of someone’.45 However, the corporate sheen and ever-present 
sense of ulterior motives and undeclared desires simultaneously constructs a 
counterpoint to this benevolent, maternal Otherness. Thus Big Lizard also 
emerges as a pantomimic version of the tyrannical superego that Žižek 
suggests bombards us, in contemporary times, ‘from all sides with different 
versions of the injunction “Enjoy!”46 In my reading of Big Lizard, a persistent, 
demanding figure who makes impenetrable demands exists alongside 
Winnicott’s facilitator of play. It is, of course, not always clear which one of 
these figures participants are dealing with.  
 
For Žižek the contemporary liberal capitalist subject must be able to fully 
enjoy ‘from direct enjoyment in sexual performance to enjoyment in their 
professional achievement or in spiritual awakening’.47 For Freud guilt was 
caught up in the violation of moral inhibitions, now we are made to feel bad 
                                                
45 Winnicott, p. 64. 
46 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 104. 
47 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 104.  
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when we are unable to enjoy.48 My observation of this demand in Big Lizard is 
essential to my argument. The injunction ‘Enjoy’, overwhelmingly enwrapped 
in guilt and duty, has the potential to stop us reflecting on what we are 
enjoying and the effects of our enjoyment. However, in the following I suggest 
that Big Lizard has the potential to allow us to experience this demand for 
enjoyment whilst simultaneously being critically paranoid about what it really 
wants from us.  
 
Enjoy! 
 
 In Big Lizard (as in the socio-political context it lampoons), ‘Enjoy!’ is not a 
directly spoken demand, and its consistently implicit nature make it difficult to 
pinpoint an example. The persisting encouragement of enjoyment, fun, and 
untroubled pleasure is built into the structure and aesthetic of the project. In 
order for us to fully participate in Big Lizard, to get closer to the elusive ‘Big 
Idea’ give ourselves over to enjoyment. And whilst we might receive looks of 
disapproval from fellow gallery- or theatre-goers if we’re seen to be having too 
much fun, in Big Lizard the peer-pressure is geared towards getting carried 
away with it all. Aaron Juneau, in his review of a more recent Reactor project, 
Green Man and Regular Fellows (2011), captures this when he concludes that 
‘instead of stiffly sipping red wine and trying hopelessly to talk about Deleuze, 
I held hands with strangers, gave a grown man a piggyback and danced and 
howled with wonderful irregularity to the jingling of tambourines. Cheers!’49  
                                                
48 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 104.  
49 Aaron Juneau, ‘Review: Green Man and Regular Fellows’, a-n, < 
http://www.a-n.co.uk/p/1650841>, [accessed 22 June 2013]. 
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Of course the superegoic injunction to enjoy is cruelly complicated through its 
emergence at a time when the objects offered for our enjoyment are ‘more 
hampered than ever’.50 Products and experience are domesticated, rendered 
undamaging and safely virtualised, so that we are deprived of the truly 
enjoyable properties that might shift the experience from a mundane pleasure 
to a Lacanian jouissance.51 As Žižek demonstrates, we live in a system of 
‘coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol’.52  
 
Reading the play on offer in Big Lizard through this Žižekian context suggests 
an awkwardly multi-layered experience. Firstly, the project insists that we 
overcome our inhibitions, fully and unabashedly participating in silly games 
with strangers, floppy hugs with Disney-esque mascots, and sugar and 
champagne fuelled partying in fancy dress. However, this push to ‘let yourself 
go’ is undermined by the family-friendly aesthetic, as well the occasional 
overwhelming collections of infants surrounding Big Lizard and the Fun Bus. 
These reminders of responsibility, decency, and apparent innocence might 
hinder an adult participant’s ability to fully let go and enjoy playing. Thus, after 
all this, Reactor’s play emerges as a split, between the injunction to fully, 
uncontrollably enjoy and the limited, hampered, ‘decaffeinated’ fun that is 
actually on offer.  
 
                                                
50 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 37. 
51 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 38.  
52 Žižek, How to Read Lacan, p. 38. 
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It is these ‘splits’ between what is offered and what is experienced that are 
essential in generating the productive paranoia in Reactor’s projects. For 
example, the Winnicottian aims I observe in the project are unavoidably 
enmeshed in deception and failure. It is absurd to suggest that an art project 
and its characters can provide the safe and encouraging context for play that 
an adult caregiver can for their child.  For all the gleeful infantilising elements 
of the project’s aesthetic and tone, it is still an art project aimed at adults. Of 
course the important element of the Winnicottian theory of child-development 
that I am working with is the essential relationship between the ability to 
productively and confidently play and the non-intrusive presence of a 
facilitating, benevolent other. However, my potentially reductive application of 
this psychoanalytic theory should foreground an important split that re-occurs 
in Big Lizard and throughout Reactor’s projects. This is the unnerving disparity 
between an enunciated invitation (to indulge in safe, infantile, productive play) 
and the position of enunciation (the impossibility of authentically facilitating 
this experience for adults in an art piece).  
 
In his foreword to the second edition of For they know not what they do: 
Enjoyment as a Political Factor Žižek discusses this split between enunciated 
and enunciating subjects in relation to Joshua Piven’s and David Borgenicht’s 
bestselling handbook, The Worst-Case Scenario Survival Handbook (2000). 
The book, which gives tips on surviving such scenarios as alligator or lion 
attacks is, Žižek claims, ‘totally useless in our social reality’.53 Thus, whilst ‘the 
situations it describes are in fact serious, and the solutions are correct – the 
                                                
53 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political 
Factor. 2nd ed (London: Verso, 2008), p. xcii. 
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only problem is: Why are the authors telling us all this? Who needs advice like 
this?’54 Similarly, the peculiar discrepancy between the Winnicottian aims I 
observe (the benevolent facilitation of productive play) and the realities of 
setting up a ‘fun’ bus for adults on a public high-street reflects and leads to a 
questioning of authorial intentions and motivations: Why are Reactor providing 
this? Who needs to play like this? This split, also evidenced in Reactor’s 
confessions in my interview and the uneasy questioning it encourages plays 
an essential role in the nurturing of paranoia in relation to the collective. To 
summarise, this brief psychoanalytic approach to play in Big Lizard observes 
a lovingly facilitating, omnipresent, but un-intrusive ‘mother-figure’ alongside 
an unnerving ‘father-figure’ who insistently permits and implicitly prohibits our 
playing. Again, these two figures related to the structure and concepts of the 
project itself, as well as being personified in the character ‘Big Lizard’.  
 
What is paranoia for?  
 
Eve Sedgwick discusses the problems of celebrating paranoiac pursuits of 
knowledge, quoting her HIV activist friend on the conspiracies around the 
epidemics history: ‘Supposing we were ever so sure of all those things – what 
would we know then that we don’t already know?’55 In line with this dismissal, 
I admit that it might well be over determining the socio-political efficacy of the 
work to suggest that Big Lizard offers a space for practicing an essential 
paranoid investigative attitude towards invitations of frivolous play and 
                                                
54 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, p. xcii. Emphasis orginal.  
55 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity. (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2003), p. 123. 
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enjoyment in the socio-political world outside the project. There is, however, a 
clear satirical edge to the project, which mocks the contemporary subject’s 
uneasy relationship to the manic injunction “Enjoy!” and the impossibility of 
fully enjoying the banalised, decaffeinated experiences on offer. Ideally, 
participants might, after experiencing Big Lizard, develop their own critically 
paranoid relationship towards the motivations that lie behind the demand for 
enjoyment. Findings from these critically paranoid investigations might even 
lead to useful tools for resistance or change from within the systems we are 
unavoidably involved in. 
 
However, I suggest a more productive and realistic outcome might be a 
confrontation with our own complicity in the perpetuation of this injunction. 
This relies on an understanding of a third type of paranoia, a constructive 
paranoia. If ‘clinical paranoia’ is a kind of affliction in which we obsess about 
the activities of malevolent others and ‘critical paranoia’ is the insistent pursuit 
of answers around who is really running things and what they are up to, then 
a ‘constructive paranoia’ enables us to escape the fact that there is no ‘hidden 
subject who pulls the strings’, by constructing the myth of a ‘consistent, closed 
order’.56 It is this constructive paranoia that arises in respect to the 
contradictions, fragmentation, contingencies, and splits in the fictional world of 
Big Lizard and the real world of Reactor. Our paranoia constructs the Others 
for whom we attempt and fail to enjoy. When we ask ‘Why are Reactor 
providing this?’ in response to a contradiction between a position of 
                                                
56 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through 
Popular Culture, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 18-19. 
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enunciation and an enunciated position we rely on a fantasy of a consistent, 
self-knowing subject as ‘author’. By resisting this fantasy and allowing for 
inconsistencies, fragmentations and splits to emerge in their existence as the 
‘author’ Reactor and in the temporary systems they construct, Reactor remind 
participants of the role of their own paranoid fantasies in holding things 
together, in keeping things going, and in defining what and who these ‘things’ 
are. 
Conclusion 
 
I am aware that Reactor’s anti-humanising confusion and enticement of 
paranoia could be read as an example of the ‘rather clichéd masculinist, edgy, 
can’t-pin-me-down vision of the unintelligible artist’ that Shannon Jackson 
accuses art critic Claire Bishop of unquestionably celebrating.57 Bishop’s own 
critique of what she sees as the Christian ethics and New Labour politics of 
much recent participatory art does, as I have addressed, favour titillating, 
enigmatic artists, such as Santiago Sierra.58 However, unlike Reactor, the 
unintelligibility of artists such as Sierra is not a consequence of the burying of 
individuals in a multitude of collaborators and participants. For me, Reactor’s 
foregrounding of the awkwardness of interactivity and the facilitation of 
productive paranoia offers, like Hoyle’s car-crashes, a welcome departure 
from the facilitation of participatory performance around a tone of either 
conviviality or antagonism.  
                                                
57 Jackson, 116.  
58 Claire Bishop, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’ October 110, 
(Autumn 2004); ‘The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents’, 
ArtForum, (February 2006) <http://www.artforum.com/inprint/id=10274> 
[accessed 1 February 2009]. 
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These experiences are productive primarily because they encourage one to 
maintain a critical uneasiness in response to work that is insistently either 
feel-good or feel-bad.  Again, like Hoyle, Reactor offer a participatory 
experience in which you can both participate and maintain a critical position in 
your participation. One of the implicit criticisms in Bishop’s approach to the 
‘cozy situation’ in which ‘art does not feel the need to defend itself, and it 
collapses into compensatory (and self-congratulatory) entertainment’ is that 
‘having fun’ is all that is occurring.59 A swift glance at the Big Lizard project is 
more likely to inspire this kind of criticism than encourage ethical concerns 
about the agency and understanding that participants have whilst playing. 
This is exemplified in my experience of many potential participants who 
declined to get involved because they presumed, on seeing the Fun Bus, that 
the project was ‘for kids’. It was often not until individuals began participating, 
whether through extended conversations with entourage, or full engagement 
with the activities on offer, that the experience of potential deception emerged. 
 
This creates a flipped version of the critique of worried observers that 
Jonathan Waring put forward in the interview described above. Here, instead 
of being concerned for participants, outside viewers, similarly to Bishop, see 
mundane playfulness. At the same, time those inside the project are provoked 
into worrying about the intentions behind that playfulness.  Paranoia shifts 
from the unknowing outsider who naively ‘gets it’ (i.e. snappily reducing the 
project to an indulgence in frivolous fun) to the insider-participant whose 
developing proximity to the core of the project only increases its obscurity.  
                                                
59 Bishop, ‘Antagonism’, 79. 
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This refusal of a secondary audience is essential to the potential socio-
political efficacy of Big Lizard and the experience it offers participants.  It 
provides a context in which participants can ‘play’ with their ‘neighbours’ 
within the project, whilst simultaneously developing pleasurable ‘clinical’ and 
productive ‘critical’ paranoia in response to that play. It does not require that 
play ends, and then someone else looks at documentation and works out 
what was really going on. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
I opened this thesis with the question ‘What might be ‘great’ about awkward 
methods of creating and facilitating participatory art and performance?’ This 
was a response to Battersea Arts Centre’s Ali Tomkinson’s admittance that 
when an artist “hasn’t got great facilitation skills” the BAC “back fill them with 
people who actually are really great at facilitation”.1 I used Tomkinson’s term 
‘great’ in order to clearly define the way this thesis aimed to flip the approach 
that her comment exemplifies. Thus, throughout the thesis I have identified 
moments in contemporary participatory performance that I have experienced 
as awkward. My primary focus was to argue for the efficacy of these 
moments. Through this I aimed to problematize the blind spots around 
awkwardness that I have observed in the discourses around the social turn in 
art and performance. This was partially motivated by an underlying desire to 
intervene in negative and exclusionary attitudes towards awkward modes of 
being, due to my own experiences with dyspraxia.  
 
Each of the examples of awkwardness that I have discussed can be 
approached via Adam Kotsko’s definition of awkwardness as ‘a breakdown in 
our normal experience of social interaction while itself remaining irreducibly 
social’.2 What follows is a summary of my experiences and findings. The first 
part of this conclusion collects together the various ways this thesis has met 
                                                
1 Ali Tomkinson, ‘Participate’, Theatre Conversations: Participation and 
Activism < http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/our-research/bcct/projects/theatre-
conversations> [accessed 12 December 2012]. 
2 Adam Kotsko, Awkwardness (Ropley: 0-Books, 2010), p. 15. 
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its key aims – to account for the efficacy of awkwardness and to reveal blind 
spots and exclusions in the discourses around the social turn in art and 
performance. The second part tackles Claire Bishop’s demand that 
participatory art and performance carefully caters for secondary viewers.3 This 
segues into the proposition that a project about awkwardness should itself be 
efficaciously awkward. This entails a return to the ideas around dyspraxia and 
performative writing introduced in the preface of this thesis.  
 
What Might be ‘Great’ About Awkward Methods of Creating and 
Facilitating Participatory Art and Performance? 
 
This section identifies eight overlapping ways in which this thesis has 
accounted for the efficacy of awkwardness and highlighted blind spots in the 
discourse around the social turn in art and performance. These eight 
approaches address awkwardness in relation to the desire of others; 
awkwardness as a prompt to be awkward; awkwardness in relation to 
examining our role in a system or structure from within that system or 
structure; awkwardness as a contingent outcome that is nonetheless 
embraced; awkward affirmation of awkward causes; awkwardness in relation 
to the ambiguity, flux and multiplicity of the qualities and tones of an 
interactive performance or artwork; and, finally, awkwardness in relation to 
intentionality, capability and authority.  
 
                                                
3 Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship (London and New York: Verso, 2012), p. 9. 
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Firstly, using psychoanalytic theory, usually as developed by Jacques Lacan 
and supplemented and put to use by Slavoj Žižek, my framing of the 
‘greatness’ of awkwardness has emerged as being attached to our experience 
of the proximity to desiring others. As outlined in my detailed writing on 
psychoanalysis in Chapter 2, this proximity in turn has the potential to 
foreground the Lacanian idea that the subject’s ‘desire is the desire of the 
other’.4 Participatory performance, and especially awkward participatory 
performance has emerged through this thesis as an ideal context in which to 
address and explore our existence as desiring subjects and our role in an 
interconnected matrix of other desiring subjects. Thus the key questions thrust 
upon us during experiences of participatory performance include ‘Am I acting 
in accordance with my desire?’ (Am I participating because I want to?), ‘How 
are my desires being affected by those around me?’ (Are other participants 
helping/hindering me to get what I want?), ‘What am I supposed to be 
desiring?’ and ‘What does the Other (the performance, the artist, the systems 
in which the performance occurs) desire from me?’ Awkwardness arises when 
the answers to these questions remain unclear or unfixed. It reminds us that 
we are complicit in the systems in which we participate and that our desires 
emerge through those systems.  This challenges discourses around the social 
turn in art and performance, such as Claire Bishop’s, that base their ethical 
arguments on a distinction between projects in which artists or participants 
can pursue their desires and those in which they have to acquiesce to the 
desires of others.  
                                                
4 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, ed. 
by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London and New York: 
Karnac, 1977), p. 235. 
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Secondly, awkwardness is great because it can signal a glitch, or a gap in the 
boundaries that we presume are framing and limiting our experiences. 
Awkwardness here emerges as a call for us to test these boundaries and 
confront our own role in sustaining them. Participatory performance that 
wields awkwardness in this way allows for participants to discover or even 
create new possibilities, areas, and experiences from within the performance. 
Participants do not do this by directly breaking the rules, but by acting 
awkwardly in response to the realisation that they are complicit in maintaining 
the rules. Hence the efficacy of awkward (i.e. disruptive, uncomfortable, 
difficult) situations in participatory performances is connected to the way that 
they can trigger potentially awkward (i.e. disruptive, uncomfortable, difficult) 
modes of participation. As a participant in Outside In I allowed Bjørn Venø to 
undress me, and then, in response to feeling awkward, removed myself from 
what appeared to be the framework of his performance and placed myself in 
the framework of Franko B’s (Chapter 1). This was not an act of destruction, 
but an act that revealed that Venø’s performance was more open to 
malleability and extension than its tone and aesthetics suggested. The extent 
to which a participatory performance is ‘open’ or ‘closed’, therefore, is not 
dependent on the level to which the artist signals his intentions of openness. 
Instead the extent of a project’s openness is revealed through the way it 
handles a participant’s unexpected or awkward responses.  
 
In Chapter 4 I demonstrated how David Hoyle’s performances could appear to 
be wildly antagonistic dictatorships in which audience participants and guests 
risk being brutally admonished. However, Hoyle’s commitment to spontaneity 
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and contradiction means that a participant’s response can undo and redirect 
the dominating tones and power structures of the performance. Of course, it 
can also work the other way, triggering a shift from a convivial sense of 
communality and democracy to a torrent of despotic outrage. The only way of 
knowing whether interaction will have an impact on Hoyle’s performance is to 
risk interacting, knowing that your mode of participation may fail 
embarrassingly or even lead to you being brutally rejected by Hoyle and his 
audience. Thus Hoyle’s enticement for us to test the boundaries of his 
performances and to reveal the extent to which they are open to participation 
is guided by his Antigonian ethics. We are prompted to follow Hoyle’s 
example of going too far, committing to an action or response that risks 
ending in exclusion and self-destruction.  
 
In Reactor’s awkwardly immersive extended role-plays, such as Total Ghaos 
and Big Lizard’s Big Idea, whole areas and threads of the project open up in 
response to participant’s decisions to test, push and rebel. The experience of 
visiting ‘Big Nurse’ in Total Ghaos is only available to those who are caught 
breaking the rules of the project. In BLBI a sense of paranoia might prompt 
participants to continually revisit, test, and question the project in order to find 
an unsavoury ideology, agenda or individual that rules over the project and 
benefits from our participation. Reactor cater for such investigative pursuits by 
preparing a myriad of different back-stories and allowing for a multitude of 
different paths to be taken through the project. Thus Reactor’s projects open 
up in response to participant’s awkward actions and interactions. Those who 
attempt to disrupt the project, or whose motivations for interacting are based 
  240 
upon questioning the motivations behind the projects, are rewarded. In 
situations in which participants only follow clearly signposted routes through 
the project, or who interact in the way they feel they are being told to, the 
projects remain reasonably closed.  
 
As is often the case in this thesis, to a certain extent a.a.s stand as the 
exception here. As discussed in Chapter 2, in projects such as Xe54, a radical 
openness to the contingencies of participation is clear from the moment a 
participant or collaborator enters. Openness is clearly signposted as an 
intention of the project. In fact their commitment to openness is so strong that 
much of the project’s actions and interactions are built around a resistance to 
closure or defining clear territories. In the case of Xe54 awkwardness arose 
partially as a result of AuntyNazi’s attempts to delimit the project and reduce 
its openness to contingency. In this sense the awkwardness was not 
efficacious in terms of signalling gaps or glitches that prompt participants to 
test boundaries, because a.a.s and their collaborators repeatedly undermine 
those boundaries themselves.  In this way Xe54 could be framed as the kind 
of project in which, as Claire Bishop observes, ‘the meaning of the work 
becomes so synonymous with the fact that its meaning is ‘open’ that it ends 
up foreclosing its open-endedness.5 I discussed this critique in Chapter 1. 
Following Bishop, it could be argued that a.a.s’ openness was foreclosed in 
the moments where they refused AuntyNazi’s demands for boundaries. In 
other words, a.a.s were open to anything but closure. However, AuntyNazi 
and our demands were never excluded from the project or shut down. Our 
                                                
5 Claire Bishop, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’, October, 110 
(Autumn 2004), 62, n. 30. 
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(failed) attempts to generate or expose rules, territories and definitive 
outcomes became part of the project, as did the awkwardness that arose as a 
consequence. This awkwardness had a significant impact on how the project 
developed, leading to ‘new, anxious, work that was outside anything either 
group usually produced’.6 Therefore, whilst, unlike the other projects I discuss, 
it would be superfluous to test the boundaries of Xe54, AuntyNazi’s awkward 
response to its lack of boundaries did have an important impact and led to the 
project developing in unexpected ways.  
 
This focus on awkwardness in relation to openness contributes to the 
discourses around the social turn in art and performance by highlighting its 
limited approaches to a project’s open or closed relationship to audience 
interactivity. These discourses focus on participatory performance and art 
projects that are clear about the extent to which participant’s actions can have 
an impact. This overlooks projects in which there is an ambiguity around how 
much impact a participant can have, or where the extent of the impact is 
contingent upon the individuals and actions involved at that particular 
moment. This focus on awkwardness in relation to clarity and assumption 
around a project’s openness also highlights a potential methodological 
problem of the discourses around the social turn in art and performance. 
Arguments are built around the ethics, efficacies and aesthetic value of a 
project based on identifying whether or not the project is open to the 
contingencies of audience participation. However, my dyspraxic 
                                                
6 Stuart Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’, in A thousand lines of flight – Anarchist 
Network Conference, Loughborough University, 3-5 September 2012 < 
http://stuarttait.com/writing/molecularpaper/> [accessed 5/12/2014]. 
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Collaborator/Performer-Participation-as-Research method has demonstrated 
that the extent to which a participatory project limits, absorbs or responds to 
different modes of interaction is often only discoverable from inside the project 
and in the moment of participation. This problematizes the lack of reference to 
participation–as-research in the discourses around the social turn in art and 
performance.  
 
Fourthly, awkwardness is great because it prompts us to escape from a 
situation whilst simultaneously holding us in it and reflecting on our complicity 
in its perpetuation. In this sense, awkwardness is what Sianne Ngai describes 
as an ‘ugly feeling’, a sensation that tends ‘to be diagnostic rather than 
strategic, and to be diagnostically concerned with states of inaction in 
particular’.7 When Christine Twite described her desire to ‘externalise’ her 
experience of being hugged by a stranger in Adrian Howell’s The Pleasure of 
Being: Washing, Feeding, Holding she alludes to this sense of simultaneous 
inaction and diagnosis.8 Twite was held, both physically and through the 
impeding affects of discomfort. Diagnosis of the situation (Twite’s focus on 
ascertaining the ‘artistic meaning behind the work’) arises through an attempt 
to break that hold.9 Whilst, in my experience of Venø’s performance, such 
discomfort prompted a physical action that revealed the malleable boundaries 
of his performance, in Howell’s it prompts us to remain held whilst re-
                                                
7 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London : 
Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 22. Emphasis Original.  
8 Christine Twite, ‘The One-on-One Festival at BAC’, Cultures of 
Spectatorship < 
https://culturesofspectatorship.wordpress.com/2011/04/07/the-one-on-one-
festival-at-bac> [accessed 20 August 2012]. 
9 Twite. 
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evaluating the ways in which desire manifests and flows in such intimate 
experiences.  As I implied after my lengthy engagement with psychoanalysis 
in Chapter 2, this means confronting the idea that, as participants, we may be 
the object of performer’s and other’s desires, but also that our own desires 
emerge from, and through that position.  
 
In each of the chapter’s that focus on a particular case study I identified 
awkward strategies and modes of being that allowed for this paradoxical, 
awkward position of being both immersed in a project and maintaining some 
critical distance from it. In Chapter 3 I discussed the way in which Herman 
Melville’s character Bartleby ‘prefers not to’ follow the demands put upon him 
in a particular situation, but also ‘prefers not to’ leave those situations. a.a.s 
take Bartleby-like position in relation to the places, contexts, and structures in 
which their projects take place. This includes the context of ‘participatory 
performance’, exemplified in their framing of their projects as collaborative 
and participatory whilst refusing to take significant steps towards increasing 
the numbers of participants. At times they were content to perform actions 
and rituals without anyone other than paid collaborators involved. Core 
member Stuart Tait is aware of the way a.a.s’ approach to participation is 
unusual, noting that in ‘most commentary about participatory art practice 
maximum success comes with maximum participation, in terms of numbers’.10 
Just as Hoyle’s Antigonian ethics encourages audience members to ‘go too 
far’ in their acts of intervention and participation, so a.a.s’ Bartleby-like refusal 
to actively encourage people to get involved can inspire their participants to 
                                                
10 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
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maintain an awkwardly inactive presence within the projects. a.a.s’ 
participants can become collaborators on a project such as Xe54 just by being 
present. They can ‘prefer not to’ engage in any of the interventions, rituals, or 
other activities whilst maintaining a role in the project. Thus, like Bartleby, they 
maintain an awkward position of both internal influence and external 
observation.  
 
In my discussion of Hoyle’s performance practice I referred to the way that 
audience members can be committed to Hoyle’s performance practice for 
many years but refuse to act affirmatively towards particular acts in particular 
performances. Audience members who return to Hoyle’s performances again 
and again maintain a role in affirming, and thus perpetuating an on-going 
Hoylian project. When such audience members actively and vocally withdraw 
from acting affirmatively towards a particular act that they find problematic, 
they are not withdrawing from their commitment to Hoyle’s on going practice. 
Again, a situation is created wherein a participant can be actively participating 
in a project whilst also withdrawing and reflecting on their role.  
 
In Reactor’s projects the paranoia that their slippery relationship to motivation, 
authorship, and membership can trigger inspires some participants to delve 
deeper and deeper into their projects. These participants commit to Reactor’s 
implicit encouragement and explicit requests for them to keep interacting, 
engaging in a multitude of different activities and repeatedly returning to a 
project over the course of several days. This commitment can be motivated by 
the desire to figure out what exactly is being committed to. Participants 
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become complicit in the perpetuation of the systems and structures Reactor 
devise through their investigations into those systems and structures. Again 
this exemplifies a position of simultaneous immersion and externalisation, 
diving deeper into a system of participation and interactivity whilst continually 
questioning that system and your role within it.  
 
Again, the contribution made to the discourses around the social turn in art 
and performance relates primarily to methodology. Each of the critical 
observations and arguments made by the theorists and critics that address 
the ethics, politics, and aesthetic of participatory art and performance emerge 
through a position of an outsider. Whether the writers have participated in 
these projects or not, their writing positions them as critical observes who 
maintain a distance from the projects they address. This perpetuates the idea 
that it is only possible to diagnose and critically respond to a situation from the 
outside. My thesis demonstrates that this is not the case, and that 
awkwardness plays a key role in triggering and facilitating diagnosis and 
critique from the inside.  
 
Fifthly, awkwardness is great, even when it emerges as a contingent result of 
particular individuals responding to particular situations.  a.a.s do not pursue 
awkwardness, but their approach does heighten the potential for it to be 
produced. In my experience, when such awkwardness does emerge it is 
embraced as material for the project and allowed to guide its development 
into something new. This connects a.a.s’ relationship to awkwardness to 
Hoyle’s and Reactor’s. Unlike Hoyle and Reactor, a.a.s do not strategically 
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trigger awkward situations. However, Hoyle, Reactor and a.a.s all embrace 
awkwardness once it occurs, allowing it to spread through the actions and 
interactions of their projects and impact upon the way performances and 
events unfold.  This means they also embrace individuals, like myself, who 
have an occasional awkward mode of being. My modes of interaction and my 
contributions are not overlooked or ignored because of a predetermined idea 
of relevancy and an instinctive urge to bypass or quell awkwardness. By 
dismissing or overlooking the awkwardness that can arise in any participatory 
performance or art project, the discourses around the social turn in art and 
performance (and the performances and projects they focus on) risk excluding 
those who might trigger such awkwardness.  
 
Sixthly, awkwardness in participatory performance is great because it is 
entwined with the overlapping experience of pleasures and anxiety in 
response to our affirmation of acts and causes we do not necessarily 
comfortably agree with. Affirming awkwardly means maintaining a critical 
relationship with these acts and causes whilst not disavowing our unavoidable 
role in their perpetuation. I have demonstrated the ways in which Hoyle 
immerses his audiences in a productively troubled menagerie of affirmation, 
allegiance, responsibility and complicity (Chapter 4).  They are coerced into 
participating in the perpetuation of a multi-faceted ‘cause’ that flickers 
ambiguously between a rampant and addictive experientialism, a relentless 
celebration of the marginalised and the excluded, and a ceaseless rage 
against the oppressively normative and the damagingly judgemental. 
Consequently, rampant ambiguity and contradiction emerge as causes 
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themselves, linking the ethics of Hoyle’s practice to a.a.s, whom stubbornly 
dedicate themselves to the cause of avoiding singular causes. For Reactor, 
participants determine the key cause of the project through the decisions they 
make as they interact and the conclusions they come to through their 
investigations.  
 
Approaches to ethics and politics in the discourses around the social turn in 
art and performance tend to focus on projects with a fixed relationship to a 
clearly defined cause. Santiago Sierra aims to expose problems around 
labour, delegation and immigration. WochenKlausur base each of their 
projects around an ameliorative response to a specific, concrete cause that 
relates to the location in which they are working. Other projects, such as 
Rirkrit Tiravanija’s relational installations, are not rooted in a cause, but act as 
open invitations to convivially interact around a loosely defined activity, such 
as eating. The projects I discuss each develop and maintain an awkward 
relationship with the idea of causes, producing a tension and ambiguity that is 
overlooked or dismissed in the discourses around the social turn in art and 
performance. 
 
Seventhly, awkwardness is great when it disrupts the dominating affective 
tones of a social situation. When Hoyle’s behaviour shifts abruptly from 
antagonism to conviviality, and vice versa (Chapter 4), he displays an 
awkward relationship with what Ngai describes as ‘tone’: ‘a feeling which is 
perceived rather than felt and whose very nonfeltness is perceived’.11 In 
                                                
11 Ngai, p. 76.  
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writings on the social turn in art and performance ‘conviviality’ and 
‘antagonism’ are often identified based on the perceptions of those outside of 
the artworks and performances addressed. Hoyle disrupts these perceptions 
and challenges their authority through awkward outbursts and shifts that 
remind us that within either convivial, or antagonistic set-ups individuals are 
experiencing a range of fluxing feelings. His outbursts illustrate the way in 
which the organization of social experiences around pre-determined ‘tones’ 
(i.e. conviviality or antagonism) excludes or represses any felt responses that 
are in tension with those tones.  
 
Reactor remind us that convivial relations with others are unavoidably 
‘complex and dirty’.12 Their awkward facilitation of neighbourly encounters 
confront us with the domesticating and diluting consequences of disavowing 
that complexity and dirt (Chapter 5). a.a.s are aware of the demands on artists 
to facilitate uncomplicated relations between collaborators and participants. 
Tait writes that: 
 
A project’s success is defined by its ability to build consensus and to 
produce a participatory community in the work, and host galleries want 
this to emerge smoothly and with minimum demands on them. This 
means artists are encouraged to confine themselves to convivial 
relationships that make few demands of their participants and remain 
within the parameters of what is comfortable for everyone.13 
 
 
In response to this, Tait implies his own position on the efficacy of 
awkwardness, arguing that: 
                                                
12 Mel Jordan, ‘Ivan’s Dogs, We Provide the Smiles: Interview with Mel 
Jordan,’ Reactor 2006-2011 (Reactor, 2012 [on DVD]). 
13 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
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[A]n art practice that stays within acceptable boundaries of what is 
comfortable, comprehensible and safe for its audience, participants or 
co-participants does not fulfill what for Félix Guattari is the main 
characteristic of art, that it be a technology for transformation.14 
 
For me, even a willfully antagonistic practice can become ‘comfortable, 
comprehensible and safe’ when participants understand that antagonism is 
intended and that any deviations from it are unintended and unwelcome. The 
awkwardness of a.a.s’, Hoyle’s, and Reactor’s projects often arises through 
an uncertainty around how participants should be affected by the project. It is 
unclear whether they should be feeling antagonized, entertained, befriended 
or provoked. This uncertainty is often generated by the temporary nature of 
any particular quality of interactivity.  
 
Shannon Jackson observes the problematic polarizations that Bishop relies 
on to build her critique of the social turn in art and performance. She names 
these as ‘1) social incorporation versus social antagonism; 2) legibility versus 
illegibility; 3) radically functional versus radically nonfunctional; 4) artistic 
heteronomy versus artistic autonomy’.15  Throughout my thesis I discuss the 
ways in which awkwardness arises as a consequence of these polarizations 
becoming blurred. In Chapter 1 I demonstrated that the dominant arguments 
around the ethics and aesthetics of participatory art and performance also 
                                                
14 Tait, ‘Molecular Collaboration’. 
15 Shannon Jackson, ‘Social Practice’, in ‘P-S’, Performance Research, 11:3, 
(2006) 87-126; ‘What is the “Social” in Social Practice?: comparing 
experiments in performance’ in The Cambridge Companion to Performance 
Studies, ed. by Tracy C. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008),136-150 (115). 
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often rely on a polarization of conviviality versus antagonism. This assumes 
that a participant or performer cannot or will not impact upon the convivial or 
antagonistic tone of a performance or artwork, shifting it to the other or 
contributing to a multiplicity or layering of differing experiences and affects. 
This is another oversight of the discourses around the social turn in art and 
performance that relates to awkwardness being overlooked. 
 
Finally, awkwardness is great because it reminds us of the potential fragility 
and fallibility of authoritative Others. In the conclusion of Chapter 3 I 
suggested that the awkwardness that might arise in response to a.a.s’ 
Bartleby-like withdrawal relates to the possibility that it emerges from a difficult 
subjective disposition. We might read Bartleby’s withdrawal as a strategic act 
of resistance when in fact it is a consequence of depression or an inability to 
comfortably contribute or interact with others. Similarly, David Hoyle’s 
frequent and open reference to his own struggles with mental health 
problematizes the framing of his self-destructive acts as an example of 
Antigonian ethics. When awkwardness arises in a Reactor project it could be 
a result of authority being handed over to someone who has only just joined 
the project as a participant, not a carefully manipulated scenario to instil 
paranoia. In Enjoy Your Symptoms! Slavoj Žižek describes a scene from 
Charlie Chaplin’s The Circus in which a ‘split’ is caused by a ‘mistaken 
gaze’:16 
 
                                                
16 Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptoms! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2008), p. 5. 
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[T]he tramp, on the run from the police, finds himself on a rope at the 
top of the circus tent; he starts to gesticulate wildly, trying to keep his 
balance, while the audience laughs and applauds, mistaking his 
desperate struggle for survival for a comedian’s virtuosity – the origin of 
comedy is to be sought precisely in such blindness, unawareness of 
the tragic reality of a situation.17 
 
 
When awkwardness occurs in participatory performance it has the potential to 
trigger the idea that participants are making a similar mistake, misreading an 
artist’s or performer’s struggle as a strategic attempt to be challenging. We 
are confronted with the possibility that those facilitating, guiding or triggering 
our interactions are struggling with an incapability or personal limitation. 
Reactor play with this idea when they construct fictional, farcical big Others 
(Big Lizard, Uncle Commi, The Green Man) that we are told are in charge of 
the project. Such awkwardness intervenes in our ability to continue confidently 
delegating responsibility for our participation onto the artist. Participants are 
confronted with the possibility that there is no guarantor for their actions and 
interactions. The ambiguity around whether awkwardness emerges through 
intentionality or incapability intervenes in participants understanding of the 
extent of their responsibilities – for themselves, for each other, and for the 
success of the performance or artwork that they are participating in. Here 
awkwardness not only confronts us with our complicity in a situation, but 
signals the potential that we might need to take charge, or that we may 
unwittingly already be in a position of authority.  
 
I end with this approach to awkwardness in relation to authority, capability and 
responsibility for two reasons. Firstly, because its contributions to the 
                                                
17 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptoms!, p. 17. 
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discourse around the social turn in art and performance exemplify the key 
challenges that this thesis makes overall in response to that discourse.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have identified blind spots that arises from reductive 
approaches to selecting and analysing participatory art and performance. 
Here this reductive approach entails the framing of a performance or artwork 
as being either authoritatively managed so that participants have few 
responsibilities, or loosely facilitated so that participants have many 
responsibilities. This overlooks the possibility that a participant’s sense of 
responsibility can be triggered by a breakdown of authority and management, 
of which awkwardness can be both an instigator and an outcome. It also risks 
overlooking or excluding participatory art and performance that is created and 
managed by individuals for whom there is a heightened risk of a personal 
struggle triggering such a breakdown. I, for example, might struggle to avoid a 
breakdown of management due to the difficulties I experience imposing order 
on activities as a result of my dyspraxia. This is another example of how the 
dismissal or overlooking of awkwardness might lead to the exclusion of 
individuals with awkward modes of being involving themselves in participatory 
art and performance.  
 
This reference to dyspraxia links to the second reason for ending with this 
discussion of awkwardness in relation to authority. In the final section of this 
thesis I challenge Bishop’s critique of participatory performance that does not 
adequately cater for secondary viewers. However, I also understand that my 
own descriptions of participatory performances act as links between 
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participatory performances and secondary viewers. For this reason I conclude 
this section by proposing that an ideal account of the efficacy of awkwardness 
should itself embrace ambiguities around authority, expertise and capability. 
Finally, returning to comments made in the preface to this thesis, I suggest 
that dysraxia might offer an ideal way to do that.  
 
Love Thy Secondary Viewer? No Thanks! 
 
I hope to have demonstrated that, the best way to experience and account for 
the efficacies of awkwardness in participatory art and performance 
summarised above, is to participate. These are not experiences to be 
perceived, diagnosed, and critiqued from outside the project, but require our 
immersion in them. This assertion goes against one of Bishop’s key 
arguments, which is that participatory performances should ensure they 
accommodate the ‘secondary’ viewer, who experiences the documentation of 
the project after the participation is over.18  
 
In Artificial Hells, Bishop describes the ‘pitfalls of so much participatory art, in 
which there is no space for critical reflection’.19 In fact, she sees the ‘central 
project’ of her book as being ‘to find ways of accounting for participatory art 
that focuses on the meaning of what it produces, rather than attending solely 
to process’.20 Following this, she insists upon the necessity of a ‘mediating 
object, concept, image or story’ as a ‘necessary link between the artist and a 
                                                
18 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 9. 
19 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 264. 
20 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 9. 
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secondary audience’.21  My concern is that this secondary mediation 
encourages, or even relies upon a de-cluttering of the participatory 
experience. It risks decontaminating interactivity of its awkwardness, or 
containing that awkwardness in a way that undoes its impact. As this thesis 
contains a series of accounts of awkward participatory performances that act 
as a mediation between my experiences and a secondary reader, I will use 
these final paragraphs to address the potential pitfalls of my own approach 
and suggest possible alternatives that will influence future projects.   
 
In the essay on neighbourly love that had a key role in chapter 5 of this thesis, 
Žižek describes a problematic, ‘pseudo-Freudian’ approach to accounting for 
our actions and experiences.22 This approach is exemplified by John Gray 
and his work on the Oprah Winfrey show:  
 
What he [Gray] proposes is that, after regressing to his primal 
traumatic scene and thus directly confronting it, the subject should, 
under the therapist’s guidance, “rewrite” this scene, this ultimate 
fantasmatic framework of his subjectivity, in a more “positive,” benign, 
and productive narrative.23 
 
The problems with this method of developing productive agency over our past 
are, I would argue, similar to the problem of becoming overly concerned about 
mediating participatory projects for secondary viewers. It is not an issue of 
being ‘untrue’ or of constructing an acceptable version of events that over-
                                                
21 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 9. 
22 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence’, 
in The Neighbor: Three Enquiries in Political Theology, Kenneth Reinhard, 
Eric L. Santner, and Slavoj Žižek (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), pp.134-190, (p. 136). 
23 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Neighbors’, p. 136. 
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write what ‘really went on’. It is that awkwardness risks being neatened out, 
contained, or, as is often the case in story-telling, reconstituted as comedy. 
This loss is described in Žižek’s own critique of Gray’s method: 
 
What disappears in this total availability of the past to its subsequent 
retroactive rewriting are not primarily the “hard facts,” but the Real 
traumatic encounter whose structuring role in the subject’s psychic 
economy forever resists its symbolic rewriting.24 
 
 
In his description of the Lacanian Objet Petit a Fink refers to a Real that 
‘remains, insists, and ex-sists after or despite symbolization’.25 This ‘Real after 
Symbolisation is written as “R2”’.26 For Žižek, pseudo-Freudian approaches, 
such as that exemplified by Gray, act to diminish, deny or exclude this ‘R2’ 
element. Following this, my own concern is that the mediation of participatory 
performance encouraged by Bishop might diminish, deny or exclude the 
awkwardness that could remain after or despite that mediation. 
 
Therefore I propose that any future attempts to mediate, repackage, or 
theorise an awkward participatory or collaborative experience should 
accommodate what I will call an ‘AWK2’, taking my lead from Lacan’s ‘R2’. 
‘AWK2’ is a trace or element of awkwardness that remains and insists after 
the process of documentation, mediation or theorisation of awkward 
situations. The dyspraxic C/PPaR approach I have taken throughout this 
thesis (see my Preface, and the ‘Methodology’ section in my Introduction) is 
related to this attempt to have a fidelity to the maintenance of this ‘AWK2’. I 
                                                
24 Žižek, ‘Neighbors’, p. 136.  
25 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance 
(New Jersey and West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 83. 
26 Fink, p. 27. 
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propose that if awkward participatory performance must be mediated for a 
secondary viewer (or reader), it should be done awkwardly.   
 
The aim of the embracing of ‘AWK2’ would be to propagate the kind of 
cacophony of responses to awkward participatory performance that Žižek 
observed after the 2011 UK riots in which we see  
 
[S]ociologists, intellectuals, and commentators trying to understand and 
to help. Trying desperately to translate the protests back into their 
familiar language, they only succeeded in obfuscating the key enigma 
the riots presented.27 
 
 
Thus I am not entirely disparaging of the shift from experiences of immersed 
participation to critically appreciable documentation. I am, however, 
suggesting that the experience of the ‘secondary audience’ should also be 
awkward. This would mean drawing them into an experience of ambiguity, 
disruption and difficulty that reflects the experiences described. Like the 
participants of an awkward participatory performance, they should be offered 
the opportunity of thinking through a situation from the inside. Thus such 
writing would aim to immerse the reader in awkwardness at the same time as 
inviting them to reflect on the efficacy of that awkwardness. 
 
In the last paragraphs of the previous section I argued that the efficacy of 
awkwardness could relate to an ambiguity around the capabilities and 
intentions of those in authority in a situation. I suggested that those with an 
awkward mode of being are particular adept at producing such ambiguity. 
                                                
27 Slavoj Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (London and New York: 
Verso, 2012), p. 54. 
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Thus, in order to pursue my aim of developing accounts of awkward 
participatory performance that are themselves awkward, committing to the 
maintenance of ‘AWK2’, I would offer the reader experiences of disruptions 
that would prompt them to question my own authority and capability. Such 
writing would aim to challenge the reader’s understanding of whether my style 
was intentionally performative or rooted in a personal limitation or dysfunction. 
This is why, in written projects on awkwardness that follow this one, I aim to 
experiment with allowing my dyspraxia to be less contained and disciplined 
than it is here. This will produce a series of haphazard accounts of 
awkwardness that maintain a fidelity to the idea of disrupting experiences of 
authority and imply that the responsibility for accounting for these awkward 
moments may lie as much with the reader as the writer.  This would reflect the 
experiences of responsibility triggered in participants involved in awkward 
participatory performance.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have insisted that awkwardness should not be 
overlooked or excluded because, firstly, it has particular efficacies, and 
secondly because such exclusions contribute to, or reinforce barriers to 
individuals with an awkward mode of being. Following this insistence, future 
written projects that demand that awkwardness be embraced and appreciated 
would embrace the awkward outcomes of my own awkward mode of being.  
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